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Need is a concept that carries intuitive appeal in moral decision-making. As it stands, 
need is relatively under-theorised, given its currency not just in philosophical 
argumentation but in news coverage, charitable appeals, and political practice. Need 
claims carry compelling normative force, and they are amenable to widespread support 
as our most basic needs are some of the things we most transparently share with our 
fellow human beings. However, how should we understand that normative force? Is 
need best understood to compel us as a matter of justice? 
I begin my account by considering the kind of need relevant to the project. I build from 
an understanding of need as a three-place relation, which is by its nature needing for a 
purpose. I suggest that morally important needs are those which aim at the objective 
interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings 
(‘non-arbitrary needs’). Further, I distinguish the existentially urgent subset of those 
non-arbitrary needs as ‘basic needs.’ 
Given this understanding, I consider how basic needs theory relates to its conceptual 
neighbours. I focus on capabilities as the nearest neighbours, but also comment on 
wants, interests, and rights. I judge that the theories developed by Martha Nussbaum 
(capabilities) and Len Doyal and Ian Gough (needs) benefit from a complementary 
reading, with each supplementing the other. I then draw from Amartya Sen’s early 
writings on capabilities to ultimately see capabilities and needs as two sides of the 
same coin. This helps to situate needs theory in relation to a mainstream branch of 
political theory more generally, and indicates that we can recognise the special 
significance of needs without eschewing other morally important categories. 
I then move to establish a scope of justice that allows us to distinguish between duties 
of justice and other moral duties. If we think that duties of beneficence are weak and 
optional, whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great deal rides on 
how we characterise our duties to the global poor. I offer a ‘moral enforceability’ 
account, claiming that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally 




Returning to need, I then ask how another’s need comes to give me a moral reason for 
action. I canvas a range of existing accounts, many of which furnish important insights. 
I then propose that it is the morally relevant capacities of the being in need which gives 
them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. We are morally 
required to answer this need with responsiveness, as a demonstration of appropriate 
respect for the sort of being that the human in need is. If this is right, we are morally 
required to be responsive to need, even if we are not always required to reduce it. 
Finally, I bring the diverse strands of the foregoing argument together to return to the 
relationship between need and justice. I consider what a duty of responsiveness might 
amount to in practice, and suggest that our duties of responsiveness are best thought 
of as collective duties, grounded in the capacity of the global well-off to contribute. 
Further, I argue that duties of responsiveness are a matter of justice, as they are the 
sort of duties that are, in principle, morally enforceable. A wide range of threats to the 
necessary conditions for human flourishing, and even human life, are on the horizon, 
and many of these are uniquely collective challenges. The seriousness of those 
challenges, and the extent to which we have treated our responsibilities to those in 
need as discretionary in the past, means collective action and problem solving are 






Need is a concept that carries intuitive appeal. In moral and political theory, although 
it is not always treated as a central or foundational concept, its currency is often called 
on when considering the “morality of the depths.”1 Basic needs reveal a line beneath 
which no one should be allowed to sink. Beyond theory, when faced with catastrophic 
disasters such as Hurricane Matthew in Haiti (2016) and the famine in Somalia (2017), 
media reports emphasised the severity and urgency of the situation by highlighting the 
number of people ‘in need’ and the basic and necessary nature of the goods needed.2 
Need also plays a justificatory role in distributive justice decision-making, both at the 
macro and micro-levels: funding decisions are defended as responding to the greatest 
need,3 and rationing of scarce medical resources is often justified on grounds of 
‘medical need.’4 
One reason needs carry this level of currency is that the most basic human needs are 
universal: we all need nutrition and hydration to survive. Need claims are amenable to 
widespread support, as our most basic needs are some of the things we most 
transparently share with our fellow human beings. However, need has received 
relatively little philosophical attention in comparison with concepts like freedom or 
rights. We often do take the need of others to give us reasons for action, but why should 
we do so? Why should the need of our fellow human beings move us? What gives 
need normative force? Further, we might wonder whether need is best understood to 
compel us as a matter of justice. How are need and justice related? 




1 Shue, 1980, p. 18. Here Henry Shue is defending basic rights as belonging to the morality 
of the depths, but his account of ‘subsistence rights’ aligns with what many theorists 
consider basic needs. See, for example: Decew, 1985. 
2 UN News Centre, 2016; Parry, 2017. 
3 Howden & Fotiadis, 2017. 
4 NHS Ambulance Services, 2015, para. 5. See also Eddie Chaloner’s analysis of the 
ongoing changes to the scope of ‘medical need’ as defined by the National Health Service in 
the UK (2013). 
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I begin this introduction by identifying the focus of the project, and several motivations 
which make it a worthwhile inquiry. I then point to the current state of need in moral 
and political theory, and defend the project’s aim of focusing on need-in-itself. I then 
address issues of terminology. The grammar of need is worth attending to as the 
subject of much philosophical study, and the language used to denote positions of 
disadvantage and destitution is contestable. I then provide a brief account of the 
methodological approach of this project, identifying some of the tools of analytic 
political theory which are employed throughout. Finally, I summarise the structure of 
the thesis. 
I. The Project 
I.i Focus and motivation 
The project is an attempt to offer the strongest possible account of the moral 
normativity of need. This does not include analysing the concept of need to determine 
what it already contains, or what we actually mean when we use it. Rather, it involves 
considering the reasons we can offer as defensible grounds for taking need to give us 
moral reason for action, and the kind of obligations that follow from these reasons for 
action. The inquiry centres on the following organising questions: 
• Why might someone being in need give us moral reason for action? 
• What kind of duties follow from the moral normativity of need, and are they 
best seen as duties of justice, or of some other moral domain? 
The strongest possible account will retain the practical merits that need is often taken 
to have as a concept – namely intuitive moral force and simplicity – and will also 
survive scrutiny and more robust interrogation. I use these considerations as a guide 
when evaluating existing accounts of need, and when offering my own.5 




5 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
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It might seem unnecessary to question the grounds of need’s moral normativity, given 
its obvious traction in moral and political theory, and in people’s justifications of their 
individual and public decision-making. On this point, there is relatively little 
disagreement: need claims are a regular feature of life as we currently know it, and 
their intelligibility and relevance is not limited to the confines of academe.6 We might 
think “the brute fact that a person is in serious need”7 offers compelling moral reason 
for action, and no further comment or investigation is needed. 
Of course, even if it were unanimously agreed that need is morally normative, it would 
still be of philosophical interest to question how and why it is normative. Further, need 
claims may be ubiquitous, but do all need claims share the same moral status? Need 
is used to make appeals for goods as various as clean water and high-speed internet 
connections; how far does the concept stretch? 
However, need is not universally acknowledged as morally normative: 
“A morality that holds need as a claim, holds emptiness – nonexistence – as its 
standard of value; it rewards an absence, a defect: weakness, inability, 
incompetence, suffering, disease, disaster, the lack, the flaw – the zero.”8 
“[Robin Hood] is the man who became the symbol of the idea that need, not 
achievement, is the source of rights, that we don’t have to produce, only to 
want, that the earned does not belong to us, but the unearned does. […] And 
this has brought us to a world where the more a man produces, the closer he 
comes to the loss of all his rights, until, if his ability is great enough, he 
becomes a rightless creature delivered as prey to any claimant – while in order 
to be placed above rights, above principles, above morality, placed where 
anything is permitted to him, even plunder and murder, all a man has to do is 
to be in need.”9 




6 For example: Reader & Brock, 2004; Hamilton, 2003; Doyal & Gough, 1991; Thomson, 
1987. 
7 Elazar, 2003, p. 5. 
8 Rand, 1996, p. 931. 
9 Rand, 1996, p. 532-533. 
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The writings of Ayn Rand offer many such scathing indictments of need’s role in 
morality,10 and her work continues to enjoy influence with many American elites, 
whose influence is, in turn, felt globally.11 Libertarians such as Jan Narveson and 
Robert Nozick offer more considered and rigorous challenges for the moral 
normativity of need, particularly that of strangers and non-compatriots.12 
I will not approach this inquiry as a direct response to Rand or to classical libertarians. 
In doing so, we risk allowing the terms and the scope of the discussion to be set when 
these may be the very sources of the challenge at hand. Rather, I point to Rand as an 
exemplar of persistent disagreement with the fundamental claim that need is 
normative. So long as such views hold influence in public arenas, the value of 
developing and refining needs theory is not solely philosophical. 
Developing a strong account of the kind of moral claims need makes on us, their 
relative strength, and whether they are an enforceable matter of justice or a 
discretionary matter of humanity or beneficence, is potentially illuminating for the 
application of the concept to public policy and the concrete challenges human society 
currently faces. Lichtenberg suggests that one reason there is a discrepancy between 
our belief that it is bad that so many people are in dire need, and our relative inaction 
in affluent states, is that we associate addressing such need with charity rather than 
justice.13 As she puts it, there is no ‘or else’: no threat of enforcement of such 
obligations either in terms of legal consequences or social disapproval. If this is right, 




10 I do not offer Rand as a serious philosophical challenger for needs theory, but rather as an 
author whose political views have resonated with generations of politicians.  
11 Two such elites include the current President and Secretary of State of the United States, 
Donald Trump and Rex Tillerson, respectively: see Hohmann, 2016. Also see Watkins 
(2012) on why Rand’s ongoing influence may be uniquely American. 
12 See Chapter 3 Section 2.2 where I identify problems with the libertarian distinction 
between justice and beneficence, and Chapter 6 Sections 3 and 4 where I address libertarian 
challenges for my view. 
13 Lichtenberg, 2004, p. 79-81. 
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demonstrating that such obligations are duties of justice, which are amenable to 
enforcement, is a contribution to giving such obligations teeth.14 
I.ii Need’s current role in moral and political theory 
In recent years, need has been recovered from a state of “philosophical disrepute,”15 
and subjected to “rehabilitation.”16 It was considered both too strong and too weak, 
allowing too many and too few things to be considered ‘needs.’ This challenge of 
specifying what we mean by need has been tackled by modern needs theorists, who 
have sought to defend a distinction between needs and wants which addresses this 
concern.17 
However, much of this focus has been dedicated to responding to challenges of 
specification, or to understanding the grammar of need. Most modern theorists have 
their own view on the normativity of need, but these are often cursory, with some 
claiming that need just is intrinsically normative.18 Others offer views which rely on 
prior acceptance of contested theoretical underpinnings such as Kantian19 or 
utilitarian20 theory – such positions are seemingly incompatible, but no sustained 
dialogue between theorists has been offered to defend the virtues of one over the other. 
This is particularly surprising, as need is often taken to be normative in moral and 




14 Following such reasoning, it is the actual development of enforcement mechanisms that 
will complete this process. Direct policy recommendations will not be the focus of this 
project, although I gesture towards concordant recommendations in Chapter 6. 
15 Daniels, 1981, p. 149.  
16 Hamilton, 2003, p. 9. Need is now enjoying a resurgence as indicated by a dedicated 
research colloquium and journal volume in 2005 (each entitled “The Philosophy of Need” 
and led by the Royal Institute of Philosophy), and several books dedicated to investigating 
need (Miller, 2012; Dean, 2010; Reader, 2007; Hamilton, 2003). 
17 I address this challenge in Chapter 1, where I provide an account of which needs can 
properly be said to be morally important. In addition, I argue there that the concept of need is 
not best thought of as exhausting all moral or political theory – need theory is best suited to a 
relatively urgent subset of the moral realm, and will therefore not accommodate all moral 
considerations. In one sense, this amounts to biting the bullet on the charge of 
acknowledging ‘too few’ needs. 
18 Reader & Brock, 2004. 
19 Miller, 2012, 2005; O’Neill, 1998. 
20 Braybrooke, 2005, 1987; Thomson, 2005, 1987. 
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political philosophical work. Need is not just a feature of everyday language and moral 
practice, but is also a regular feature in philosophical investigations – for example, in 
distributive justice theory and bioethics.21 It is therefore important that this resurgence 
of the concept of need, and moral and political theory more generally, be informed by 
a clearer picture of need’s moral normativity. 
I.iii Defending a focus on ‘need-in-itself’ 
I will now defend the chosen focus for this project: the moral normativity of need-in-
itself, aside from considerations of harm or exploitation. 
An account of the moral normativity of need offers us one way of understanding duties 
which we hold to those in need. For example, it provides one way of approaching 
responsibilities to take action on global poverty or the refugee crisis. It does so by 
noting the uncontroversial fact and extent of need, the extent of current capacity to 
respond to need, and the kind of duties which need gives us to respond. However, other 
ways of approaching such challenges are available. Rather than focusing on need and 
the reasons it gives us for action, we might instead focus on ‘harm,’ for example.22 
Harm-based approaches attempt to establish the more controversial fact that global 
poverty is harmful, or stems from historical harms, and from this fact reason that we 
have stringent duties to both stop harming and to make reparation. I describe the 
empirical claim as ‘more controversial’ because even when need is extreme and 
beyond reasonable contestation, this does not necessarily establish that harm has taken 
place. On the most familiar understandings of harm, it is an inherently comparative 
concept, wherein the victim of harm is made worse off.23 In practice, this means that 




21 Horne, 2016; Page, 2011; Hope et al., 2010; Daniels, 2007; Wild, 2005; Grey, 1976. 
22 Note that there are other approaches beyond those focused on either need or harm – for 
example, those focusing on exploitation or unjust power relations (Overland, 2013; 
Anderson, 1999; Wertheimer, 1996). Each of these views provides one important piece of 
the puzzle, and any exhaustive account of our obligations to the global poor would be 
incomplete if it excluded any one source of such obligations. I also consider more closely 
related views (interests, capabilities, and rights) in Chapter 2. 
23 Roberts, 2015, section 2.4. Perhaps the most influential view of this kind in recent years is 
Thomas Pogge’s (2002). 
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we must therefore have some way of determining that the victim is worse off than they 
would have been, worse off than they were before, or worse off by some other 
comparative measure. In the case of global poverty, this involves empirical claims that 
are either contestable or speculative.24 Such problems have led some theorists 
defending stringent duties to consider adopting a non-comparative view of harm.25 
However, this too has its challenges, not the least of which is defending the non-
comparative view of harm as still meaningfully addressing the same concept which we 
usually associate with harm (i.e. the comparative concept). 
This is not to dismiss harm-based accounts of stringent duties, but rather to point to 
some of the challenges they face. Need-based accounts of stringent duties simply face 
different challenges. Harm-based accounts must establish that we have harmed those 
in need (or some subset of them), and who precisely we have harmed. This relies on 
comparatively contested empirical claims, but once this is achieved, it is difficult to 
deny a moral duty to respond.26 By comparison, need-based accounts rely on 
comparatively uncontested empirical claims, but face the difficulty of showing that 
need-in-itself is a reason for action, or face demandingness concerns due to their 
broader reach. For those who are unconvinced by harm-based accounts, need-based 
accounts offer an alternative which rests on solid ground, empirically.27 Even for those 
who are moved by harm-based or alternative views, I consider focusing on need-in-
itself – that is, need, regardless of whether harm or exploitation or other arguments 
apply – to be complementary rather than competitive. If the argument for responding 
to need-in-itself goes through, it provides another way of defending stringent duties.28 




24 Pavel, 2014; Hayward, 2008; Risse, 2005. 
25 For example: Harman, 2004; Shiffrin, 1999. 
26 Comparative harm-based accounts are subject to the non-identity problem, which many 
theorists have found compelling. A range of responses to the challenge have been offered, so 
it unlikely to be a decisive factor in the balance between harm and need-based accounts. See: 
Parfit, 1987, p. 352-379. 
27 Lichtenberg, 2004, p. 79. 
28 This being said, it is imperative that if we are focusing on need-in-itself, we do not 
presume that capacity to take action to respond to need is magicked out of thin air, or based 
solely in our own virtuous hard work. Where capacity to help stems from unjustly allocated 
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A challenge that might be levelled against such a need-based approach is that it is not 
sufficiently political.29 This concern comes in two forms: first, by focusing on need-
in-itself, aside from questions of harm or exploitation, we risk oversimplifying the 
complexity of the moral landscape. Second, that focusing on need-in-itself abstracts 
us from the very spheres in which needs are formed and reified. 
On the first reading, the challenge is clear. As I have suggested, a need-based view 
should be seen as complementary to other accounts of stringent duties, such as those 
focused on harm. However, if these understandings contribute something valuable to 
our moral understanding, should they not be included in any view? Here, the first 
response must be that not every case of someone in need is necessarily a case of 
someone having been harmed or exploited. If harm and exploitation exhausted the 
range of human need, it might still have been the case that need-in-itself offered 
another way of thinking of our moral obligations, but as harm and exploitation do not 
exhaust the range of human need, there will inevitably be some cases where such 
accounts fall silent. Further, where there is dispute over empirical premises or 
disagreement over whether harm or exploitation truly have taken place, if the need-
based argument is successful, it specifies obligations we have, regardless of harm and 
exploitation, which should be honoured even while the arbitration over harm and 
exploitation continues. 
On the second reading, the challenge is somewhat more elusive. Lawrence Hamilton 
suggests that politics necessarily involves collective choice, whose outcome will 
inevitably involve some degree of coercion. As we shall see, the view I will defend 
does ultimately mandate collective choice and action, with morally enforceable 
demands of justice that will often call for coercion.30 However, a significant difference 




historical benefits and harms, such as the rapid progress colonial nations achieved by their 
use of slave labour, obligations of need must be augmented or supplemented with historical 
obligations. (On what this might look like, see Berkey (2017) and Thompson (2000).) This is 
what I mean when I say that the various approaches are complementary. 
29 Hamilton, 2003, p. 14-15. 
30 See Chapter 3 on the scope of justice as defined by moral enforceability, and Chapter 6 on 
the necessity of coercion for co-ordinated collective action on the scale required to address 
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between Hamilton’s account and my own, as well as other leading theorists whom he 
describes as apolitical, is that he does not accept a categorical distinction between 
needs and wants.31 Rather, he develops a typology of need which includes felt needs 
(that is, needs that are subjectively or intersubjectively experienced by an individual 
or group) and seeks to tell a story of the causal determinants of such needs. I suggest 
that these are ultimately two very distinct projects.32 Describing the process of (felt) 
need generation and reification, and tracing its causal underpinnings, is assuredly 
political. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the value of inquiry into the moral 
normativity of objective need. Indeed, even Hamilton includes a category of need, 
‘vital needs,’ which he describes as “general goals in the form of conditions for 
minimal human functioning.”33 So even on Hamilton’s account, there are some 
minimal objective needs whose existence cannot be accounted for by political 
processes and whose normativity will require a different kind of explanation. 
Relative to the entire field of moral and political theory, my focus is quite narrow. I do 
not claim that need is the only, or even the most important, source of moral 
normativity. This means that need claims do not provide a complete picture of moral 
claims more generally, and morality contains other features. Further, I do not claim 
that addressing need is sufficient for meeting obligations of justice, even of a minimal 




human need. Each of these proposals is grounded on an objective understanding of need as 
developed in Chapter 1. 
31 See Chapters 1 and 2 for my own distinction between needs and wants. 
32 Similarly, I do not look to Karl Marx and the aphorism “from each according to their 
abilities, to each according to their needs” when sketching out our need-based obligations in 
Chapters 5 and 6 (p. 17.). Marx envisioned this principle’s implementation in the second 
phase of communism, once moral and political culture would no longer be coloured by 
bourgeois principles, and there would be enough material abundance to support not just the 
most basic, but the higher flourishing needs of all. As such, it aims at a more high-level, 
comprehensive view of political morality than the basic needs approach I will be concerned 
with. See Gilabert (2015) for a contemporary reinterpretation of the socialist principle. 
The Marxian notion of a “species being” (1959, p. 31) has been of more direct influence for 
my view on non-arbitrary need. However, I avoid developing a substantive account of non-
basic need so that any preferred theory will work with my understanding of basic needs: see 
Chapter 1. 
33 2003, p. 23. Hamilton maintains that these “are experienced both as felt drives and general 
goals,” [emphasis added] but the absence of the subjective experience of need does not 
change its reality as a condition for minimal human functioning. 
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sort. This means that even minimal justice requires more than attention to need. 
However, on the view I defend, the need of others gives us moral reasons to respond 
and such reasons are best viewed as a matter of justice. Need is not exhaustive of the 
moral landscape, but it is an important part of it.34 
II. Terminology 
The lexicon of need has been of particular interest to theorists, with distinctions and 
associated definitions often demarcating subtle differences with significant 
consequences for the resultant theory.35 I will comment now on the grammar of need 
and the differences in tone and focus between ‘need,’ ‘needs,’ and ‘needing.’ 
Contemporary moral and political philosophical accounts of need tend to approach it 
from the vantage point of ‘needs.’ Needs are seen here as necessary conditions to 
morally important ends. This tends to focus attention on the things that satisfy needs – 
such as hydration or shelter – and to offering lists of needs (for example, health needs) 
and need-satisfiers. Perhaps the most famous treatment of needs is psychologist 
Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, wherein needs are seen as drives or 
motivational forces.36 The hierarchical structure is intended to indicate the usual 
chronology of human motivation, with people moving from physiological needs, 
safety needs, belongingness and love needs, and esteem needs, ultimately to the need 
for self-actualisation, in that order, as each prior need is met.37 Although Maslow’s 
theory is subject to challenges on its own merit, the primary reason it is unsuited to the 
inquiry at hand is that it is, as the title of his seminal paper indicates, “a theory of 




34 See Chapter 2 on how need is related to nearby concepts such as capabilities and rights. 
35 For example, ‘vital needs’ often represent a more circumscribed domain of interest 
focused on biological necessities for survival, whereas ‘basic needs’ are defined more 
variously, with some limiting them along the lines of vital needs, and others including a wide 
range of higher-level critical thinking and liberationist capacities (on the latter, see Doyal & 
Gough, 1991, p. 187-190). In Chapter 1, I arbitrate between some of the leading 
philosophical distinctions. 
36 Maslow, 1943. 
37 Mathes, 1981. 
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human motivation.”38 Maslow’s hierarchy is a theory not of what people should be 
motivated to do, or the needs which we should consider morally important, but of what 
people are actually motivated by. Henceforth, I will exclusively refer to needs in terms 
of necessary conditions. 
In comparison to ‘needs,’ ‘need’ is more commonly used to indicate something more 
abstract. For example, need might be contrasted against desert, reciprocity, or other 
distributive norms, and in this context it stands for entitlement grounded in relatively 
ahistorical considerations, such as current (or potential) well-being. 
By focusing on needing, we shift attention to the entity which is in need, as there is 
some thing or someone doing the needing. Needing speaks to the more 
phenomenological experience of need, as it denotes “a state or condition of 
dependency.”39 Being in need is often associated with a sense of lack, as with a person 
who is hungry and in need of sustenance, but lacks food. However, this association is 
potentially misleading; we are quite capable of needing that which we currently have, 
and needs (unlike wants) do not disappear entirely when they are met.40 Even after the 
hungry person obtains food, they continue to need sustenance. It is perhaps more 
helpful to think of the hungry person as having an occurrent need, or a need which is 
presently unmet.41 This still amounts to a lack, but it makes clear that only when we 
are in occurrent need is need necessarily associated with a lack. This distinction is 
important as it brings to the fore the recognition that when we speak of needing beings, 
in an important sense this includes all human beings and not only those whose needs 
are chronically unmet. Those with the means to meet their needs are still ‘needy,’ or 
needing beings. Those who find themselves currently without (or systematically 
deprived of) said means are no more inherently needy than anyone else, but are in a 
state of occurrent need. It is this occurrent need which has such weight and moral pull. 




38 Maslow, 1943. 
39 Wiggins & Dermen, 1987, p. 63. 
40 Hamilton, 2003, p. 52. 
41 Reader, 2007, p. 71. 
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This allusion to the needy presents an opportunity to pause and consider the language 
used to refer to people with unmet needs. I will, at times, reflect on the implications of 
my theory of need’s moral normativity for global challenges such as systemic poverty. 
Addressing such topics requires that I describe individuals and groups who are in 
urgent and serious need, and those with the capacity to act to respond to that need. 
Further, it will at times require that I refer to geographic regions or states where people 
are facing comparatively urgent or serious levels of need, and regions or states where 
the situation is comparatively less dire. It behoves any theorist faced with such a task 
to be reflective about their choice of language in this domain, as both a moral 
requirement of the dignity due to those whose lives and circumstances we cannot 
presume to understand, and as a pedagogical virtue, given that the language we use to 
refer to subjects and situations shapes our understanding of them. 
I have chosen to favour ‘in need’ over ‘the needy,’ as there are particularly undesirable 
connotations of victimhood and condescending pity associated with speaking of the 
needy. For this reason, I also avoid using the term ‘victim’ unless I am describing a 
situation in which someone has an obvious claim or entitlement, and where it is 
important to stress the sense of injustice. At times, when I refer not immediately to 
need but to a person or group’s dire financial or material position, I use the term ‘poor’ 
or ‘global poor.’ These terms are problematic for similar reasons to the term ‘needy,’ 
but I have not found a better way to refer to such a financial or material position. When 
I refer to a person or group’s comparative position, I use terms such as ‘the affluent,’ 
‘the worst-off,’ or refer to those with capacity to take responsive action. 
When referring to regions or states, I use various terms such as ‘wealthy/poor’ and 
‘developing/developed.’ These terms are necessarily imprecise and mask differences 
in the dimensions of wealth and development. However, as I observed at the individual 
or group-level, I have not found a better way to refer to these important differences 




I will now offer a brief comment on the methodology I employ in conducting this 
inquiry: analytic philosophy.42  
I take it that the aim of such inquiry is “providing [a] better understanding of the 
requirements of morality.”43 My approach to this task is fairly problem-focused. It 
begins with the perception of a problem, challenge, or puzzle: in this case, an 
influential line of thought challenges the notion of need’s normativity, particularly for 
non-compatriots. This runs counter to the deep-seated intuitions of many (including 
myself), and also stands in contrast to the reality that people are motivated by need 
when making or justifying moral and political decisions.44 In order to investigate the 
grounds of need’s intuitive and observed normativity in moral practice, I begin by 
examining the arguments others have offered, both for and against. Do these 
arguments require us to abandon other moral principles which we are comparatively 
confident in? Do they have undesirable outcomes when taken to their logical 
conclusions? Do they adhere with nearby intuitions, and provide a meaningful measure 
of action guidance? By means of this kind of investigation, we come to better 
understand the problem we first outlined, and we put ourselves in a position to offer 
the strongest argument possible, as it will be one that has the opportunity to learn from 
the virtues and pitfalls of foregoing accounts. 
In taking this approach I, like those before me, stand on the shoulders of foregoing 
theorists. It is therefore important that any technical or specialist terminology is used 
consistently, or is flagged as departing from previous approaches. This is particularly 
important in a field with such a plethora of distinctions as needs theory, where it might 




42 I do not offer a full defence or description of this methodology, but I consider that Daniel 
McDermott (2008) offers a promising defence in his “Analytical Political Philosophy,” and 
Christian List and Laura Valentini’s (2016) “Methodology of Political Theory” offers a 
helpful breakdown of the methods, limits, and challenges of (analytical, normative) political 
theory. 
43 McDermott, 2008, p. 13. 
44 See Chapter 5 Section 2 for examples of need’s normativity in practice. 
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be easy for theorists to unknowingly be talking past each other. It would be unhelpful 
to talk about need’s normativity before considering what I and others have meant by 
need, and how need relates to nearby concepts (Chapters 1-2).45 Similarly, before 
defending an account of need-based duties of justice, I must establish what I take it to 
mean for a duty to be a duty of justice (Chapter 3). This being said, the regress of 
explanation and defence should not be infinite. Like any specialised field, analytical 
moral and political theory46 benefits from a division of labour. Most obviously, it relies 
on meta-ethical presumptions such as whether there are any moral facts, but it also 
relies on epistemological and meta-philosophical assumptions about how we should 
think, learn, and reason.47 
This approach also appeals to intuitions – not as a form of reified moral knowledge, 
but rather as one possible way of testing the arguments we make, questioning how they 
would adhere or conflict with nearby intuitions.48 One way of triggering and 
sharpening such intuitions is the thought experiment, wherein we can isolate and adjust 
the contextual factors of a given situation to test the contours of our intuitions. This 
process may lead us to abandon some of our intuitions, or to adjust our moral 
arguments or principles. Such investigation is iterative, and although I offer here a 
fixed snapshot of this project, the very practice of academic analytic philosophy (and 
indeed academic research more generally) is in some ways a macrocosm of such an 
approach. 
Another tool I make use of, and one that is perhaps not as regularly in use in analytic 
moral theory, is empirical evidence. Use of up-to-date statistics to understand the 




45 List & Valentini, 2016, p. 9. 
46 I take the terms moral or political ‘theory’ and moral or political ‘philosophy’ to be 
interchangeable. 
47 McDermott, 2008, p. 16. It is likely that the assumptions involved in this division of 
labour are sometimes the source of first-order normative disagreements, and my defence of 
this division of labour should not be taken to suggest that examining the relation between 
first-order normative theory and meta-ethics, epistemology, or other branches of philosophy 
is never worthwhile or illuminating. 
48 List & Valentini, 2016, p. 8. 
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moral and political problems which applied theory faces is relatively uncontroversial, 
and in places I do this to get a sense of the extent of human need as it stands today.49 
However, I also engage with social psychological research at times, in order to 
understand and address challenges of psychological plausibility. If the very idea of 
need being normative across borders, for example, is deemed by its detractors to be 
too psychologically challenging or implausible, one way of defending against this 
charge is to demonstrate that people do (and therefore, can) sometimes take need to be 
normative in this way, in practice. Even here, we must be wary not to interpret the 
bounds of the possible in line with current practice, but empirical evidence does offer 
one possible strategy in such cases.50 Further, moral and social psychology can guide 
our strategies to organise, cooperate, and structure challenges so that we can meet 
moral demands in ways that are both effective and relatively psychologically 
comfortable. If such synergy is successful, it may help to allay concerns about 
demandingness.51 
IV. Thesis Summary 
Having set up the motivation and the aim of the project, and commented on the 
language and methodology used, I will now summarise the structure of the thesis. 
I begin my account by considering the kind of need relevant to the project. Chapter 1 
builds from an understanding of need as a three-place relation (‘X needs Y in order to 
Z’), which is “by its nature needing for a purpose.”52 I distinguish needs from wants, 
suggesting that morally important needs are those which aim at the objective interests 
that all people have, in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings (‘non-




49 This will necessarily be fallible and approximate information, due to the challenges and 
limitations of data collection and analysis of this kind. However, if we use the best 
information available to us, it is far better to use fallible and approximate information than it 
is to proceed on presumption. 
50 List & Valentini, 2016, p. 2. 
51 Importantly, empirical evidence is not used to dictate that what people actually do or think 
is what they should do or think. 
52 Wiggins, 1987, p. 7. 
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arbitrary needs’). Further, I distinguish the existentially urgent subset of those non-
arbitrary needs as ‘basic needs.’ 
Given this understanding, Chapter 2 considers how basic needs theory relates to its 
conceptual neighbours, with particular attention to capabilities. I judge that the theories 
developed by Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and Len Doyal and Ian Gough (needs) 
benefit from a complementary reading, with each supplementing the other where 
challenges or conceptual gaps are apparent. However, this mutual reliance is a 
contingent feature of those two particular theories, and I draw from Amartya Sen’s 
early writings on capabilities and my own needs theory to ultimately see needs and 
capabilities as two sides of the same coin. Each offers a distinctive perspective and 
focus for well-being and entitlement. This helps to situate needs theory in relation to a 
mainstream branch of justice theory more generally, and indicates that we can 
recognise the special significance of needs without eschewing other morally important 
categories. I also comment on the relation between needs and wants, interests, and 
rights. I argue that needs are not irreducible, but that they play an important role in 
moral and political theory. Need is a concept we should not do without. 
I then move, in Chapter 3, to establish a scope of justice that allows us to distinguish 
between duties of justice and other moral duties. If we think that duties of beneficence 
are weak and optional, whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great 
deal rides on how we characterise our duties to the global poor. After considering some 
of the prevalent views on this distinction, I offer a ‘moral enforceability’ account, 
claiming that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable.  
Returning to need, I then ask how and in what way another’s need comes to give me a 
moral reason for action. Chapter 4 canvases a range of existing views from within 
needs theory, many of which furnish important insights. However, each suffers from 
significant challenges, and several rely on contested theoretical frameworks (such as 
acceptance of a Kantian or utilitarian moral theory), leaving them unsatisfying. In 
Chapter 5, I propose that it is the morally relevant capacities of the being in need which 
gives them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. We are morally 
required to answer this need with responsiveness, as a demonstration of appropriate 
respect for the sort of being that the human in need is. The human condition is seen to 
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be inherently vulnerable, and an account of what it means to be responsive to need 
(versus to meet need) is developed. If this is right, we are morally required to be 
responsive to need, even if we are not always required to reduce it. 
Finally, Chapter 6 brings the diverse strands of the foregoing argument together to 
return to the relationship between need and justice. I reflect on what a duty of 
responsiveness might amount to in practice, and suggest that our duties of 
responsiveness are best thought of as collective duties, grounded in the capacity of the 
global well-off to contribute. Further, I argue that duties of responsiveness are indeed 
a matter of justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally 
enforceable. A wide range of threats to the necessary conditions for human flourishing, 
and even human life, are on the horizon, and many of these are uniquely collective 
challenges. The seriousness of these challenges, and the extent to which we have 
treated our responsibilities to those in need as discretionary in the past, means 
collective action and problem solving are called for when there are no easy answers. 
If this argument is successful, we have morally enforceable duties of responsiveness 
to those in need, on the grounds of their morally relevant capacities, and our shared 
human vulnerability. In the Conclusion, I comment on some of the ways that this 
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Chapter 1: Needs and Their Ends 
1. Introduction 
A wide range of binary distinctions have been applied to the concept of need, in order 
to better understand what are perceived to be different kinds of need, or to determine 
when need is morally important.53 The most important of these distinctions is that 
between needs and wants, or desires – it distinguishes the need theorist from the desire 
satisfaction theorist, and produces significantly different grounds of moral importance. 
In this chapter, I seek to clarify what I mean by need. I begin by considering the 
standard account of need and its components: the three-part relation, ‘X needs Y in 
order to Z.’ In recent years, this previously uncontentious view has come under 
scrutiny. I will argue that the standard account survives this scrutiny, albeit with a 
minor adjustment for linguistic clarity. 
I then address the challenge of providing an account of morally important needs which 
distinguishes them from wants. I consider two leading views: David Wiggins’ 
unforsakeable, quasi-categorical needs,54 and Soran Reader and Gillian Brock’s non-
contingent need.55 I suggest that both views employ language which, at times, implies 
a degree of mind-dependence which is undesirable, and probably unintentional. In 
their stead, I provide an account of morally important non-arbitrary need, grounded in 
objective interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua 
human beings. Further, I distinguish an existentially urgent subset of such needs, 
which I define as basic needs, using Henry Shue’s understanding of basic rights.56 
Here I defend my decision not to include a list of basic needs; however, I gesture 
toward some likely candidates, and defend the inclusion of one less obvious candidate 




53 Hartley Dean identifies 17 binaries, including: absolute/relative, objective/subjective, 
basic/higher, positive/negative, intrinsic/procedural, and true/false (2010). 
54 2005, p. 29-31; 1987, p. 7-13. 
55 Reader & Brock, 2004. 
56 Shue, 1980. 
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(social inclusion). I also address two potential challenges for the view: epistemic 
elitism, and the relativity of even basic need. 
Finally, I turn to a more general challenge for the need theorist: the problem of scope. 
It has been suggested that even the most compelling understandings of need will only 
get us so far.57 While our most urgent biological needs are perhaps the most intuitively 
powerful, these cannot be elaborated enough to give us a full complement of human 
rights or a theory of justice. I will accept this view, and defend a picture of need on 
which they are highly important to moral and political theory, but not exhaustive of 
the realm of morality or justice. 
2. The Standard Account 
Most prominent analytical need theorists agree on a three-part understanding of need 
claims.58 On this understanding, need is “by its nature needing for a purpose.”59 
X needs Y in order to Z. 
(Where X represents an entity – in this context, a human being – and Y 
represents a necessary condition to the end Z obtaining.)60 
This means that whenever the word ‘need’ is appropriately used, we should be able to 
identify three things: the entity that needs, the necessary condition to the need being 
satisfied, and the end that the need is directed towards. The end (or Z-term) of a need 
may be implicit, as in ‘I need a break,’ but the suppressed term can be gleaned from 
the context (perhaps ‘in order to maintain my sanity’), or otherwise determined 
through questioning or consideration. An everyday example might be: 
I need to take the train to get to the airport. 




57 Schuppert, 2011. 
58 This three-part relation bears notable similarities to Gerald MacCallum’s characterisation 
of freedom (1967, p. 314). 
59 Wiggins, 1987, p. 7 [emphasis added]. 
60 Thomson, 2005, p. 177; Brock, 1998, p. 1; Doyal & Gough, 1991, p. 39. 
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Here, need identifies a necessary condition for obtaining a goal or fulfilling a desire, 
namely the desire to get to the airport. Wiggins formalizes this kind of need claim as: 
“Necessarily [as of now, in present circumstances], unless I take the train, I 
will not get to the airport.”61 
Notice that, on this understanding, there is at least one sense in which all need claims 
are instrumental. That is: they are all directed towards an end obtaining, and even 
where no such end is explicitly stated, it would not be incoherent to ask ‘for what?’ 
However, this three-part understanding of need has recently been subjected to 
increased scrutiny,62 and I will now consider two challenges: that it is ambiguous 
between instrumental and absolute need, and that it is less instructive than an 
alternative.63 Ultimately, I adjust the language of the relation slightly for clarity, but 
otherwise argue that it escapes these challenges unscathed. 
2.1 Instrumental versus absolute need 
I suggested above that there is at least one sense in which all needs are instrumental: 
they are all directed, or for a purpose. However, Stephen McLeod has challenged this 
view, arguing that on the best way of understanding need, some needs are absolute. 
Instrumentalism: all needs are instrumental 
Absolutism: there are both instrumental and absolute needs, with neither 
being a species of, or reducible to, the other64 




61 Wiggins, 2005, p. 29-30. 
62 Fletcher, Forthcoming 2018; McLeod, 2015; Hamilton, 2003. 
63 I will not respond to Lawrence Hamilton’s critique of the three-part relation of need 
(2003). His critique is aimed more broadly at what he describes as the rights-preferences 
couple (the predominant political framework for contemporary politics, on which rights set a 
legal structure, within which preferences are given free reign), and he does not accept a 
strong distinction between needs and wants. Further, Hamilton is interested in not only the 
normative, but the causal properties of needs. As I suggested in the Introduction Section I, 
his goals for needs theory are quite distinct from my own and those of the other theorists I 
entertain here. 
64 McLeod, 2015, p. 4 [original emphasis removed]. 
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He claims that those who defend an instrumentalist view of need are faced with a 
dilemma: either they are committed to the view that needs are ontologically dependent 
on the existence of a mind, or their view collapses into that of the absolutist. 
One possible reason for McLeod thinking that instrumentalists face this dilemma 
might be the very real ambiguity in the language of needs theorists. The range of binary 
distinctions advocated at times masks agreement, and at other times sharp difference. 
He identifies some theorists as instrumentalists, and it is true that such theorists also 
often use language suggesting their view of need is mind-dependent.65 For example: 
“Needs are means to ends: a subject always needs something for some 
purpose.”66 
“If there is no goal to have a need for,” then there is “no need.”67 
However, I suggest that the mind-dependent view of need and the instrumentalist view 
of need are in fact distinct, and the instrumentalist is not committed to mind-
dependence. 
Crucially, McLeod allows that “the contention that everything that is needed is needed 
for something is consistent with absolutism.”68 Further, “absolutism does not deny that 
all needs are related to outcomes.”69 What he contends is not consistent with 
absolutism is that needs are dependent on ends, goals, or purposes. He considers that 
ends, goals, or purposes characteristically belong to agents, and so the instrumentalist, 
who he takes to be committed to needs directed towards ends, goals, or purposes, is 
committed to needs being dependent for their very existence on their being the end, 
goal, or purpose of an agent. However, I have referred to ‘needing for a purpose’ or 
need ‘directed towards an end’ in the sense of need that is directed towards an end 
state. When need is used in this way, it is still instrumental in the sense that it is 




65 As we shall see in the following section, language implying mind-dependence will 
complicate our understanding of morally important needs as well. 
66 Plant, Lesser, & Taylor-Gooby, 1980, p. 244. 
67 Liss, 1993, p. 45. 
68 2015, p. 11 [emphasis original]. 
69 2015, p. 6-7 [emphasis original]. 
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directed, and we can always ask what a need aims towards, but it is not mind-
dependent. For example, on this view it is not incoherent to say: 
This car needs oil. 
A car cannot have a goal of its own, but this need is implicitly directed, perhaps, to the 
end state of the car running smoothly. On McLeod’s understanding of instrumentalism, 
my account has collapsed into absolutism, but notice that the sense in which I 
suggested all need is instrumental has not changed.70 
I judge that McLeod’s challenge is a response to ambiguous language used by needs 
theorists which seems to imply mind-dependence, but is not genuinely intended to do 
so. I therefore endorse adjusting the language of the three-part relation for clarity: 
X needs Y in order that Z. 
On this version of the relation, it is, I hope, clear that Z refers to an end state that is 
mind-independent, and that the need is instrumental to the obtaining of that end state. 
2.2 Standards of necessity versus end states 
Having addressed a concern that the standard account is ambiguous as to its mind-
dependence, I now address the concern that it is ambiguous as to the standard of 
necessity it employs. 
Guy Fletcher argues that, although the three-part relation is coherent, it fails to 
distinguish between the range of standards of necessity a need claim might implicitly 
refer to.71 He suggests that instead, we should understand need claims as modal claims 
“about what is true in all worlds in which some kind of necessity is adhered to and 
some state of affairs obtains.”72 For example: 




70 McLeod’s understanding of the instrumental/absolute distinction might be closer to my 
understanding of the objective/subjective distinction identified in Section 3.3. 
71 Forthcoming 2018. 
72 Forthcoming 2018, p. 13-14. 
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(a) Blatter needs to be punished. 
(b) Blatter needs a corkscrew to open that wine. 
Each can be analysed in terms of ‘X needs Y in order that Z,’ but this will not 
illuminate the kind of necessity involved in each. If, instead, we attend to the modality 
of the claim, we discover that in this example, (a) is a claim of moral necessity, 
whereas (b) is a claim of instrumental necessity. 
In one sense, Fletcher is right: his modal analysis focuses attention on quite what we 
mean by ‘necessity,’ and the reality that in both ordinary and philosophical usage, need 
claims employ a range of standards including instrumental, moral, and prudential 
necessity. However, I suggest that it is a mistake to think that this illuminates the 
substantive concerns that moral and political philosophers have been preoccupied 
with. Rather, debate tends to have focused on the Z-term, or the state of affairs. 
Drawing attention to the standard of necessity is enlightening as an analysis of what a 
particular claim means by ‘needs to,’ for example, but it is silent as to the grounds of 
the need claim’s moral importance (if any): the state of affairs it is directed towards. 
Although Fletcher’s modal analysis of need is insightful, it is best seen as 
complementary to the standard three-place account. 
In the next section, I shift attention to the grounds of need claims, and question when 
needs are morally important, and distinct from wants. 
3. Morally Important Needs73 
In the previous section, I defended an (in at least one sense) instrumental 
understanding of need claims, of the structure ‘X needs Y in order that Z.’ However, 
any coherent need claim may be formulated such that it fits this three-part relation, so 
we have not yet identified any category or type of need which is morally important. 
Needing to take the train to get to the airport looks like a different kind of need to 




73 I have adopted this phrasing from Reader and Brock’s subtitle “The concept of a morally 
important need” (2005, p. 252). 
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needing food and water in order to survive, although at first glance they appear to have 
a similar structure. To make sense of this distinction, theorists generally focus on 
providing a universally valuable end that our morally important needs are directed 
towards. The candidates for such ends include: life (or survival), avoidance of (serious) 
harm, agency, and flourishing. 
Before considering proposals, it is worth reflecting on what features we might hope 
the candidates will offer. For example, needs are often taken to denote a uniquely 
urgent or serious subset of moral concerns. Schuppert suggests that an important 
desideratum for any theory of morally important need should be that it can make sense 
of the existential urgency that makes needs so morally compelling: “basic needs are 
absolutely necessary, not only for achieving an end [Z], but also for [X], the needing 
being, as such, existentially.”74  
In addition, I propose that any candidate should ideally offer a view of morally 
important need that is as linguistically precise as possible. This is a pragmatic rather 
than a substantive concern, but it stems from the suspicion that imprecision has been 
at the root of much seeming disagreement between needs theorists.75 Therefore, it is 
desirable that the terms we use to describe morally important need be as clear as 
possible, and not employed in an obscure technical sense which clouds their meaning. 
I now canvas two leading treatments of morally important need, before offering my 
own. 
3.1 Quasi-categorical needs and unforsakeable ends 
Wiggins offers an influential view of morally important need that employs a loosely 
Kantian view of categorical needs, which aim at unforsakeable ends. He understands 
‘avoidance of serious harm’ to be the most suited to needs talk and the role of need 
claims in moral philosophy. Using the example of ‘I need £200 to buy that suit,’ he 




74 Schuppert, 2011, p. 5. 
75 An example of such disagreement is McLeod’s challenge in Section 2.1. 
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suggests that for a need claim like this to be morally important, we must demonstrate 
that I “cannot get on without that suit, that [my] life will be blighted without it, or some 
such.”76 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern moral philosophy”77 plays a key role in Wiggins’ 
treatment of morally important need. Although her paper also has broader aspirations, 
Wiggins employs her reasoning to argue that some types of needs are not simply 
instrumental, but more “serious, [and] putatively quasi-categorical”78: 
“To say that [an animate creature] needs [such and such] environment is not to 
say, for example, that you want it to have that environment, but that it won’t 
flourish unless it has it.”79 
Adding to instrumental needs, if something is necessary to an “indispensable or 
unforsakeable” end, Wiggins contends we arrive at a quasi-categorical need of the 
following structure: 
“Necessarily at t (if x (which is unforsakeable) is to be, then …)”80 
It is worth pausing to consider what Wiggins means by quasi-categorical. He shifts 
between the qualified “quasi” and full “categorical” in his 2005 paper, and in his earlier 
book on the topic he sticks to an “absolute [and] categorical”81 characterization. In a 
footnote in his 2005 paper he explains that he means “categorical in a sense that 
contrasts with hypothetical.”82 Of further confusion is a later footnote where he refers 
to the “quasi-Kantian sense [of] hypothetical” and the “quasi-Kantian sense [of] 
categorical.”83 I am unsure what quasi- would mean in this context, aside from a blurry 




76 Wiggins, 1998, p. 9 [emphasis original]. 
77 Anscombe, 1958. 
78 Wiggins, 2005, p. 29. 
79 Wiggins, 2005, p. 29; Anscombe, 1958, p. 6. 
80 Wiggins, 2005, p. 30. 
81 Wiggins, 1987, p. 10. 
82 Wiggins, 2005, footnote 6. 
83 Wiggins, 2005, footnote 9. 
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version of the stricter Kantian terminology. Accordingly, I will hesitantly interpret 
Wiggins on a standard Kantian understanding of the terms. 
Briefly, hypothetical imperatives tell us what to do to achieve some particular goal, 
much like instrumental needs capture what is necessary to meet some particular goal. 
Recall the above example about taking the train to get to the airport: if I do not want 
to get to the airport, I do not need to take the train. In this example, the imperative rests 
on your desire or preference to get to the airport. Categorical imperatives, on the other 
hand, apply to us irrespective of our desires. For example, whether or not you want to 
be honest, you must not lie. 
“Unlike ‘desire’ or ‘want’ then, ‘need’ is not evidently an intentional verb. 
What I need depends not on thought or the workings of my mind (or not only 
on these) but on the way the world is.”84 
In the Kantian sense, such imperatives are necessary for rationality: no matter what 
your desires, violating such imperatives is irrational. A categorical need, then, is a need 
that has normative force irrespective of your desire. 
The picture is further complicated by Wiggins’ explication of categorical needs. For 
him, categorical needs are those which are instrumental to an unforsakeable end. 
Unforsakeable carries an empirical connotation – it sounds like a factual question 
whether or not there are some things we cannot forsake, which it seems will depend 
heavily on the workings of the mind. 
Perhaps an example will help illustrate this point. Let us take the simplest candidate 
for a universally valuable end grounding all morally important needs: ‘survival.’ What 
would it mean for survival to be unforsakeable? I suspect we need to say at least that, 
as a matter of fact, no one has forsaken survival as an end. (If people have forsaken it, 
it is forsakeable.) We might further be committed to saying that it is conceptually 
unforsakeable. And yet, martyrdom and suicide seem to be two cases where people 




84 Wiggins, 1987, p. 7. 
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have, as a matter of fact, forsaken survival as an end. How can Wiggins respond to this 
counterexample? 
One answer might be to admit that survival has in fact been forsaken, but add that it 
was forsaken for some other unforsakeable end. This fits particularly nicely in the case 
of martyrs, who have died for some other valuable end such as religious freedom. If 
this allows all unforsakeable ends to be forsaken for other unforsakeable ends, using 
the word ‘unforsakeable’ is no longer appropriate. Instead, we may end up saying that 
if survival has been forsaken, it must not be (one of) the truly unforsakeable end(s). If 
counterexamples like suicide appear likely for the other prevailing candidates 
(avoidance of harm, agency, and flourishing), then we can dismiss this account until 
we find an unforsakeable end with no available counterexamples. 
Another response might be that Wiggins did not mean unforsakeable in the common-
sense way, to suggest that it can never be forsaken, but in some more nuanced or 
technical sense wherein even if you have prioritised some other valued end over 
survival, you could never forsake the end of survival. In some way, you stay true to it 
even as you commit suicide. While this might be so, it relinquishes the normative, 
action-guiding nature of unforsakeable ends, and would make it difficult to distinguish 
between ends that are and are not forsakeable. 
Relatedly, one might argue that it only appears that you have forsaken survival; 
actually, committing suicide is either an expression of, or at least consistent with, the 
end of survival. I suspect that this response ultimately collapses into forsaking survival 
for some other valuable end. For example, I may kill myself as an expression of my 
commitment to survival of the species (say, if I am infected with a dangerous and 
contagious disease), but the survival of the species is a distinct end to my own survival. 
Lastly, we might lean on the categorical nature of our needs for unforsakeable ends, 
and admit that while survival has in fact been forsaken, I have forgotten that such needs 
might be rationally categorical, and need not be unforsakeable in an empirical sense. 
If this is right, we should understand unforsakeable to mean ‘rationally unforsakeable,’ 
and simply accept that some people have, as a matter of fact, irrationally forsaken 
unforsakeable ends. Now we can answer that in any case where a person has forsaken 
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their survival, as in the case of martyrdom and suicide, they have acted irrationally. 
While this is not altogether outlandish, I consider it a counterintuitive response. For 
example, martyrs for causes that themselves appear to be valuable ends are not 
obviously rationally faulty. This option is also unattractive, as it ties Wiggins’ basic 
needs to a fairly demanding account of rationality. 
If we continue with the ‘rationally categorical’ interpretation of Wiggins, perhaps it 
will take on a better light if applied to his chosen specification of an unforsakeable 
end: avoidance of serious harm. Unfortunately, it seems that ‘avoidance of serious 
harm’ will suffer from similar counterintuitive results in the case of extreme sacrifice. 
Those who undertake extreme sacrifices, which substantially blight their lives, for 
causes that themselves appear to be valuable ends are not obviously rationally faulty. 
Wiggins does not provide any further detail on what he means by harm, but it seems 
that the best prospect we have for escaping this predicament is to suggest a highly 
counterintuitive and gerrymandered view of harm. It would need to establish that, even 
though the sacrificer’s life is blighted and they experience extreme suffering and 
destitution, they are not harmed or made worse off than they were, because of the value 
their sacrifice for their cause has (for their life). Such a view of harm would make it 
difficult to determine whether any given need claim is in fact morally important, as it 
would be challenging to determine whether any particular case of apparent need is 
actually likely to generate all-things-considered harm. 
Where does this leave Wiggins’ account of morally important needs? I suspect that if 
our simplest valuable end contender, ‘survival,’ is not unforsakeable, and Wiggins’ 
suggested ‘avoidance of serious harm’ falls at similar hurdles, our chances of finding 
another such end are slim.85 So unless we are to understand ‘categorical’ and 
‘unforsakeable’ in some more obscure technical sense, we should keep looking. 




85 I also suspect that Garrett Thomson’s “inescapable” fundamental needs will face similar 
problems, as he claims that “what one needs, one cannot forgo” (2005, p. 177).  
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3.2 Non-contingent needs and non-contingent aims 
Reader and Brock describe morally important needs somewhat differently, and 
Schuppert follows suit by adopting their terminology.86 Morally uninteresting needs 
are those which are contingent – that is, “required for contingent ends, which the 
needing being might or might not have.”87 So far, this maps onto Wiggins’ 
instrumental needs. However, morally important needs are those that are non-
contingent, or “necessary conditions for non-contingent aims that the needing being 
could not but have (like life).”88 Further: 
“The mark of the moral importance of non-contingent needs in ethics is that 
the needing being simply cannot go on unless its need is met. It is no 
exaggeration to say that in a state of non-contingent need, the very existence 
of the needing being as we know it is at stake.”89 
On Reader and Brock’s account, then, non-contingent needs are by their nature also 
existentially urgent. They add that every moral agent must, as such, take themselves 
to be obligated to meet non-contingent needs.90 These needs are pro tanto and 
defeasible by other considerations: 
“The moral agent may be obliged to ignore the pressure to meet one non-
contingent need, and obliged to respond instead to a different moral norm (the 
pressure to meet a more urgent non-contingent need, say) or to a non-moral 
norm (the pressure to complete an important scientific experiment, say).”91 
It seems from this discussion that non-contingent needs can only be defeated by other 
non-contingent needs in the moral sphere, and not by less important moral 




86 At times, Schuppert also adds “inescapable,” drawing from Thomson. For example, 
“because of X’s inescapable necessity for A, basic needs of this kind are of seemingly 
unique moral force…” (2011, p. 5). Insofar as this relies on an empirical claim that there are 
some ends that are in fact inescapable, or a claim that there are some ends that are rationally 
inescapable, Schuppert would face similar problems to Wiggins. Nonetheless, his account 
does not need to rely on inescapability, even if that is what he means by inescapable. 
87 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 252. 
88 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 252. 
89 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 252. 
90 See Chapter 4 Section 2 for more on the ‘intrinsic normativity’ account of the moral 
normativity of need. 
91 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 253-254. 
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considerations like ‘the value of keeping promises.’ Schuppert assigns the meeting of 
non-contingent needs absolute priority in social justice over other moral considerations 
of a non-existential nature, such as free social agency. 
While non-contingent needs appear to be the moral trump card, Reader and Brock are 
careful to explain that the moral force of these needs is “hypothetical, in the sense that 
it depends on something contingent.”92 Needs only oblige you if you choose to take 
part in moral practice. You might choose not to, and thereby release yourself from 
responding to non-contingent needs. I think we can understand this in two ways. 
First, Reader and Brock might mean that by opting out of morality, you not only opt 
out of your obligations to meet non-contingent needs, but you may also opt out of “the 
non-contingent aims that the needing being could not but have (like life).” On this 
reading, “non-contingent” just means “contingent-on-being-moral.” However, the 
kinds of non-contingent aims we are considering, like survival, do not seem to be tied 
to moral practice in that way. My goal of ‘survival’ looks equally forsakeable (or 
unforsakeable) no matter my interest in living a moral life. Perhaps it is even more 
likely that I will take my survival to be an ultimate end if I am not tied to moral practice 
and concerned with the needs of others. 
Alternatively, we could understand Reader and Brock to say that by opting out of 
morality, you only opt out of your obligations to meet the non-contingent needs of 
others. You will still necessarily have the non-contingent aims that a needing being 
could not but have. 
It is puzzling to me to think that there is some set of universal aims that we cannot get 
rid of, and have no control over. This requires that people, in fact, continue to have 
these aims even when they think they have antagonistic ones. To illustrate, imagine a 
fervent believer in the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement named Claire. 93 Claire 
thinks that people are bad for the Earth’s ecology. She develops a sense of guilt about 




92 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 254 
93 See: http://www.vhemt.org. 
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the damage continued human existence causes (including her own survival), and 
comes to associate any human survival with such negative ecological effects. She 
decides that she would rather kill herself than be a part of the destruction of the Earth’s 
biosphere. It seems strange to say that even as Claire ends her life, she continues to 
have the aim of survival. Granted, seemingly strange things are not necessarily untrue, 
but I think we can describe what is happening in a more convincing way. I do think 
that there is something to the intuition that Claire cannot get rid of her survival needs; 
even once she has chosen to end her life, if she is desperately thirsty, we might still 
think she needs water. However, I do not think the best way of understanding the things 
that Claire cannot get rid of is through talk of non-contingent aims. 
Crucially, I suspect that the concern here is again one of language. As we saw in 
Section 2.1, talk of ‘aims’ carries a connotation of mind-dependence. ‘Aims’ are 
particularly challenging to interpret in a mind-independent way when referring to the 
choices of a moral agent. I consider that my suggestion in the following section will 
be concordant with a mind-independent reading of Reader and Brock, but will employ 
relevant terminology in a way that is less ambiguous. 
3.3 Non-arbitrary needs and objective interests 
It is indisputable that we all share a small set of basic things that we each need to 
survive. Of course, the particular kind of nutrition, or the amount of it varies from 
person to person, but every human being needs nutrition and hydration in order to live, 
no matter what they believe or value. I consider this to be as close to an objective fact 
about human beings as we can hope for. Further, such facts about what it is to be a 
human being are useful to understanding what is good for a human being as such, or 
what is objectively in their interest. For example, human beings cannot thrive if they 
are chronically malnourished – malnourishment means they will be more likely to 
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become ill or die young, and are more vulnerable to oppression from those with the 
resources to meet their needs.94 
These observations are not new, nor are they radical. However, I suggest that they give 
us a strong ground on which to understand need, and when it is morally important. I 
propose that we understand morally important needs as ‘non-arbitrary.’ Non-arbitrary 
needs are those which are universal to all human beings, and “not subject to individual 
determination.” 95 Arbitrary needs, then, are those which are given by our particular 
subjective aims, goals, and interests. Non-arbitrary needs aim at objective interests that 
all people have, in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human beings, no matter 
what subjective aims we have. This speaks to the intuition that we cannot get rid of 
our survival needs, whether or not we have forsaken them. 
Notice that this distinction rests on a further distinction between objective and 
subjective interests. I take my use of these terms to be in line with standard usage in 
well-being theory, but to be clear, I mean ‘objective’ in the sense identified by Thomas 
Scanlon: 
“By an objective criterion I mean a criterion that provides a basis for appraisal 
of a person’s level of well-being which is independent of that person’s 
tastes.”96 
An example of a non-arbitrary need might plausibly be ‘the need for companionship.’ 
Although the form this need takes will be different for different people, social relations 
and friendship of some kind are good for human beings, as such. By contrast, ‘the need 
to read mystery novels before bed’ is an arbitrary need, as it is given (if at all) by a 
person’s individual psychological make-up. It may well be a necessary condition for 




94 For more on the unique vulnerability of having unmet basic needs, see Chapter 5 Section 
3.3. 
95 Non-arbitrary. In Vocabulary.com. Retrieved from: 
http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/nonarbitrary. 
96 Scanlon, 1975, p. 658 [emphasis original]. 
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sleep for a particular person, but it is the need to sleep itself which is non-arbitrary, 
not the necessary means to sleep. 
I do not claim that subjective interests can never have any kind of moral importance. 
Indeed, in some circumstances we may have good moral reason to prioritise a person’s 
subjective desires over their objective interests qua human being.97 I have already 
offered the example of martyrs, and those who undertake sacrifices which are 
detrimental to their well-being as a human being, and I think this is the best way of 
understanding those cases.98 The claim here is that such moral importance is not best 
understood in terms of morally important need. The objective/subjective distinction 
helps us to understand the distinction between needs and wants/preferences/desires. 
We can expect that there will often be overlap between needs and wants, in that what 
is good for someone as a human being will often also feature in their motivations. This 
is the grounding insight that Maslow’s hierarchy of need captures, and this is the idea 
behind seeing needs as psychological drives more generally. However, needs will not 
always translate into wants, nor will our needs always necessarily be apparent to us. A 
familiar example might be nutrient deficiency: if I do not know the signs of iron 
deficiency, I may not realise that my fatigue and shortness of breath are signs of this 
deficiency, and I may experience no desire whatsoever to increase my intake of iron. 
This does not change the fact that it would be good for me if I were to increase my 
intake of iron. 
I must say more to get at the most compelling subset of non-arbitrary needs. It might 
be that a wide range of goods are necessary for supreme human flourishing, with 
possible candidates including goods like friendship and self-respect. However, only a 
select few of these interests carry existential urgency. To continue to exist, and to exist 




97 Frankfurt, 1998, p. 20. 
98 It might be objected that, while it is morally straightforward for the would-be martyr 
herself to prioritise her subjective goal over her objective interest in survival, it is less clear 
that facilitating her martyrdom is morally acceptable for third parties. I think this is right – it 
is less clear, but it still seems to me that, perhaps depending on the cause of her martyrdom, 
a third party might be warranted in facilitating the would-be martyr’s goals. 
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as an agent in some minimal sense, is a precondition to any other objective interests 
being realised. Unsurprisingly, then, the existentially urgent subset of our non-
arbitrary needs are the basic needs that are so often central to needs theory. 
My understanding of ‘basic-ness’ is informed by Shue’s analysis of basic rights: 
“Why should anything be so important? The reason is that rights are basic in 
the sense used here only if enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of 
all other rights. This is what is distinctive about a basic right.”99 
A basic need, then, is essential to the enjoyment of all other non-arbitrary needs. When 
such needs go unmet, we risk our lives, and our most basic agential capacities for 
choice. We lack the necessary conditions for meaningfully securing any non-basic 
needs.100 
Even our basic needs are defeasible. They can be outweighed by other basic needs that 
are more urgent, or by non-arbitrary needs or preferences that are of greater subjective 
importance. However, we must have good reason to deprioritise needs of this kind.101 
I leave the possibility open that we might be morally justified in granting subjective 
interests priority over our basic needs, and so do not assign basic needs any absolute 
moral priority. A tragic example might be that of a malnourished parent who, despite 
their own dire need for nutrition, gives a measure of their share of food to their child 
to give them a better chance of survival.102 




99 Shue, 1980, p. 19 [emphasis added]. 
100 Notice that this understanding of a basic need will rely on a threshold for determining 
whether a given occurrent need is existentially urgent. For example, I need hydration in 
order to survive, but I am currently sitting at a desk with a large glass of clean water at my 
disposal. By contrast, if I go mountaineering without any form of hydration, this basic need 
may develop occurrent existential urgency. The need continues to be basic even when it is 
currently satisfied, but when it becomes an occurrent need that is existentially urgent at that 
time, we can meaningfully say that my basic needs are unmet. This avoids the 
counterintuitive alternative that I have unmet basic needs any time I am a bit thirsty. 
101 In Chapters 5 and (especially) 6 I examine in more detail the kind and strength of moral 
claims that basic need makes of us.  
102 We might plausibly think that this example is not as apt as that of the martyr, as the 
relation between a parent and child is best understood in terms of non-arbitrary need rather 
than subjective preference. Even if this is so, the idea here is that the parent literally risks 
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I do not offer a fixed list of basic needs, although I have already gestured at some of 
the plausible candidates, such as need for hydration, nutrition, and shelter. Many 
theorists who do offer lists agree on such archetypal basic needs, but I suspect that 
empirical evidence and refinement of our understanding of human needs and needs 
theory continue to hold potential for expansion and change of such lists. Like theorists 
such as Hamilton and Amartya Sen, I worry that to offer a list of basic needs would 
“entrench a single moment in a dynamic process.”103 However, I will here defend the 
inclusion of a human need which we may not associate with existential urgency, but 
we should: social inclusion. 
Kimberley Brownlee has argued persuasively that, as human beings, we have a deep 
need to seek out the company of our fellow humans:104 
“Our social needs include basic, non-contingent needs for decent contact, 
inclusion, association and interdependent care – in short social connections – 
without which we could not lead human lives. Our social needs also include 
social contribution needs since social contribution goes as much to the heart of 
what it means to be human as social access does.”105  
In an earlier paper, Brownlee was hesitant to accord such a need unqualified basic 
status on Shue’s understanding of the term, as she considered that many other things 
that are good for human beings, as such, are not dependent on social inclusion, such 
as breathable air.106 However, recent empirical research suggests that social inclusion 




ceasing to exist, which would preclude any securing of their non-arbitrary need for the 
parent-child relation. Thus, they have deprioritised their own non-arbitrary need in an 
attempt to promote their deep desire for their child’s survival. 
103 Hamilton, 2003, p. 12; Sen, 2005. Sen defends his decision not to follow Martha 
Nussbaum’s direction in listing central capabilities: “The problem is not with listing 
important capabilities, but with insisting on one pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, 
chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning. To have such 
a fixed list, emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public 
participation on what should be included and why” (p. 158). 
1042016; 2013. 
105 2016, p. 55. Brownlee here uses Reader and Brock’s understanding of non-contingent 
needs. 
106 2013, p. 214. Note that Brownlee is here concerned with a right against social 
deprivation, but the concern she raises also stands in the case of need. 
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is indeed existentially urgent, and to be deprived of it beyond a certain threshold 
increases risk of premature mortality: that is, for the most deprived, social deprivation 
is a matter of life or death. 
Social exclusion has been linked to suicide and premature death due to coronary heart 
disease, violence, accidents, or substance abuse, particularly in males in young and 
middle-age groups.107 Researchers investigating the social determinants of health have 
developed measures of social deprivation (such as the proportion of separated, 
divorced, or widowed people, and the proportion of persons living alone)108 which 
have been linked to premature mortality across populations, due to diverse causes such 
as cancer and circulatory diseases.109 In a Canadian study, the effect of social 
deprivation on premature mortality was as much as doubled for rural populations.110 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, skin-to-skin contact between preterm infants and 
parents has been shown to reduce mortality, severe illness, infection, and length of 
hospital stays in both developing countries and high-income countries.111 Such 
findings suggest that we should take a basic, non-arbitrary need for social inclusion 
seriously, and that, although it manifests itself differently in different populations and 
age groups, it is a need that we all share as humans. 
It is worth noting that Reader and Brock’s account of non-contingent need is 
potentially consistent with my own, in a loose sense. Arbitrary needs map onto 
contingent needs relatively unproblematically (and Wiggins’ instrumental needs, for 
that matter). On the most likely reading, both accounts also attempt to describe the 




107 Möller-Leimkühler, 2003. 
108 Measures of social deprivation are often relativised to the particular population being 
studied. These indicators would not necessarily be applicable across cultural or geographic 
populations, as other measures of social deprivation may be more relevant in other contexts. 
109 Saint-Jacques et al., 2014; Santana, 2002; Rose, 2000. 
110 Saint-Jacques et al., 2014. 
111 Jefferies, 2012. Skin-to-skin contact (also known as ‘kangaroo care’) provides a range of 
benefits, such as improved temperature regulation and sleep organisation, which may not be 
best understood directly in terms of social inclusion, but skin-to-skin contact remains 
superior to mimicking such effects using intensive care unit technologies, despite the 
comparative precision and control of such technologies.  
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things which are good for people no matter what they think. However, I am able to 
avoid saying that people can have aims they cannot get rid of by saying that they have 
objective interests qua human beings that they cannot get rid of. I may not have a 
subjective aim that I should flourish as a human being, but that does not change the 
fact that it would be good for me, as a human being, to have enough hydration that I 
can survive. Further, Reader and Brock tie non-contingent needs to existential urgency 
directly, possibly in an attempt to establish normative force from the get-go. However, 
it is unlikely that non-contingent aims are coextensive with existentially urgent aims, 
unless we think that there are only very few, survival-relevant, things that are good for 
us as people. I do not tie non-arbitrariness to existential urgency, so I am able to make 
sense of a broader range of needs that are less urgent and uncontroversial (like 
friendship and self-respect), but still appear to be universal to human beings, as such. 
I will now consider two potential objections to my account of non-arbitrary need 
grounded in objective interests. The first is the charge of epistemic elitism, and the 
second relates to the emergence of new medical technologies as indicating a relativity 
at the heart of even basic need. 
As a view of well-being which has an objective component (i.e. grounding non-
arbitrary need in objective interests), my view is open to the charge that it depends on 
epistemic elitism.112 The idea here is that it is counterintuitive for well-being to be 
judged by objective standards which ignore the individual’s point of view of their own 
life, and what it means for that life to go well.113 How could ‘experts’ claim to know 
better than I can what is good for me and for my life? I suspect this concern is among 
the reasons Sen is hesitant to proffer a central capabilities list from on high, so to speak, 
and the concern must be taken seriously. I have defended a very narrow understanding 
of basic needs, and the most archetypal of these is unlikely to be the source of such 
concern. It does not require expertise to recognise the necessity of hydration and 




112 Badhwar, 2014, p. 24-25. 
113 Note that this concern is often related to the concern of paternalism, where there is 
intervention against the will of the person concerned, on the grounds of their own well-
being. I do not engage with this concern here as I have not advocated for such intervention. 
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shelter for survival, for example. Rather, I suspect this challenge will be strongest 
when it is used to motivate an expansion of our understanding of basic-ness and 
existential urgency, or to challenge liminal cases. Two considerations may mitigate 
the seriousness of this concern: the morally defeasible nature of even basic needs, and 
the distinction between needs and their satisfiers. 
First, on the view I defend, objective interests do not (necessarily) have exclusive reign 
over human well-being. I have allowed that subjective preferences may be prioritised 
over even our basic needs in some cases, although I have cautioned that we must have 
weighty reasons for ignoring basic needs altogether. What it means for a life to go well 
for a particular person is accorded moral weight on this view, but so too is what it 
means for a life to go well qua human being. 
Second, although empirical evidence from experts is important on this view for 
determining which needs are basic (as demonstrated by the argument I offered for a 
basic need to social inclusion), the satisfiers of any basic need will always need to be 
relativised to the particular person and context. Expert evidence may clarify the impact 
of social exclusion on the average middle-aged man in a certain demographic, for 
example, but it cannot dictate the benefits or drawbacks of participation in a 
community outreach project for any individual man. 
The second objection observes that, as new medical technologies emerge, it seems to 
make sense to understand those with serious medical conditions as having a basic need 
for such technologies. Does the emergence of such interventions create new human 
needs? If so, are needs not then relative to the context the needing being finds 
themselves in? Here again the response must be to distinguish between needs and the 
satisfiers of those needs. This is easiest to see in a scenario where more than one 
technology could be used to save a person’s life, but they will likely die if they do not 
receive any intervention. The person does not have basic need, in the sense I have 
defined, for ‘Intervention 1 (e.g. surgery) or Intervention 2 (e.g. medication).’ Rather, 
these interventions are each potential satisfiers for a condition which a particular 
individual has. New medical technologies offer the promise of new need satisfiers, but 
the individual would have had the underlying need even if there were no possible 
satisfiers available. 
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4. The Scope of Needs Theory 
I have proposed that we should think of basic needs as the existentially urgent subset 
of our non-arbitrary needs. Satisfaction of such needs is necessary for the securing of 
any less urgent needs, and any other goods, as the needing being cannot continue to 
exist as such without their basic needs being addressed. I have suggested that in one 
sense, maintaining the narrow, urgent scope of basic needs is desirable: the narrow, 
urgent nature of our basic needs is what makes them so compelling.114 However, such 
an account will be too narrow to provide a more complete ground for global justice, or 
even for some minimal level of justice. Should a theory of need be aimed at providing 
a more expansive picture of human well-being or entitlement? 
Theorists such as Len Doyal and Ian Gough have defended more expansive views of 
our basic needs.115 Doyal and Gough include critical autonomy as a basic need, which 
involves the combination of freedom of agency (being able, in principle, to choose) 
and political freedom (participation “in agreeing to or changing the rules of a 
culture”116). This is a distinctly high-level basic need, as it is plausible that many 
people even in high-income countries cannot be said to have genuine political freedom 
in this liberationist sense. Further, it bears a very different kind of urgency to needs 
for hydration or shelter. I agree with Schuppert that defence of higher-level needs like 
critical autonomy under the banner of ‘basic needs’ risks diluting the moral force of 
the concept.117 
Sarah Clark Miller offers a counterexample to narrow accounts involving fire fighters: 
“Fire companies, when called to the scene of a fire, have as their goal not to 
rescue burn victims at a point prior to their death, but rather to rescue victims 
in as timely a fashion as is possible, so as to minimize all possible damage to 
them (including physical and psychological pain and suffering).”118 




114 Schuppert, 2011. 
115 1998; 1991. 
116 Doyal, 1998, p. 162 [original emphasis removed]. 
117 Schuppert, 2011. 
118 Miller, 2012, p. 27. 
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Of course, she is right – a moral or political theory which made space only for basic 
needs, and excluded everything but survival needs from that category, would be both 
incomplete and ridiculous. There are far more components to human well-being than 
survival and minimal agency. Indeed, the view of need I have offered could 
accommodate a rich, thick conception of objective well-being in the form of our non-
basic needs, in terms of the things that make one’s life go well qua human being. 
However, I have sought to limit the designation of ‘basic needs’ along narrower lines 
because such needs, as the necessary conditions for any higher-level human goods, 
carry uniquely compelling force for moral and political practice.119 
As a result, I again agree with Schuppert that the most morally compelling needs, our 
basic needs, are not enough to ground a full theory of social or distributive justice. 
Luckily, basic needs do not have to “shoulder the entire burden of grounding a full 
theory of social justice.”120 What makes basic needs powerful is that they provide the 
most transparently common ground we can hope to find. The broader list of things that 
are good for human beings as such is contentious, and easily obscured by the particular 
lives we lead and ends we value. It is also possible that, in order to get at what is good 
for people as such, we must thin our concepts down such that they no longer provide 
much guidance without further operationalization, which will itself be contentious. 
From a pragmatic perspective, basic needs give us some purchase on universality that 
is amenable to widespread support, versus more substantive needs or interests that may 
require shared values and moral norms to gain traction. 
People die on a massive scale every day because their basic needs are not met. 
According to the United Nations, “while food is the most basic of human needs 
required for survival, 1 in 8 people do not have enough to eat, most of them women 




119 This will be important when, in Chapters 5 and 6, I seek to determine the kind of duties 
we have to respond to need. There, I argue that duties to respond to basic need are duties of 
justice, and thus amenable to coercive enforcement, in principle. It is worth noting that 
Miller does not defend stringent, enforceable duties of this kind. 
120 Schuppert, 2011, p. 16. 
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and children.”121 Using a narrow view of basic needs enables theorists like Brock to 
argue that any plausible theory of distributive justice must “make space for the special 
significance of our needs.”122 Our needs for survival and minimal agency may be 
relatively few, and so limited in scope, but if a theory of need is able to make a 
convincing case for responding to those needs, then its scope is sufficient to warrant 
serious attention. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have developed an account of needing, distinguished morally 
important needs from wants, and defended a narrow view of basic needs in terms of 
existential urgency. 
I began by identifying needing as a three-part relation, and defended this standard 
account against recent accusations of mind-dependence and ambiguity. I then sought 
to develop an account of morally important needs which distinguishes them from 
wants. After suggesting that both Wiggins’ quasi-categorical needs, and Reader and 
Brock’s non-contingent needs suffer from imprecision on the question of mind-
dependence, I offered my own view. Here non-arbitrary need is grounded in the 
objective interests that all people have in virtue of what is good for us, as human 
beings. The existentially urgent subset of such needs are our basic needs. 
I addressed two challenges for my view: epistemic elitism, and the seeming relativity 
of even basic needs. Finally, I defended the value of a relatively narrow scope for basic 
needs: basic needs do not offer a complete theory of morality or justice, but they do 
concentrate attention on a uniquely compelling subset of our most urgent, shared 
interests. 
In the next chapter, I consider the relation between needs and nearby concepts in moral 
and political theory, with a particular focus on their closest neighbours: capabilities. 




121 UN WFP, 2013. 
122 Brock, 2005. 
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Chapter 2: Needs and Their Neighbours 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, I have provided a view of need as a three-place relation, and of morally 
important needs as those which are non-arbitrary, aiming at the objective interests that 
all humans have in virtue of being human. I further posited that the existentially urgent 
subset of our non-arbitrary needs are the basic needs that are so central to needs theory. 
I now consider how needs are related to their nearby conceptual neighbours. Given the 
prominent role that objective interests play in my account, I begin with the relation 
between needs, interests, and wants. Much of what I say on wants and interests follows 
from the account of non-arbitrary needs I have offered. 
Then, I move to consider the closest conceptual relative of basic needs: capabilities. 
The capabilities approach has achieved significant notice and influence in both justice 
theory and development studies, and its close relationship with needs theory warrants 
sustained consideration. I compare two of the most prominent views in their respective 
domains: Len Doyal and Ian Gough’s basic needs theory, and Martha Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach. After entertaining the notion that needs are best seen as a rival 
for capabilities, or that each theory is incomplete without the other as its complement, 
I suggest that they are best seen as two sides of the same coin. Each offers a distinctive 
focus, and each can provide a comprehensive view that is of value to the overall picture 
of well-being and entitlement. Straining the metaphor, I briefly suggest adding rights 
as a third side of the coin. 
Finally, I entertain an argument which justifies the value of needs-talk on the grounds 
of the conceptual irreducibility of need. I posit that needs can be reduced to other 
concepts, which are at least more fundamental in this sense. However, I defend the 
value of needs-talk along other lines. Further, I indicate that other reducible concepts 
play a similarly vital role in moral political theory, such as vulnerability. Need, like 
vulnerability, is reducible, yet it is still of central interest to moral and political theory. 
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Examining the relation of need to nearby neighbours allows us to gain a clearer 
understanding of need itself, and to give it a more tangible position and role in 
contemporary theory. 
2. Needs, Wants, and Interests 
2.1 Wants 
I have indicated that one of the chief challenges for any needs theorist is providing 
some compelling and intelligible distinction between needs and ‘mere wants.’ If needs 
are allowed to collapse into a rhetorically compelling subset of wants, they will no 
longer occasion much theoretical concern. I responded to this challenge in the previous 
chapter, but it is worth brief reflection here on what is meant by ‘want,’ and the moral 
status of wants in relation to needs. 
As with most other terms of interest to philosophers, everyday use of the term ‘want’ 
is varied. We sometimes use ‘want’ to describe a lack, as in “they perished for want 
of food.”123 Want, in this sense, often describes a material lack, but it does not 
necessarily refer to humans, much less to the interests or desires of humans. For 
example, even if ‘the houses are in want of repair,’ it may be in no human’s interest to 
repair them, and no human may have the desire to repair them. We can make sense of 
this idea of ‘a lack’ by making use of the three-place need relation: there is a lack when 
a need exists, and the object (Y) necessary to the end state (Z) is not currently available. 
This sits nicely with the account of needs that I have already provided, and situates ‘a 
lack’ as an occurrent need.124 The occurrent need is morally important when the need 
itself is morally important: when it aims at objective interests that humans have qua 
human beings. 




123 Crisp, 2003, p. 761. 
124 Recall my comment in Introduction Section 2 that speaking of needs as lacks may 
obscure the sense in which needs persist even when they are not currently unmet; hence my 
preference for the term ‘occurrent need.’ 
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We also commonly talk of ‘wants’ in terms of desires, and it is these wants that I take 
to present the more interesting challenge for needs theorists.125 Desires are not 
restricted in their aim; they need not aim at any previously existing interests at all. For 
example, I may come to want something (perhaps via brainwashing or advertising) 
that would otherwise be bad for me in every way.126 People often do want things that 
are in their interest, and this is sometimes a good way to start thinking about the 
interests that people do have, but desires are not exhaustive of, or co-extensive with, 
needs or interests. 
Already, we can see significant points of departure between needs and wants so 
understood. Desires are uncontroversially considered to be mental states with 
intentionality, whereas needs are neither necessarily intentional, nor are they mental 
states: 
“What I need depends not on the thought or workings of my mind (or not only 
on these) but on the way the world is.”127 
Although need is sometimes thought of as a special kind of desire, on this 
understanding, needs are not directly related to desires. 
My account of needs is in tension with a simplistic desire-satisfaction theory of well-
being, on which the only thing that is good for me is the satisfaction of desires. If we 
think, as I do, that there are some things that are good for human beings as human 
beings, regardless of what they happen to desire, then we must reject simple desire-




125 I focus on desires rather than preferences because preferences may be taken to have more 
complex connotations. While preferences might be thought of as idealised, informed, 
authentic, etc., I hope to engage with desires in their simplest and broadest sense. I take it 
that I leave normative evaluation of desires sufficiently open that what I have to say applies 
to at least some understandings of preferences as well as desires. 
126 Here a qualification is necessary: if we think that desires are morally important, there is at 
least one way in which getting something that I desire would be good for me. Further, on a 
simplistic desire-satisfaction picture of well-being, the only thing that is good for me is 
satisfaction of desire, so the only sense in which the desired thing could “otherwise be bad 
for me in every way” is if it went against my desires. Such views have sufficiently serious 
counterexamples that I will not attend to them in detail here. 
127 Wiggins, 1987, p. 6. 
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satisfaction theories. However, we can still allow that satisfaction of desires might be 
a good thing, even when it is in tension with satisfaction of needs. Recall the case of 
the martyr. We might think that this is a case where a person sacrifices her interest in 
survival for something she values more, such as the desire to effect change, and that 
she is not clearly making a mistake in prioritising this desire. 
I will leave the moral value of desire satisfaction, and so whether wanting is itself 
morally important, as an open question for my account. I suspect that on any plausible 
interpretation of desire satisfaction, it does not provide a good that is basic in the same 
way that, say, survival goods are. That is, some goods (such as physical security and 
adequate nutrition) are necessary in order to secure any other goods, and desire 
satisfaction is not basic in this way. In this sense, desire satisfaction may not share the 
same kind of politically justifiable distributive priority that we associate with more 
fecund goods. However, if wanting is itself morally important, this need not cause 
difficulties for my account of needs. Needs do not have to encompass all morally 
relevant things to be themselves morally important.128 
2.2 Interests 
As I have defined morally important, non-arbitrary needs in terms of (objective) 
interests, I will now consider the relationship between needs and interests. By 
definition, on my view interests are a more fundamental concept than needs in the 
sense that needs are defined in terms of interests.129 
Following David Owens, I understand interests in the following way: 
“Something is in the interests of an agent when it is good for the agent, when 
it makes that agent’s life go better.”130 




128 Note that if we take wanting to create an interest in that desire being fulfilled, we can 
make sense of that interest using my account of interests in the following section. 
129 Schuppert, 2011. 
130 2012, p. 7. 
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Recall that in Chapter 1, I outlined two broad categories of interest: objective and 
subjective. Objective interests, on my understanding, are those interests that we all 
have in virtue of being human. They are universal, and not dependent on individual 
preference.131 Subjective interests, then, are interests that are given by the 
particularities of a human life, such as an individual’s life goals, relationships, and 
values. For example, while human beings as such have an interest in having adequate 
shelter for protection from the elements, it is particular human lives that make sense 
of interests in pursuit of musical or athletic excellence. 
It is important that we not confuse this use of the terms objective and subjective with 
others. For example, when we talk about what is ‘objectively in my interests’ we may 
be distinguishing what we think is in our interests (‘subjectively in our interests’) from 
what is really in our interests (‘objectively in our interests’). On my use of these terms, 
both objective and subjective interests are interests that we really have; when I think I 
have an interest but I am mistaken, I do not have any kind of interest at all. A parallel 
distinction is drawn in the language of obligation or duty. Whereas natural duties are 
owed to all persons simply qua persons, special obligations are owed to a subset of 
persons with whom we share a particular relationship, such as fellow citizens or people 
to whom we have made promises.132 Notice that special obligations, like subjective 
interests, are no less real for their particularity. 
On my account, non-arbitrary needs are defined in terms of objective interests, and 
arbitrary needs are defined in terms of subjective interests. I do not suggest that 
objective interests should always have absolute moral priority over subjective 
interests, or vice versa. Rather, in Chapter 6 I defend an enforceable duty to respond 
to non-arbitrary needs that are existentially urgent; I remain agnostic as to the kinds of 
duties that subjective interests might generate. 




131 Doyal & Gough, 1984, p. 49. 
132 Jeske, 2014, para. 1. 
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3. Basic Needs and Capabilities 
Basic needs theory and the capabilities approach bear striking similarities, and their 
modern iterations were first articulated at around the same time; however, they have 
largely developed independently of one another even up to the present.133 While needs 
are certainly not a new concept, the International Labour Organization’s World 
Employment Program and its 1976 conference is often credited with regenerating basic 
needs as a focal point for development strategy.134 Throughout the 1980s, it was 
developed further by a variety of thinkers both as an approach to development 
programmes and, to a lesser extent, as a branch of normative theory.135 By comparison, 
the capabilities approach has a more cohesive origin. Developed in the 1980s, 
economist and philosopher Amartya Sen is widely recognised as its founder, and 
following their collaboration, philosopher Nussbaum has provided influential re-
workings.136 
The capabilities approach has enjoyed critical and popular success in a range of 
disciplines, as well as influence in the policies of international agencies such as the 
World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, most notably through 
the annual Human Development Reports which began in 1990, producing “their own 
capability-based studies of the well-being of different regions and groups in their own 
societies.”137  In contrast, basic needs theory is now thought by some to be too minimal 
and mechanistic by comparison to the capabilities approach, which vindicates a richer 
spectrum of things that make our lives go well.138 Some needs theorists have responded 




133 Gough, 2014, p. 357. 
134 Jolly, 1976. 
135 Needs literature from this era often demonstrates a curious blend of development studies 
and normative theorising, but for example Paul Streeten’s First Things First (1981) and 
Mahbub ul Haq et al.’s Meeting Basic Needs (1980) focus more on the former, whereas 
David Wiggins’ Needs, Values, Truth (1987) and Garrett Thomson’s Needs (1987) are 
squarely located within the latter. 
136 See: Sen, 1989, 1985, 1980; Nussbaum, 2011, 2001, 1988. 
137 Nussbaum, 2011, p. x. 
138 Reader, 2006. 
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to this challenge by contending that basic needs provide a firmer ground for 
international agreement and emancipatory change than the capabilities approach. 
Gough’s recent “Lists and thresholds”139 compares two leading accounts of needs and 
capabilities, pitting them against each other as rivals over the same conceptual domain: 
Doyal and Gough’s needs theory, and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.140  
Therefore, it will be instructive to engage with these theories to determine whether 
needs and capabilities are best thought of as rivals. Although basic needs theory is 
relatively fragmented, Doyal and Gough’s work is foundational to much work in 
contemporary needs theory, and so is a fitting study for comparison. Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach has similarly stimulated significant enthusiasm and development 
of capabilities theory. In Section 3.5, I consider how Sen’s capabilities approach, and 
my own view of basic needs, might paint a different picture.  
I begin by offering a necessarily brief background on the two approaches.141 I then 
reflect on the relationship between capabilities and needs, entertaining three broad 
accounts of this relationship. On the first, we see needs as a competitor for the 
conceptual ground of well-being and justice. Here, needs are directly in competition 
with capabilities as a fundamental way of understanding entitlements and 
responsibilities, and things that make a life go well. Second, I consider needs as a 
complement to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, bolstering her more perfectionist 
conception of well-being with the comparative urgency of basic need. Ultimately, I 
suggest that we should see needs and capabilities as two sides of the same coin. This 
proposal draws from Sen’s early writings on capabilities to see capabilities as an 
“interpretation of needs,”142 and my own view of needs presented in Chapter 1. 
Although the Doyal-Gough and Nussbaum approaches do benefit from mutual 





140 Particularly the accounts set out in A Theory of Human Needs (1991) and Creating 
Capabilities (2011) respectively. 
141 For a more complete introduction: on capabilities see Robeyns (2011), on needs Gough 
(2014). 
142 Sen, 1980, p. 218. 
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supplementation, the value of such supplementation is contingent on the particular way 
those approaches have been developed. We could well develop a view of needs or 
capabilities which is not conceptually dependent on other views. Rather, each view is 
valuable for the particular lens or perspective it offers us to the moral and political 
domain.143 I conclude the section by proposing that needs and capabilities stand in a 
similar relation to rights. 
3.1 Fundamentals of the capabilities approach 
The capabilities approach employs a core set of concepts, the foremost of which are 
functionings and capabilities. Functionings are “beings and doings,”144 or states of 
being and activities that a person undertakes, such as ‘being well-nourished’ or ‘caring 
for a child.’145 Capabilities, on the other hand, are “sets of interrelated opportunities 
to choose and act,”146 or to achieve functionings. For example, while ‘being well-
nourished’ is a functioning, the real opportunity to be well-nourished is a capability. 
Thus, functionings are concrete achievements, whereas capabilities are valuable 
opportunities from which we can choose. 
Nussbaum’s explication of the capabilities approach provides a list of ten core 
capabilities necessary for a “dignified and minimally flourishing life”147: 




143 One might think that there is another option to be considered: that of a pluralist 
understanding of justice, wherein various principles are weighed against each other 
casuistically. This is often the picture implied by social research on distributive justice 
decision-making: we weigh between distributive norms such as equality, merit, and need to 
give each their appropriate consideration, while accepting each principle as potentially in 
conflict with its competitors. See, for example: Carson & Banuazizi, 2008; Marshall et al., 
1999; Miller, 1992.  
On this picture, capabilities might either be understood in terms of some higher level 
principle or principles, or taken themselves to form a more or less homogenous ‘principle’ 
themselves. However, while this picture might be helpful as a decision-making heuristic, it is 
at best incomplete, requiring supplementation with some further theoretical lens to 
understand relationships between principles. 
144 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 25. 
145 Robeyns, 2011, section 2.1 para. 1. 
146 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 20. 
147 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 30. 
 




Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length. 
2. Bodily health 
Being able to have good health, including reproductive health. 
3. Bodily integrity 
Being able to move freely, being secure against assault, having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and reproduction. 
4. Senses, imagination, and thought 
Being able to use the senses to imagine, think, and reason in a ‘truly 
human’ way. 
5. Emotions 
Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves. 
6. Practical reason 
Being able to form a conception of the good and engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life. 
7. Affiliation 
(a) Being able to live with and towards others. 
(b) Having social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation. 
8. Other species 
Being able to live with concern for and in relation to other species. 
9. Play 
Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over one’s environment 
(a) Being able to participate effectively in political choices. 
(b) Being able to hold property and seek employment on an equal basis 
with others.148 
Together, the core capabilities set a minimum, necessary standard for social justice: 
“at a bare minimum, an ample threshold level of ten central capabilities is required.”149  
They are irreducible to each other, and all need to be secured to have a minimally just 
society.150 We should think of cases where two capabilities are in competition, and not 




148 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 33-34 [some paraphrasing for length]. 
149 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 32. 
150 Here it is important to note the distinction between social justice (that is, justice for 
societies) and global justice (that is, justice for all people, regardless of society). Nussbaum’s 
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mutually compossible, as situations of “tragic choice”151 in which we inevitably 
violate someone’s entitlements. They cannot justifiably be weighted or prioritised, as 
all represent basic entitlements. In such cases, we must work to ensure that we are not 
faced with such tragic choices in the future. While the task of specifying thresholds is 
left to each nation, an ample threshold of some capabilities will require the capability 
to be fully and equally realised, such as with capabilities for political participation. 
3.2 Fundamentals of basic needs theory 
Unlike the capabilities approach, basic needs theory does not share a commonly 
accepted conceptual architecture or scope. However, any account of basic needs will 
contend that needs are morally important, and will then have to explain which needs 
are normative, and how. 
A three-place understanding of need is standardly accepted in the literature: 
X needs Y in order that Z. 
(Where X represents an entity – in this context, a human being – and Y 
represents a necessary condition to the end state Z obtaining.)152 
Accordingly, needs theory has sought to answer the challenge of identifying morally 
important needs by specifying an end state (Z) that is of inherent value to the agent 
(X). 
Further, a key distinction in needs theory is drawn between needs and their satisfiers. 
Early proponents of needs theory were charged with excessive commodity fetishism, 
and this distinction serves to highlight the difference between needs and commodities 
or other satisfiers of those needs. While needs themselves are thought to be universal, 




capabilities are most explicitly aimed at minimal criteria for social, rather than global justice. 
Similar limits on the action-guidance of Nussbaum’s theory are identified in Section 3.4 
151 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 37. 
152 See Chapter 1 Section 2. 
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what is necessary to satisfy needs is not. Here satisfiers are understood to be “all 
objects, activities, and relationships which satisfy our basic needs.”153 
Doyal and Gough argue that avoidance of serious harm is the inherently valuable end 
of all basic needs. They take such harm to be any “fundamental disablement in the 
pursuit of one’s vision of the good.”154 They contend that physical health and 
autonomy emerge as the two basic needs stemming from the end of harm avoidance, 
and within the broader category of autonomy they include both a lower and a higher-
level form.155 ‘Autonomy of agency’ involves the ability to make informed choices 
about what should be done and how to go about doing it, whereas ‘critical autonomy’ 
is “the capacity to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one’s own culture, 
to work with others to change them and, in extremis, to move to another culture.”156 
Doyal and Gough elaborate a list of intermediate needs (also called universal satisfier 
characteristics) that always contribute to the two basic needs of health and autonomy: 
Nutritional food and clean water 
Protective housing 
A non-hazardous work environment 
A non-hazardous physical environment 
Safe birth control and child-bearing 
Appropriate health care 
A secure childhood 









153 Max-Neef, 1989. p. 19. 
154 Gough, 2014, p. 364. 
155 Gough, 2014; White, 2008, footnote 1. 
156 Doyal & Gough, 1991, p. 187. 
157 Gough, 2014, p. 367. 
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3.3 Needs as a competitor to capabilities 
If needs are in competition with capabilities, they must act as central, organising 
concepts for justice theory; that is, they must be serving a similar purpose to the 
capabilities. On this view, needs provide a fundamental way of understanding just 
entitlements, responsibilities, and things that make a life go well.158  
I take Gough’s 2014 chapter, as well as Doyal and Gough’s seminal 1991 A Theory of 
Human Need, to be exemplars of the needs as a central concept account.159 Gough 
understands needs theory and the capabilities approach as having a common goal: to 
“clarify and defend those universal human interests which alone can underpin an 
emancipatory and effective political programme for all women and men.”160 He judges 
that there is significant overlap between the lists that Doyal and Gough and Nussbaum 
have generated,161 but that the more limited list of needs is more plausible as it restricts 
itself to urgent items that are properly considered of comparable moral importance. 
For example, Nussbaum’s list includes play, which he argues does not “rank on a par 
with bodily integrity or practical reason.”162  
The most powerful of Gough’s arguments are summed up in the following passage: 
“Nussbaum’s thick approach to human capabilities embraces a wide range of 
human activities and extols a broad vision of human flourishing, but its 
foundations are shaky and its potential for securing cross-cultural consensus is 
unproven and probably weak. Sen’s thin theory of capabilities has greater 
potential for identifying priority capacities and has a proven record in 
underpinning an international consensus on human development, but it 
provides little systematic or comprehensive guidance on components of human 
functioning or well-being. Our theory of human need, we would claim, 
combines the merits of both. By expounding a thin derivation, and by carefully 
distinguishing autonomy of agency from critical autonomy, it recognises 
cultural differences within a universalist framework, but by positing universal 




158 At least two prominent needs theorists have defended this kind of view: Gough, 2014; 
Brock, 2005. 
159 Brock’s 2005 “Needs and global justice” offers a similar view, but when comparing needs 
and rights. I engage with it in Section 3.6. 
160 Gough, 2014, p. 358. 
161 See Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
162 Gough, 2014, p. 372. 
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satisfier characteristics and recognising our collective understanding of these 
it provides a richer framework for conceiving, measuring, and – conceivably – 
improving human well-being.”163 
I will take this to form two broad criticisms of the capabilities approach by comparison 
to its needs counterpart: the problem of specification, and the problem of conceptual 
disadvantages.  
First, the charge that the capabilities approach suffers from problems with 
specification. The challenge goes something like this: ‘On one leading account 
(Nussbaum), the capabilities approach achieves its goal of breadth, but consequently 
it is too normatively loaded to have universal appeal. On the other leading account 
(Sen), it is sufficiently thin to have universal appeal, but fails to deliver a sufficiently 
rich range of things that make a life go well. Only needs theory escapes this undesirable 
impasse by offering an approach that is at once thin enough to be universally 
uncontroversial, and wide-ranging enough to make sense of the breadth of all that 
makes a human life go well.’ This challenge can be dealt with if we undermine the 
claim that needs theory avoids the impasse. That is, if it can be shown that needs theory 
is similarly positioned to the capabilities in this respect, we do not have to engage in 
empirical speculation as to the relative fitness for cross-cultural consensus.164  
As we have seen, the Doyal-Gough approach takes prevention of serious harm to be 
the end of morally important needs. However, it is due to this very minimal focus that 
the Doyal-Gough approach is unable to make sense of many of the things we might 
think make a life go well. It is therefore unsurprising that the Doyal-Gough list of 
needs is more limited than that of Nussbaum’s list, excluding items such as play or 
relationships with animals and surroundings. Even if we accept that having the ability 
to enjoy recreational activities is not as necessary to prevention of serious harm as, 
say, having protective housing, we might think that it is either (a) still necessary for 




163 Gough, 2014, p. 379. 
164 I take it that this is a preferable way to proceed if it is successful, as the level and quality 
of empirical proof that would be needed to decisively confirm or dispute the objection is not 
readily available. 
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avoiding morally important harms and even serious harms, or (b) that it is sufficiently 
important for human development that its exclusion does not reflect well on a 
comprehensive theory of human well-being. The range of things that help us avoid 
serious harm will never provide as rich of a foundation as one that aims at something 
more maximal: Nussbaum’s capabilities are directed more aspirationally at “a 
dignified and minimally flourishing life.”165 These considerations seem to indicate that 
needs theory should be acknowledged as engaging with a minimalist conception, by 
comparison to Nussbaum’s more maximalist conception of well-being. 
Nonetheless, Doyal and Gough are not satisfied with accepting a narrow range of 
outcomes for their needs theory. Recall their two-fold understanding of autonomy, 
which has the effect of adding to the breadth and scope of their view. While ‘autonomy 
of agency’ involves the mere ability to make any choice at all, ‘critical autonomy’ is 
significantly more demanding, requiring that people are able to reflect upon and 
subvert cultural rules. This demonstrably goes beyond the characteristically narrow 
view of basic needs, focused on shelter and food, and arguably goes beyond the scope 
of even the capabilities approach. 
Critical autonomy has been criticised as too demanding or high-level to be considered 
a basic need, and even critiqued as antithetical to fundamentalist religious 
communities, for example.166 If we recall that on this account basic needs are directed 
towards the avoidance of serious harm, it is difficult to reconcile critical autonomy’s 
role as a basic need in their framework. It is questionable whether the inability to 
critically reflect on and change one’s own cultural rules (critical autonomy) constitutes 
a fundamental disablement in the same way that inability to make any informed 
choices about what should be done (autonomy of agency) or wasting away from 
malnutrition (physical health) would constitute fundamental disablements. When this 




165 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 30. This contrast may even be taken to indicate that the two 
approaches are attempting to do different things, with needs focusing on a more basic subset 
of the broader picture that capabilities accommodate. If this is the case, a complementary 
account of the two approaches is well-grounded (see Section 3.4). 
166 White, 2008, footnote 1; Soper, 1993. 
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incapacity is accepted as a serious harm, Nussbaum’s more maximal list no longer 
seems out of step with the task at hand. The problem of specification does not appear 
to be solved by resort to the Doyal-Gough needs approach, as their thin derivation 
focusing on avoidance of serious harm does not sufficiently support a more ambitious 
aim of providing a rich conception of human well-being. 
Second, Gough points to conceptual benefits that are garnered by their needs theory 
that the capabilities approach cannot make sense of: namely, universal satisfier 
characteristics.167 While the common distinction between needs and their satisfiers 
allows for a universalist conception of need without commodity fetishism, Doyal and 
Gough identify a list of properties of satisfiers that serve to promote the basic needs of 
physical health and autonomy in all cultures, naming these ‘universal satisfier 
characteristics,’ or ‘intermediate needs’ for short.168 This allows them to make sense 
of a universalist bent even for satisfiers, while allowing that satisfiers themselves are 
relative.  
However, the unique conceptual gain from this feature of their theory is limited. The 
capabilities approach is quite able to make sense of the list of intermediate needs in 
their own language: for example, ‘protective housing’ becomes ‘being able to have 
adequate shelter,’ and so on. Further, the relative nature of satisfiers, to persons and 
places and societies, is nicely captured in the capabilities approach by conversion 
factors: “the degree in which a person can transform a resource into a functioning.”169 
Personal conversion factors are those that are internal to the person, such as how 
metabolism or sex may influence ability to convert foods into adequate nutrition and 
vitamins, whereas social or environmental conversion factors derive from the society 
or physical environment in which a person lives.  




167 The passage also points to the benefits of distinguishing between ‘autonomy of agency’ 
and ‘critical autonomy,’ but the foregoing paragraphs give us reasons for being suspicious of 
such benefits. 
168 See the list of intermediate needs in Section 3.2. 
169 Often credited to stem from Sen’s Inequality Re-examined, 1992, p. 19-21, 26-30; 
Robeyns, 2011, section 2.4 para. 1. 
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Moreover, the capabilities approach has an additional conceptual benefit built into its 
core architecture: the distinction between achievements (functionings) and 
opportunities (capabilities). To see why this is desirable, a classic example should 
suffice: 
Hunger strike: Gloria is engaged in a hunger strike as a form of political 
protest; she is not consuming any food or water. She has nutritious food and 
clean water readily available to her should she choose to consume them. 
Famine: Marc lives in an area with no access to clean running water, and 
changing climate patterns have led to sharp decline in access to nutritional food 
in the region. Neither he nor any members of his family have the wherewithal 
to get access to adequate nutrition and hydration. 
Both Marc and Gloria have unmet nutritional needs; that is, in this respect their 
functioning is the same. Conversely, their capabilities to meet those needs differ 
dramatically. The capabilities approach has the conceptual architecture for this 
distinction built in: the distinction between functionings and capabilities. Further, this 
distinction wards off concerns about paternalism; promoting people’s opportunities to 
achieve is less directive and imposing than claiming that they need to have or be a set 
of concrete things to make their life go well. 
Gough recognises the advantage afforded by this distinction, which is absent in his 
theory, but fails to properly appreciate its weight.170 Doyal and Gough’s inclusion of 
autonomy as a basic need might be seen as a step towards achieving similar outcomes, 
and indeed the inclusion of autonomy allows for a broad range of goods to be 
considered, similar to the capabilities. However, including autonomy will not get rid 
of counterexamples wherein promoting the substantive fulfilment of needs interferes 
with individual choice. The distinction between opportunities and achievements is a 




170 Gough, 2014, p. 375. 
 
Chapter 2: Needs and Their Neighbours 
 
68 
deep one, and when the conceptual benefits of each approach are considered, it appears 
far from obvious that Gough’s claim to greater conceptual benefits succeeds.171 
An additional complication for the needs as a central concept account is the charge 
that the intuitive force of ‘need’ seems to die out as the needs included are less urgent 
and existential.172 When disaster strikes and thousands of people are suffering and in 
immediate risk of morbidity and mortality, we draw on concepts of need as it carries 
with it a sense of severity and urgency, indicating high moral stakes. Doyal and 
Gough’s inclusion of a relatively maximal picture of autonomy as a basic need is 
problematic in this sense, as it means we can no longer use need to capture this life-
or-death urgency. This is a challenge that is unique to needs theory, as capabilities do 
not carry the same intuitive normative force, nor do they feature in public appeals and 
justifications in the same direct way.173 
In this section I have gestured to the pitfalls of privileging needs over capabilities in a 
competitive manner. The concerns that I have levelled might jointly suggest that we 
should instead throw over needs altogether, and take them to add nothing to the 
capabilities approach. However, I will now turn to consider how understanding the 
two as complementary might be fruitful. Here I indicate how the shortfalls in each of 
the accounts I have examined might allow both needs theory and the capabilities 
approach to benefit from the exchange. 
3.4 Needs as a complement to capabilities 
Understanding needs as a complement to the capabilities approach allows us to make 
use of the most compelling features of both views, incorporating them into an 
integrated whole. The proposal is that we should accept the capabilities approach as 
providing a more comprehensive way of understanding responsibilities, entitlements, 




171 This is not to say that needs theory cannot make sense of the distinction between 
opportunities and achievements. Indeed, I argue in Section 3.5 that they can. Rather, the 
Doyal-Gough account as it stands is not so equipped. 
172 Schuppert, 2011. 
173 Nearby concepts such as freedoms may have more intuitive purchase in everyday 
language. 
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and the things that make a life go well. While Nussbaum’s capabilities offer a 
comparatively holistic approach, making sense of a wider spectrum of things that make 
our lives go well, basic needs are aimed at a limited, urgent subset: the things we need 
for our lives to continue. If we think of needs as a complement to the capabilities 
approach, we can make use of the normative force behind needs appeals, and yet we 
can show a full appreciation for the broader spectrum of things that make a life go 
well, such as imagination and play. Survival is necessary in order to secure any other 
goods at all, and as such is the most basic entitlement.174 Still, survival is not the only, 
and perhaps not the most important, thing that makes a life go well. To speak to higher-
level goods, we might draw on a broader theory of well-being which has capabilities 
at its core, and aims at human flourishing.  
Recall the three-place relation of need. On the theory I am positing, it is survival that 
is taken to be the ground of basic needs and the end of inherent worth for each 
individual, in contrast to Doyal and Gough’s focus on harm prevention. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, as it is presented, is open to concerns about 
priority-setting. Her guidance in cases of tragic choice, where capabilities are in 
conflict, is limited to recognising that no matter what we choose we fail to maintain a 
fundamental entitlement. Nonetheless, survival entitlements are a necessary means to 
securing any other goods at all, no matter how minimal – and the extent of global 
poverty means that even the most basic human needs are widely going unmet. Thus, 
adding basic needs to the conceptual architecture of the capabilities approach will 
allow an ability to prioritise such urgent cases.175 Further, it is desirable that a theory 
of this kind provide some guidance on situations of tragic choice. Using the logic of 
‘necessary means’ to recognise what is necessary in order to secure any capabilities at 




174 This line of reasoning is adopted from Shue’s ‘basic-ness’ argument in Basic Rights 
(1980). 
175 It is worth noting that there may be other necessary means to securing capabilities, with 
climate and environmental security considerations as strong candidates. For more on the role 
of the environment in the capabilities approach, see: Cripps, 2010; Holland, 2008. 
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all may give us a foothold when facing situations in which not all valuable goods are 
mutually achievable.176 
Fortunately, seeing needs as necessary means will avoid establishing a hierarchy 
between the capabilities themselves, which is anathema to Nussbaum and like-minded 
capabilities theorists. The necessary means to securing and enjoying the capabilities 
are in a sense prior to the capabilities, and do not align with any particular capabilities 
themselves or mandate deeming one more ‘basic’ than the other. 
Incorporating basic needs theory brings the vision that whatever else makes a human 
life go well, no matter how we may disagree as peoples, every single human being 
needs adequate and safe hydration and nutrition in order to survive, in addition to 
shelter from the elements and physical security. If we can see meeting basic needs in 
terms of fundamental human rights to life, we are able to set comparatively clear 
targets on what is owed to people as such. When lives are at stake, there is a pragmatic 
benefit to having such unambiguous and relatively limited entitlements. 
In contrast, Nussbaum’s capabilities theory does not sufficiently allow for explicit and 
pre-set priority judgements, nor does it offer sufficient advice on setting thresholds. 
This is intentional, as on her account, each nation is itself responsible for deciding 
thresholds. However, many of the most persistent problems of poverty are global in 
nature, and require coordination on priorities in order to be meaningfully implemented. 
Seeing basic needs as a necessary means to pursuit of capabilities (due to their 
necessary nature for survival) speaks to the most demonstrable commonalities we have 
as humans: the things we need to continue to live. 177 




176 Here I am building on Sirkku Hellsten’s treatment of basic needs as the necessary means 
of promoting human capabilities and functionings (1995). 
177 Hellsten, 1995. Note that although we can see basic needs as a means in respect of their 
relationship to capabilities, this need not imply that needs are by their nature best viewed as 
merely instrumental full-stop. We can maintain that needs or their fulfilment have intrinsic 
value while still seeing them as necessary means for something else of value. 
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One challenge for this recommendation is the problem of discordant goals: while basic 
needs aim at the minimal end of survival, and should be seen as insufficient for 
securing even minimal justice, the capabilities approach is more demanding and 
ambitious, aiming at human flourishing. However, while these goals have a history of 
political friction, that friction is not problematic at the conceptual level. If we see 
securing basic needs as a means to promoting capabilities and human flourishing, we 
can recognise that on this account both needs and capabilities are ultimately 
understood in terms of their promotion of human flourishing. 
3.5 Two sides of the same coin 
I have just suggested an adaptation of the Doyal-Gough needs theory and Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach that allows each to benefit from the theoretical insights of the 
other. On the complementary, or hybrid, view that I proposed, we are able to make 
sense of a wider range of entitlements and levels of urgency than either account is able 
to accommodate on their own. However, I have not demonstrated that such a hybrid 
view is necessary for any needs or capabilities theory; rather, that it is valuable for the 
Doyal-Gough and Nussbaum views. In this section, I will consider Sen’s capabilities 
approach and my own view of basic needs, and argue that not all needs and capabilities 
approaches are necessarily dependent on each other for theoretical completeness. 
Rather, such alternatives might be thought of as two sides of the same coin, as each 
offers a different perspective of, and focus within, the same domain. 
Thus far, I have neglected Sen’s capabilities approach. We have seen that Nussbaum 
does not allow for any narrowing of the core capabilities to form a list of those that are 
most basic, urgent, or high-priority. Given this, basic needs offered a way of bridging 
the gap; a valuable addition to highlight the necessary means required to secure any 
other goods, including capabilities. In contrast, Sen’s capabilities approach may have 
no need for supplementation in this regard. Sen allows for the salience and importance 
of basic capabilities, and in his early work, he at times implies that needs and 
capabilities are in fact two sides of the same coin. 
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In contrast to Nussbaum, Sen is reluctant to provide a list of core capabilities.178 He 
judges that public reasoning and democratic participation should have a central role in 
forming the list of core capabilities for each society. “Some of the basic capabilities 
will no doubt figure in every list of relevant capabilities in every society. But the exact 
list to be used will have to take note of the purpose of the exercise.”179 He further 
points out that even once we have produced a list, we face the additional difficulty of 
ranking items on that list. It is not clear, for example, whether having sufficient shelter 
should rank above or below having sufficient nutrition in every case; it is more likely 
that the circumstances of each case will help us to set priorities. 
Sen does propose that a “selected list of very elementary capabilities”180 is useful for 
the purpose of dealing with problems of extreme poverty and deprivation. Here we 
need a conception that sufficiently conveys urgency, and to that end he offers a sketch 
of some ‘basic capabilities,’ including: 
The ability to move about 
The ability to meet one’s nutritional requirements 
The wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered 
The power to participate in the social life of the community181 
In ‘Equality of what?’ Sen discusses the importance of these ‘basic capabilities.’ It is 
in this section of his early work that we might understand him to propose the ‘two 
sides of the same coin’ view: 
“If it is argued that resources should be devoted to remove or substantially 
reduce the handicap of the cripple despite there being no marginal utility 
argument (because it is expensive), despite there being no total utility argument 
(because he is so contented), and despite there being no primary goods 
deprivation (because he has the goods that others have), the case must rest on 
something else. I believe what is at issue is the interpretation of needs in the 
form of basic capabilities. This interpretation of needs and interests is often 




178 Sen, 2004. 
179 Sen, 2004, p. 79. 
180 Sen, 2004, p. 79. 
181 Sen, 1980, p. 218. 
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implicit in the demand for equality. This type of equality I shall call ‘basic 
capability equality.’”182 
This excerpt captures the intuition that needs and capabilities respond in harmony to 
the perceived shortfalls with a utilitarian or resourcist response to the ‘equality of 
what’ debate. Both approaches will level a challenge of adaptive preferences against 
the utilitarian.183 Similarly, both approaches make sense of the fundamental insight 
that people vary in their ability to convert resources into concrete need fulfilment, in 
response to the resourcist. 
However, the distinction between freedom to achieve and achievement itself is a 
central one for the capabilities approach, and as we have seen it is one that is not at the 
heart of needs theory. Indeed, if there is one core insight that the capabilities approach 
brings to the table, the distinction between freedoms and achievements is a likely 
contender. Sen, at times, compares “need-fulfilment” with capabilities to highlight its 
contrasts with freedoms of choice.184 The focus of the capabilities approach on 
freedoms of choice provides its distinctive perspective. While needs theory can make 
sense of this distinction, and distinguish between opportunities and achievements, the 
capabilities approach is centrally concerned with such freedoms. 
By contrast, I have provided a view of non-arbitrary and basic needs that has a different 
but equally vital perspective to offer within the same domain. Recall that we can make 
sense of a wide range of the things that make the life of a human being, as such, go 
well by attending to non-arbitrary needs. My attention has been focused on basic needs 
due to the importance they will have in defending need-based enforceable duties of 
justice further down the line,185 but the moral framework I have offered can indeed 




182 1980, p. 218 [emphasis added]. 
183 “Inequalities in achievements and freedoms get concealed and muffled in the space of 
conditioned perceptions” (Sen, 1995, p. 263-264). 
184 1992, p. 2-3. 
185 See Chapters 5 and (especially) 6. 
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make sense of a broad spectrum of human goods such as friendship or the experience 
of beauty. 
Perhaps the core insight in this domain of the basic needs approach generally, and my 
own view in particular, is an attention to the necessary conditions for fulfilling any 
other needs, or securing any other human goods. Recall that this is how I have 
distinguished between basic needs and other non-arbitrary needs. By their very 
conceptual make-up, needs are uniquely positioned to drive focus to such necessary 
conditions. This may be why needs theory has so often become, or focused on, basic 
needs theory. This focus allows the needs theorist to concentrate on a relatively narrow 
field of focus using reasoning that flows naturally and cohesively from the structure 
of needs themselves, thus putting the needs theorist in a position to establish duties 
with urgent moral force and high priority. Sen’s capabilities approach, and capabilities 
theorists more generally, are able to accommodate these benefits. However, the core 
concepts of needs theory will naturally be more suited to driving focus towards 
necessary conditions and their moral weight. 
If this is right, the capabilities approach and needs theory are best seen as two sides of 
the same coin. They are both able to offer the same breadth and depth of analysis, but 
by virtue of the concepts which are at the core of each approach, they will necessarily 
foreground a different focus and perspective within the same domain. In the case of 
the capabilities approach, it is the focus on freedoms of choice, and their distinction 
from achievements, which is foregrounded. In the case of needs theory, it is the 
necessary conditions for securing human goods.186 
3.6 Needs and rights 
In the previous section, I suggested that needs and capabilities are best seen as two 
sides of the same coin: they are able to offer a comparable range of analysis within the 




186 It is a consequence of this distinctive focus that the duties which emerge on a needs-based 
theory will also tend to focus on the necessary conditions for securing any human goods, in 
some sense. This is evident in the duty of responsiveness I defend in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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domain of well-being and entitlement, but their conceptual cores will direct theoretical 
attention differently. I now briefly consider the relationship between needs and rights, 
and judge that they stand in the same relation. Straining the metaphor, needs, rights, 
and capabilities are three sides of the same coin. 
As we saw with the capabilities, it has been argued that needs are a more fundamental 
concept than rights. Brock’s work, such as her “Needs and global justice,” positions 
needs at the centre of global justice theory. Taking up a comparison with human rights, 
Brock argues that needs are a more basic concept for such theory, claiming that “the 
basic needs standard is more fundamental than – and required by – the human rights 
approach.”187 This comparison is intended to show that needs are quite capable of 
acting as a central, organising concept in justice theory. Indeed, she seems to suggest 
that needs are already (if only implicitly) at the heart of such theory by reinterpreting 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a core human rights text, in 
terms of needs.  
I will not comment in detail on Brock’s reinterpretation of the UDHR, but instead offer 
a word of caution. Even if we can convincingly stretch needs and rights so that we can 
explain one entirely in terms of the other, this does not sufficiently establish that either 
needs or rights are more valuable conceptually. The conceptual structure of rights may 
still be more fruitful for legal applications, for example, or for justified claiming.188 
Like Nussbaum, I suspect that this is one of the core contributions of rights language: 
“When used as in the sentence ‘A has a right to have the basic political liberties  
secured to her by her government,’ it reminds us that people have justified and 
urgent claims to certain types of urgent treatment, no matter what the world 
around them has done about that.”189 
By their very content, rights communicate a sense of entitlement that is not 
foregrounded in the same way by conceptual structure of needs or capabilities. This 




187 Brock, 2005, p. 51. 
188 Brock’s argument about fundamentality also rests on the claim that needs are irreducible 
concepts in moral and political theory, which I shall contest in the following section. 
189 2003, p. 39 [emphasis added]. 
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sense of entitlement, and the duties commanded in response to such an entitlement, 
make legal rights a very real and valuable application of the concept.  Further, the 
foregrounding of entitlement ensures that those who claim their rights are not 
conceived of as appealing to pity or charity, but rather are equals with the moral 
standing to press their justified claim. 
We might worry that, unlike needs and capabilities, rights cannot demonstrate the 
same range over the domain of well-being and entitlement. Their application in legal 
spheres should not be of concern here if they retain their range in well-being and 
entitlement theory. Rather, the concern might be that rights are much more limited, or 
focused only on entitlement rather than well-being. This kind of concern might ring 
true, particularly for those persuaded by arguments distinguishing civil and political 
rights as the only genuine rights, and socioeconomic or green rights as mere statements 
of aspiration.190 However, such a limited view of rights is highly contested, and there 
are many rights theorists who defend a connection between rights and well-being.191 
That being the case, we have no reason to think that rights are necessarily conceptually 
limited in this way. 
Therefore, I suggest that needs, rights, and capabilities are best seen as offering three 
distinctive, valuable perspectives on the domain of well-being and entitlement. While 
rights foreground the sense of justified claiming, capabilities draw attention to 
freedoms of choice and achievements, and needs focus on necessary conditions for 
securing any other goods. 
4. Are Needs Irreducible? 
One reason that might be offered for considering a concept indispensable for a theory 
is that it is irreducible. If a concept is fundamental in this way, and cannot be explained 




190 For example, see Maurice Cranston’s canonical “Human rights, real and supposed” 
(1967). 
191 Raz, 1992; Shue, 1980; Peffer, 1978. 
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in terms of other related concepts, the thinking goes, then it must feature in the theory, 
even if it is not given explicit attention. Reader and Brock offer such a view of needs: 
“Value-based, rule-based and character-based theories have to make use of the 
concept of need as fundamental, irreducible and morally important, if they are 
to account for the simple needs-meeting moral contexts that are the bread and 
butter of everyday moral life. Needs-talk cannot be eliminated, nor reduced to 
talk of values, rules or virtues.”192 
This is a challenging line of defence for the importance of needs, given their 
conceptual structure. As we saw in Chapter 1, need claims are inherently directed, and 
we can always ask what needs are directed towards. In this sense, needs are inherently 
reducible to the end state they aim towards. Reader and Brock are right that reducing 
needs to values, rules, or virtues would be misguided. However, there are more 
obvious candidates for a reductive reading of needs.193 
On my own view, I have defined non-arbitrary needs in terms of human interests. This 
means that all needs-talk could be reduced to interests-talk.194 If irreducibility was the 
only ground on which a concept could be shown to have theoretical importance or 
value, this would be highly problematic for my account. Happily, there are other 
reasons for seeing needs-talk as valuable for moral and political theory. 




192 2004, p. 262. 
193 Guy Fletcher proposes that all needs-talk can be reduced to harm-talk. For example, 
“without Y, X will be harmed” (Forthcoming 2018, p. 23). He suggests that even in more 
maximal accounts of need that aim at flourishing or agency, all such talk can all be 
understood in terms of harm. I suspect that this presumes a view of harm which is 
problematic. An unmet need directed towards flourishing, which has never been met for a 
given individual, does not make the individual worse off than they were before (one sense of 
comparative harm). Further, to presume that the unmet need makes them worse off than they 
could be presumes that the need represents not only necessary but sufficient conditions for a 
measure of agency or flourishing, which is not a warranted presumption (another sense of 
comparative harm). His proposal may therefore need to rely on a non-comparative view of 
harm, which is itself a contested interpretation of the concept. These considerations aside, if 
we allow that Fletcher’s argument is successful, we can respond to his challenge in the same 
way that I respond to a reductive reading of needs in terms of interests in this section: by 
vindicating the value of needs-talk, despite their reducibility. 
194 Schuppert, 2011. 
 
Chapter 2: Needs and Their Neighbours 
 
78 
In the first instance, I have already defended the value of needs, by comparison to 
capabilities or rights, for the attention they draw to the necessary conditions of 
securing any other goods. By virtue of their conceptual structure, needs are uniquely 
suited to demonstrating the exceptional importance of these necessary conditions. 
The second reason needs-talk is of value is largely practical, and more particular to its 
comparison with interests-talk. Interest is a broad category, and I am more particularly 
concerned with two subsets of interests: objective interests, and within these, 
existentially urgent interests. By understanding these interests in terms of need, we set 
them apart, and give emphasis to the urgent and high stakes nature of the interests 
involved.195 This gives need claims a kind of salience that resonates in a way that 
reference to a particular subset of interests cannot. Needs represent a narrow subset 
within the broader category of interests, and because of this they carry a different feel 
and weight for claiming. 
Further, need is not the only concept that is reducible in this sense. Vulnerability 
features a similar reducibility, but to harm; specifically, the susceptibility to harm. 
While we could reinterpret all statements about vulnerability in terms of harm, this 
would obscure the particular domain of liability to harm which vulnerability brings 
into sharp focus. In fact, I suspect many concepts in moral and (especially) political 
theory are not fundamentally irreducible, but are still of great theoretical value for the 
particular focus they bring. 
To sum up, Reader and Brock’s defense of need on the basis of its irreducibility is 
unsuccessful, as needs can be analysed in terms of the end they are directed towards. 
Fortunately, we can defend needs-talk on other grounds. Need is a concept that we 
could do without, but which we should not do without.196 




195 O’Neill, 2011; Schuppert, 2011, p. 16. 
196 This line references Wiggins’ “An idea we cannot do without” (2005). 
 




In this chapter, I have attempted to place needs in relation to their nearby conceptual 
neighbours. In part, this helps to clarify the role of need in well-being and entitlement 
theory. Moreover, through this clarification I have offered a defence of the value and 
importance of the concept of need for such theory. 
I began by situating needs in relation to interests and wants. Needs are categorically 
distinct from wants, and they are understood in terms of objective interests. 
I then examined in detail the various ways that needs and capabilities theories might 
be related: as competitors, as necessary complements to each other, and as two sides 
of the same coin. I suggested that two prominent accounts (the Doyal-Gough basic 
needs theory and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach) are best seen as complementary, 
with each supplementing the other where challenges or conceptual gaps are apparent. 
However, I posited that this relation is not necessary for all versions of needs and 
capabilities theory. Each can furnish the conceptual resources required for a suitably 
comprehensive view of well-being and entitlement, and each offers its own valuable 
and distinctive focus. We should see needs and capabilities as two sides of the same 
coin. Further, rights stand in a similar relation to needs and capabilities, offering a third 
distinctive perspective. 
Finally, I considered whether needs are irreducible. After determining that they can be 
reduced to other concepts (such as interests), I suggested that irreducibility is not a 
necessary feature of valuable concepts in moral and political theory. By their very 
structure, needs direct attention towards the necessary conditions for securing any 
other goods, and the unique weight of such conditions. We still need needs. 
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Chapter 3: Duties of Justice and Beneficence 
1. Introduction 
It is common practice to distinguish between duties of justice and duties of beneficence 
in modern moral and political theory, and this distinction is of particular importance 
for our international responsibilities to those in need. Justice is often taken to be a 
narrower and more demanding category of duty than the broader beneficent or 
humanitarian duties. If we think that duties of beneficence are weak and optional, 
whereas duties of justice are binding and enforceable, a great deal rides on how we 
characterise our duties to the global poor.197 Therefore, I now address how we should 
set duties of justice and duties of beneficence apart. How should we understand the 
relationship between justice and beneficence? 
I will argue that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable. 
This means that they are the kind of duties which may justify the intervention of third 
parties to apply coercive sanctions.198 
I begin by characterising accounts of the distinction between justice and beneficence 
under two broad categories. In Section 2, I consider the view that negative duties define 
the scope of justice, as distinguished from duties of beneficence. On this view, duties 
of justice are negative, determinate, perfect, and enforceable. This view is influential 
in shaping many of our intuitions, and it is here that the division between justice and 
beneficence is often most explicit. I argue that the differentiation between positive and 
negative duties is exaggerated, and that it cannot do the work that it needs to for this 
account. Section 3 concentrates on views that either push beyond the negative/positive 




197 Perhaps for this reason, much of the literature on the distinction between justice and 
beneficence centres on the case of our international duties to those in severe poverty. I attend 
to our international obligations to those in need in Chapter 6. There I rely on the account of 
duties of justice I defend in this chapter to demonstrate that our duties of responsiveness to 
need are duties of justice. 
198 To be clear, this is quite distinct from the possibility that duties of justice are those which 
we are actually in a position to enforce in practice, or those which we are actually morally 
justified in enforcing. 
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distinction altogether, or that allow for positive duties of justice. I entertain views 
centred on determinacy, basic goods, rights, and Thomism before arguing that justice 
duties are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable. In contrast, duties of 
beneficence are those which are not legitimately enforceable by third parties. I propose 
that this understanding accommodates important intuitions that duties of justice 
involve social protections, which preserve the force and claimworthiness of our just 
entitlements. I then respond to three objections for this view. 
I assume in this chapter that any morally serious person will recognise that we have at 
least some minimal duties in the face of urgent and extreme suffering and deprivation, 
however optional and weak these duties might be.199 I will not argue for this, as even 
the strictest of negative duties accounts allow that while we may not be morally 
required to do anything for the global poor, it would be morally good to do something. 
2. Negative Duties of Justice and Positive Duties of 
Beneficence 
On what I will call the negative duties account, a fundamental distinction is made 
between negative and positive duties. Justice concerns itself only with negative duties, 
or duties of non-interference, rather than positive duties requiring action. Positive 
duties may be the subject of humanitarian concern, but these are best thought of from 
the perspective of beneficence, charity, or aid rather than entitlement. 
Many proponents of the negative duties account also support the priority thesis:200 
The Priority Thesis: “Duties not to harm are more stringent than duties to 
aid.”201 




199 I recognise that on some understandings of ‘duties’ or ‘obligations,’ these minimal 
commitments will not qualify as being properly understood as ‘duties.’ 
200 ‘Support’ of the priority thesis is often implicit, but it operates when duties of justice are 
defined in exclusively negative terms, and are taken to have moral priority over positive 
duties. For example: Valentini, 2015; Narveson, 2003; Pogge, 2002; McKinsey, 1981. 
201 Lichtenberg, 2010, p. 562. Note that Lichtenberg is a critic of the priority thesis. 
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If we accept this thesis, the upshot is that violations of non-interference duties are more 
morally important, and duties of beneficence must take a back seat. Further, this brings 
to the fore a key feature of the negative duties account: actively harming a person is 
worse than failing to prevent harm. 
I now consider the grounds of this distinction on prominent negative duties accounts, 
before positing challenges for the categorical distinction between positive and negative 
duties.202 
2.1 Enforceable, determinate, perfect duties 
The negative duties account is particularly explicit in the work of libertarian theorists 
such as Jan Narveson: 
“I will take it as given that we are certainly responsible for evils we inflict on 
others, no matter where, and that we owe those people compensation. […] 
Nevertheless, I have seen no plausible argument that we owe something, as a 
matter of general duty, to those to whom we have done nothing wrong. Still, 
morally commendable motives of humanity and sympathy support 
beneficence, and if we wish to call those ‘duties,’ there is something to be said 
for that, too.”203 
Narveson considers that beneficence should be rewarded when it is practiced, rather 
than punished when it is not. The lower priority of positive duties means that cost is 
allowed to figure into duties of beneficence. Unless we can discharge positive duties 
at a low cost to ourselves, such duties are supererogatory. This demonstrates a further 
feature of negative duties: they are morally enforceable. That is, they are the kind of 
duties that are amenable to coercive sanction by third parties. Narveson claims that 
“prospects for a universal agreement to help others when they need help, as an 
enforceable duty, are poor.”204 




202 Theorists who support the negative duties account support vastly different positions on 
our duties to the global poor, depending on the whether they consider that the global poor 
have been harmed. For a minimal picture of such duties see: Narveson, 2003; McKinsey, 
1981. On more maximal duties, see: Pogge, 2002; Nagel, 1977. 
203 Narveson, 2003, p. 419. 
204 Narveson, 2003, p. 423. 
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In addition, on the negative duties account, duties of justice are determinate.205 It is 
argued that humanity and beneficence are not good sources of absolute rights, as these 
are considerations that apply equally to every human being. Whereas negative duties 
have a correlative structure and identify a particular individual or group as bearer, the 
bearers of positive duties are more difficult to locate. We can understand determinacy 
in this context using a Hohfeldian analysis of the correlative structure between claims 
and duties: 
A has a claim that B  if and only if B has a duty to A to .206 
Notice that whenever A has a claim, it is a directed claim against some individual or 
group (B). The idea is that, for a duty to be determinate, it cannot be held against “any 
and all who can save him,” but instead must be held “against a group which could save 
him,”207 whether that group is specified in terms of ‘affluent nations’ or ‘those capable 
of helping.’ Positive duties, grounded in considerations of beneficence, are only 
weakly correlative, because it is groups that are responsible for fulfilling them, and “to 
have a right to be treated in a certain way against a group is not necessarily the same 
as having the right to be treated in that way against each member of the group.”208 We 
cannot derive determinate duties of justice from such group obligations. Instead, 
indeterminate positive duties against groups are best seen as weak and defeasible 
duties of beneficence. 
A further distinction which is often drawn by negative duties theorists is that between 
perfect and imperfect duties.209 Negative duties are seen to be perfect, in the Kantian 
sense that they are strict and admit “of no exception in favour of inclination.”210 By 




205 McKinsey, 1981. McKinsey does not explicitly align negative duties with ‘justice’ but 
instead with rights. However, he is motivating a division between obligations of benevolence 
and obligations of right, and I judge that this coincides sufficiently with the negative duties 
account of justice and beneficence that I provide to make it relevant here. 
206 Wenar, 2005, section 2.1.2; Hohfeld, 1917. 
207 McKinsey, 1981, p. 315 [emphasis original]. 
208 McKinsey, 1981, p. 316. 
209 Ashford, 2006; O’Neill, 1996. 
210 Kant, 1964, section II, 422. 
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contrast, positive duties are imperfect, and admit of exceptions as to when and how 
they are fulfilled: 
Perfect duty: One must never (or always)  to the fullest extent possible. 
Imperfect duty: One must sometimes and to some extent .211 
For example, we must never kill another human being, whereas we must take it to be 
a general policy to be beneficent; we need not be beneficent in every way, in all 
situations. Here the thought is that adhering to strict duties of non-interference is 
comparatively straightforward. I fulfil such duties simply by avoiding killing, 
attacking, or otherwise harming people every day. The same cannot be said for our 
looser duties of beneficence: because beneficence requires action rather than inaction, 
they are more demanding, and discretionary. 
In summary, on the negative duties account, the distinction between negative and 
positive duties is of fundamental moral importance. Duties of non-interference are 
properly understood as justice-relevant, enforceable, determinate, and perfect or strict, 
whereas duties of beneficence that require action are properly understood to be 
unenforceable, indeterminate, and discretionary. In the following section, I point to 
some challenges for this division between negative and positive duties, and argue that 
its moral significance is overstated. 
2.2 Problems for the negative duties account 
I now entertain three challenges for the negative duties account: the conceptual 
challenge, the ‘new harms’ challenge, and the priority challenge. 
The conceptual challenge is the most fundamental objection to the negative duties 
account, and it is not new. Shue’s landmark Basic Rights argues that the strong 
distinction between negative and positive rights is a false dichotomy. While security 
(often considered negative) and subsistence (often considered positive) rights may be 




211 Johnson, 2008, section 5, para. 2. 
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quite different in other respects, these and all rights require both negative and positive 
duties to implement them.212 Instead, he offers a “threefold analysis of correlative 
duties” for claim-rights:213 
(a) Avoiding depriving people of the substances of their rights 
(b) Protecting them against deprivation 
(c) Aiding them if they are nevertheless deprived of rights 
Shue provides the example of a right to peaceful assemblies: it is no good saying that 
people have a right to peaceful assembly if such assemblies are often broken up by 
physical violence. Unless we actively protect the right to assemble, and thereby reduce 
vulnerability to interference, security rights cannot be enjoyed. For Shue, fulfilling any 
right requires the kind of social guarantees that we would standardly associate with 
positive duties. This means that the conceptual distinction between negative and 
positive rights and duties is misguided. 
Narveson’s reply to Shue on the distinction between negative and positive rights paints 
his original negative duties account in a somewhat more radical light. He separates 
what we have a right to do and who, if anybody, will enforce the right. As our rights 
are purely negative, our duties are similarly exclusive to non-interference, and it 
follows that no one has any duty to enforce them. He stresses that this is intended to 
maintain a focus on the enforceability of duties of justice, as we may have positive 
duties of another kind, but these are merely morally commendable.214 However, even 
focusing on the narrowest conception of negative duties, we have other reasons to 
think that a categorical moral distinction between negative and positive duties is 
misguided.  
The new harms challenge changes course, targeting a shift in our moral responsibilities 
due to globalisation. Judith Lichtenberg suggests that, while we historically had good 
reasons to make a strong distinction between negative and positive duties, new harms 




212 See also: Ashford, 2011; Mieth, 2008. 
213 Shue, 1980, p. 17. 
214 Narveson, (n.d.), section 2.2 para. 5-6. 
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associated with globalisation undermine those reasons. Traditionally, it seemed 
intuitive to give negative duties priority at least in part as they were easier to honour. 
Positive duties of beneficence were subject to demandingness objections, whereas 
negative duties avoided this problem: it seemed self-evident that refraining from 
violently attacking another person is easier than protecting that person from violent 
attack. However, globalisation has expanded the influence of our daily activities to 
unprecedented levels: 
“Our most humdrum activities may harm people in myriad ways we have never 
thought about before. And because these activities are seamlessly woven into 
our normal routines, ceasing to engage in these ‘new harms’ is not at all easy 
– not simply a matter of refraining from things we never would have dreamed 
of doing in the first place, like killing and raping and robbing. Not harming 
people turns out to be difficult and to require our undivided attention.”215 
Inaction is no longer enough to honour our negative duties, because everyday 
behaviours, consumptions, and purchases contribute to these new harms.216 While 
Shue’s critique undermined the conceptual distinction between negative and positive 
duties, Lichtenberg seeks to demonstrate that the distinction no longer tracks other 
features like determinacy and the strictness of a duty. Not harming people is 
demanding enough that it is no longer something we can categorically avoid, and thus 
may not be a perfect duty. Similarly, the potential victims of harm and the correlative 
duty bearers are no longer easily identifiable in a tangle of systemic and structural 
causation. We can no longer be sure of when and whose non-interference rights we are 
violating, and the determinacy of our negative duties is no longer categorical. 
If negative duties are no longer always easier or less costly than positive ones, the 
negative duties account exaggerates the moral significance of this division. 
Lichtenberg even suggests that not harming people may often be more demanding than 
helping them. Instead, we should treat negative and positive duties similarly, by taking 
responsibility for our fair share of harm avoidance. 




215 Lichtenberg, 2010, p. 558. 
216 Ashford, 2006. 
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The priority challenge claims that duties of reparation to those we have harmed are no 
more stringent than duties of aid when suffering is urgent and severe. Gerhard 
Overland seeks to undermine the priority thesis by pressing the insignificance of the 
additional reason that causal responsibility provides.217 He argues that in the case of 
our duties to the global poor, causal responsibility is relevant only for the task of 
assigning blame, or when the cost of assistance is high. Contribution to past harms is 
morally irrelevant when suffering and poverty is severe, and the significance of 
contribution will often be overridden by considerations of urgency and severity of 
suffering. To motivate this argument, Overland provides a thought experiment: 
Unlucky careless car crash 
While driving carelessly, you lose control of your vehicle and hit a pedestrian 
on the sidewalk. You stop the car and get out to inspect the situation. The 
person you hit is in need of urgent medical attention, but you also notice that 
ten metres to the left of your victim there is a second person harmed by 
another careless driver, who has fled the scene. You are unable to help both 
people. 
Overland suggests that if the second person’s injuries are more severe and urgent, you 
should help them first. Other things being equal, you have an additional reason to help 
the person you are responsible for hitting, but when other things are not equal, severity 
and urgency of harm should take priority. Thus, the negative duties account overstates 
the moral importance of the negative/positive distinction. 
These problems for the negative duties account undermine the categorical moral 
significance of the distinction between negative and positive duties.218 The conceptual 
challenge indicates that the negative/positive distinction is misleading, as securing 
rights of non-interference will sometimes require positive duties. The new harms 




217 Overland, 2005. 
218 To be clear, I do not suggest that the distinction between negative and positive duties, or 
harming and failing to help, is altogether morally insignificant. Instead, I am attempting to 
undermine the kind of strict dichotomy that the negative duties account presents, and its 
significance for determining duties of justice and beneficence. Some of the features that 
negative duties theorists take to be inherent to negative duties are not so categorically 
divided, and we must focus instead on the moral significance of the features themselves. 
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challenge undermines the determinacy and strictness of negative duties: violations of 
negative duties are no longer easy to avoid, or to trace. Moreover, their enforceability 
is increasingly costly and demanding, and no longer provides a categorical marker for 
justice to cling to. Finally, the priority challenge indicates that the priority of negative 
duties will sometimes be outweighed by severe and urgent suffering, which is itself 
the grounds for priority in such cases. 
3. Beyond Negative Duties 
Although the negative duties account is still influential, its shortcomings have driven 
some philosophers to discount the moral significance of the negative/positive 
distinction when determining the relationship between duties of justice and 
beneficence. Echoing Shue, Martha Nussbaum claims that the idea of negative rights 
is “incoherent,”219 as “all entitlements require affirmative government action, 
including expenditure.”220 I will now present alternative views of the distinction 
between justice and beneficence.221 
First, I consider the possibility that duties of justice can be distinguished by their 
determinate structure. I suggest that this understanding is defensible, but is more 
formally than morally motivated once the negative/positive distinction is removed 
from the equation, and it isolates a narrower subset of duties than is desirable. Second, 
I examine the view that it is the goods which duties pertain to which distinguish duties 
of justice. While duties of justice promote access to basic goods or conditions, duties 
of beneficence aim at other goods. I judge that this view ultimately relies on 
enforceability to distinguish duties of justice, as the basic goods argument is only 
applicable to positive duties. Third, I entertain the proposal that duties of justice have 
to do with entitlements or rights, whereas duties of beneficence do not. I suggest that 




219 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 65. 
220 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 67. 
221 I have parsed out distinctive features of various accounts in order to discuss them 
separately, but accounts focused on basic goods or rights often also make reference to moral 
enforceability. 
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there are moral rights which are not obviously justice-relevant, and that this view either 
collapses into the basic goods view, or into moral enforceability. I then present a 
contemporary reading of the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, wherein justice and 
beneficence are different expressions of the same motivation: love of one’s neighbour. 
Although it is not a complete account, a Thomist view directs attention to the legalistic 
connotations justice carries with it, and the connection between justice and claiming. 
Finally, I assess the prospects of distinguishing between justice and beneficence along 
the lines of moral enforceability. I argue that moral enforceability is at the heart of 
many influential accounts of justice theory, and it is this which gives justice teeth. I 
consider how we might interpret moral enforceability, and address challenges for this 
view. 
3.1 Determinate duties of justice 
I argued in Section 2.2 that negative duties are not as distinctively determinate as we 
might have thought, and suggested that this is one reason for thinking that the 
negative/positive distinction does not hold. I now consider whether determinacy222 is 
itself a good indicator of duties of justice. 
When discussing the demarcation between duties of justice and duties of 
beneficence,223 John Stuart Mill focuses on the determinate nature of duties of justice 
and the fact that they involve “assignable persons:”224 
“For if a moralist attempts, as some have done, to make out that mankind 
generally, though not any given individual, have a right to all the good we can 
do them, he at once, by that thesis, includes generosity and beneficence within 
the category of justice.”225 




222 I do not consider the possible view that the perfect-ness of duties distinguishes duties of 
justice. This is because, unlike Kant, I take it that even the most thorough-going modern 
Kantian allows that perfect duties admit of some exceptions, and if this is so, the distinction 
is unhelpful. The classic example of lying to a murderer, despite having a perfect duty not to 
lie, is one such exception.  
223 Note that Mill calls these ‘duties of virtue.’ 
224 Mill, 2012b, para. 15. 
225 Mill, 2012b, para. 16. 
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Here Mill is keen to defend a strict line between justice and beneficence on the grounds 
of determinacy. His view is concordant with McKinsey’s assessment of duties against 
groups as only weak and indeterminate. If we accept this reading of determinacy, 
duties of justice pertain only to those duties for which we can identify an individual or 
specified group who bear the duty. In the case of specified groups, we must be able to 
identify who belongs to the group, and the distribution of the responsibilities pertinent 
to the duty’s fulfilment within that group.226 
The determinacy account of duties of justice has desirable features, in that it provides 
a reliable way of distinguishing between justice and beneficence, and in many of the 
cases of duties against standard harms, it seems to get this classification right.227 
Collective, indeterminate duties are more difficult to claim, and to hold individual 
people responsible for. Further, we might think determinacy has implications for the 
enforceability of duties of justice, as determinate duties will be easier to enforce. 
However, I suspect that this is somewhat of a formal distinction. The discussion of 
Lichtenberg points to a change in the determinacy of negative duties with the rise of 
globalisation. As an individual, it is no longer easy to establish when you are causally 
contributing to a serious but distant harm. If we allow that this limits the determinacy 
of such duties, then the category of duties of justice seems oddly contingent on the sort 
of context we live in.228 If we instead suggest that the duties themselves are 
determinate, but that realising them is simply more complicated in practice by our 




226 Even this may be too lax a reading to coincide with McKinsey’s criticism of groups as 
duty bearers, but given the preceding ‘new harms’ critique centred on new challenges in 
establishing the identity of victims and duty bearers, I take it that a flexible reading of this 
view will be the most charitable. 
227 I suspect that some of the motivating force behind this is an implicit alignment of 
negative duties with determinate duties. Any cases in which the determinate/indeterminate 
distinction might match up with the justice/beneficence distinction also seem to feature a 
division between negative and positive duties – as in Lichtenberg’s example of refraining 
from violently attacking someone versus protecting that person from violent attacks. 
228 Buchanan, 1987, p. 571. 
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expanding spheres of influence, the strong distinction between determinate and 
indeterminate duties becomes more opaque. 
Moreover, institutions might offer a pragmatic locus within which to meet collective 
duties, and if this is so, then one of the reasons for favouring this view evaporates. 
Although they face their own challenges, institutions offer one way of distributing the 
responsibilities of a more general collective duty. The responsibility for fulfilling 
determinate, individual duties will still be easier to locate, but the practical challenges 
of collective duties do not preclude their specification altogether. 
When the determinacy of duties is distinguished from their enforceability or their 
negative/positive nature, a focus on determinacy appears to be guided either by 
formalistic or pragmatic considerations rather than moral ones. Determinate duties will 
be easier to claim and to hold people accountable for, but that benefit does not allay 
the concern that determinacy seems to be undesirably contingent on context. Further, 
if determinacy comes apart from moral enforceability, it is moral enforceability which 
maintains the sense of entitlement “which society ought to defend me in the possession 
of.”229 It is moral enforceability that gives justice teeth. 
3.2 Duties of justice which aim at basic goods 
Another way of distinguishing duties of justice and beneficence is to focus on the 
goods that they aim to preserve and protect. On the most prominent of such views, the 
distinction between negative and positive duties is still in play, and the legitimacy of 
negative duties of justice is not in question.230 Instead, the argument focuses on 
justifying basic positive duties of justice. “A basic positive duty is one focused on 
objects, access to which is a necessary condition for the recipient to live a minimally 




229 Mill, 2012b, para. 26. 
230 Gilabert, 2006. I address Pablo Gilabert’s more recent view in the following section: there 
he explicitly highlights rights as the grounds of justice duties, although basic goods and 
enforceability are also lower level features of the account (2016). Corinna Mieth’s account 
might be understood in these terms, but I argue in Section 3.5.1 that her view in fact offers a 
way of interpreting enforceability, rather than a rival. 
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decent life.”231 This includes standard basic goods such as food, water, health care, 
education, and housing. 
Gilabert argues that basic positive duties are best understood as “enforceable duties of 
justice” rather than “informal duties of virtue,”232 and goes on to specify that justice 
duties are “duties we have, in principle, reason to hold as legally enforceable if their 
legal enforceability is necessary for their fulfilment.”233 Further, the indeterminacy of 
some positive duties should not dissuade us from considering them duties of justice, 
as “an institutional structure can be developed so that the general collective duty […] 
can be specified in a set of clearly delimited perfect duties.”234 Taking the example of 
the general duty to protect people from physical assault: 
“Structures would generate, out of the general duty to protect, which is 
imperfect, a set of specific duties, which are perfect. […] Thus, imperfect 
duties are dynamic and can be partly specified as perfect duties once their status 
as duties of justice is recognized.”235 
In this way, Gilabert hopes to bring both enforcement and a kind of determinacy along 
with his basic goods account. We should be careful to recognise that honouring the 
duties established by institutions is not precisely equivalent to rendering our individual 
duties determinate. If we were sure what these collective duties entailed at the 
individual level, and how we might meet them, we would not deem them indeterminate 
in the first place. However, institutionalising our duties does offer a promising strategy 
for managing and realising duties which might otherwise be too indeterminate, by 
allowing us to specify and allocate them in practice. I adopt and expand on such a view 
in Chapter 6, when I defend a collective approach to responding to human need.236 




231 Gilabert, 2006, p. 194. 
232 Gilabert, 2006, p. 193. 
233 Gilabert, 2006, p. 195. 
234 Gilabert, 2006, p. 210. Note that Gilabert is using the perfect/imperfect distinction to 
indicate something closer to determinacy than strictness. 
235 Gilabert, 2006, p. 196. 
236 Thanks to Philip Cook for emphasising this important point of agreement that my account 
shares with Gilabert’s. 
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However, the shortcoming of the basic goods view for the task at hand is that the 
argument defending basic goods pertains only to basic positive duties. It is these duties 
which must be justified by referring to basic goods in order to be considered 
enforceable, whereas negative duties are presumed to be so. Therefore, while positive 
duties rely on their basicness for inclusion, the distinguishing feature of both positive 
and negative duties of justice is their moral enforceability. I suspect that Gilabert 
couches his argument in the negative/positive distinction primarily as a response to the 
common sense popularity of the negative duties account. The basicness of the positive 
duties that Gilabert picks out is morally relevant because this captures the enforceable 
nature of those duties, and this is what distinguishes duties of justice from duties of 
beneficence. 
3.3 Duties of justice and rights 
Gilabert’s recent work offers a compound account of duties of justice, wherein duties 
of justice have three components:237 
(1) They pertain to moral rights238 
(2) They preserve or promote people’s access to important conditions or goods 
(3) They are, in principle, morally enforceable 
Here Gilabert refers to a broader category of conditions and goods than just the 
standard basic goods, so his argument is not vulnerable to the concern voiced in the 
previous section. 
Although the account has a three-part structure, it is the justificatory power of the 
rights concerned which determines the relevance of the other considerations: 
“There is an explanatory structure within the account of justice such that the 
importance of the relevant rights determines […] the justifiability of the 
enforcement of the duties to protect or promote their fulfilment.”239  




237 2016, p. 509. 
238 Gilabert uses ‘rights’ and ‘entitlements’ interchangeably, but seems to have in mind 
something like ‘moral rights.’ 
239 2016, p. 521. 
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Unlike the other views I have assessed, Gilabert considers dropping the component of 
enforceability altogether. It is an intentional implication of this move that it sheds the 
distinction which is often drawn between personal moral rights and duties, and those 
which pertain to public life. While third party enforceability carries with it public 
connotations, moral rights and important goods are equally important in what is often 
considered personal morality. It is suggested that enforceability is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for something to be a duty of justice, and the following counterexample 
is offered: 
“An example might be the promotion of certain cultural practices of the kind 
Rawls discusses when he identifies the task of a hypothetical ‘exchange 
branch’ of the state in a well-ordered society. An instance of this is public 
funding for opera houses.”240 
For this to be a counterexample, it must be an instance where the relevant duty is not 
a duty of justice, but it is, in principle, morally enforceable. However, it is plausible 
that ‘the duty to fund opera houses’ is not a duty of justice, but that this is an instance 
of a more generalised duty which is a duty of justice, such as ‘the duty to provide 
opportunity for meaningful recreation.’241 To the extent that this is a morally 
enforceable duty, it seems that just such a duty characterises it. 
Indeed, problems arise for the account when it relinquishes moral enforceability in 
favour of the justificatory force of rights. Not all moral rights are duties of justice; 
consider the moral right to expect a friend or romantic partner to turn up to an agreed 
meeting. Here the view relies on whether this is an ‘important condition or good,’ but 
how can we determine whether a good or condition is important? Without the strict 
reading of basic goods, and without a distinction between personal and public 
morality, it is difficult to see how such cases can be excluded. 




240 2016, p. 515. 
241 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 34. Indeed, Gilabert uses this response to the challenge that his view 
cannot accommodate some plausible duties of justice (p. 20-21). If it is thought that this duty 
does not have the moral importance which characterises a duty of justice, again Gilabert’s 
own view is that it is right that some duties of justice will be weightier than others (p. 513). 
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Finally, the most fundamental challenge for this view is that justice no longer carries 
the promise of coercive sanction, and so loses the sense of justice as something which 
society should protect and defend me in the possession of. Once enforceability is out 
of the picture, it is not clear how a duty being a duty of justice provides any additional 
force. One motivation Gilabert offers for shedding enforceability is the concern that 
we have some duties of justice even when the duty is beyond the purview of any 
possible coercive legal structure. For example, “a society without a racist culture 
would in one respect be more just than a society with a racist culture even if the 
coercive institutions of both societies were the same.”242 For the sake of argument, I 
will accept that the coercive institutions of the society with a racist culture are already 
optimised (and therefore racist practices are not in play, and racist value systems are 
discouraged), but that racist value systems persist. If we accept that such value systems 
are beyond the reach of coercive institutions, what does it add to say that any accordant 
duties are duties of justice? The claimworthiness of the relevant duties was already 
established by the qualifier that we were dealing with a moral right. If a duty of justice 
is not something which society should protect me in the possession of, it becomes 
unclear why we should distinguish between justice and beneficence at all. 
3.4 Thomism on justice and beneficence 
I now consider an interpretation of the relationship between justice and beneficence243 
that is quite different to any I have entertained thus far. Stephen Pope gives a 
contemporary reading of Aquinas’ view, suggesting that duties of justice and 
beneficence are not so far apart as modern moral philosophy depicts. Rather, duties of 
justice and beneficence spring from the same source: ‘love of one’s neighbour.’ 
“Christian love of neighbour and justice cannot be separated. For love implies 
an absolute demand for justice, namely a recognition of the dignity and rights 
of one’s neighbour.”244 




242 2016, p. 516. 
243 Pope uses the term ‘duties of charity’ rather than ‘duties of beneficence.’ 
244 Pope, 1991, p.189 (note 13); quoted from Synod of Bishops, 1976, p. 520. 
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On this view, justice is an outward expression of humanitarian motives, and is “the 
cardinal virtue that directs our actions towards other people.”245 Duties of beneficence 
are praiseworthy, and will at times be obligatory. 
At the root of the Thomist distinction is the idea of two kinds of debt. Justice is 
associated with what Pope describes as a legalistic sense of debt, where something is 
held by one person “but owned and claimed by another.”246 In contrast, duties of 
beneficence focus on moral debt, mercy, and the ‘rectitude of virtue.’ While duties of 
justice are always obligatory, moral debt will vary in obligatory force according to the 
influence a particular debt has on the character of the debtor. Interestingly, Pope claims 
that in cases of extreme poverty, we may be bound by duties of justice to give surplus 
goods to the poor. 
Although this view is strongly tied to Christian theology, the Thomist conception of 
justice as an outward expression of humanitarian motives indicates a variety of ways 
that we might recast the relationship between justice and beneficence in secular 
philosophy. Distinguishing justice as external and expressive, but in other ways quite 
strongly tied to beneficence, favours an account of justice as enforceability. This is 
because the external expression is characterised as obligatory as a recognition of the 
dignity and rights of one’s fellow human beings. Here, the distinction does not rest on 
a difference in the grounds of the duties (as both are motivated by love of one’s 
neighbour), but rather on the public sphere of expression. The idea of legalistic debt 
also speaks to the value of the distinction for making claims on others. 
The Thomist distinction does not offer a more complete picture of how we might 
distinguish duties which warrant outward expression from those which do not, and so 
will require supplementation. However, the legalistic sense of debt aligned with duties 
of justice on this account directs our attention in a helpful direction, towards the kinds 
of claims that warrant institutional enforceability. 




245 Pope, 1991, p. 170. 
246 Pope, 1991, p. 171. 
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3.5 Enforceable duties of justice 
Finally, we come to consider the view that duties of justice are those which are morally 
enforceable, and duties of beneficence are those which are not. It has taken us some 
time to reach this point because, while the preceding views often reference 
enforceability in their accounts of this relationship, they also incorporate other criteria, 
and each of these required differentiation and discussion, in turn. 
I take moral enforceability to be a matter of whether “third parties may be justified in 
applying sanctions to those who default on them.”247 Specifically, such duties are 
morally subject to the coercive sanction of institutions. Distinguishing duties of justice 
along the lines of enforceability is common across a range of views: 
“I take it to be a central question here whether we have an enforceable 
obligation to assist the badly off.”248 
Narveson [on determining whether duties to the poor are duties of justice] 
“To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought 
to defend me in the possession of.”249 
Mill 
“Justice ranges over particularly important duties whose fulfilment we are 
prepared to secure by means of public coercion.”250 
Gilabert 
“One test of the distinction between justice and humanity is whether those in 
need are regarded as having enforceable claims to the resources that will meet 
their needs, and correspondingly, whether potential donors are regarded as 
being under enforceable obligations to provide those resources.”251 
Miller 
As I have defined it, enforceability is something different to the determinacy of duties. 
As Allen Buchanan points out, “enforcement is sometimes necessary to secure 




247 Miller, 2007, p. 248. 
248 Narveson, 2003, p. 420 [emphasis original]. 
249 Mill, 2012b, para. 26. 
250 Gilabert, 2006, p. 195. As we have seen, Gilabert sometimes backs away from this view. 
251 Miller, 1992, p. 573. Miller’s language here will be problematic for those who conclude 
that duties to meet needs are a matter of justice, as he refers to the potential duty bearers as 
‘donors.’ 
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contributions to collective goods, [and] in some cases, at least where the collective 
good in question is extremely important, such enforcement seems morally justified.”252 
Examples of such collective goods include clean air or water. Rights to collective 
goods provide a classic example of correlative duties that are indeterminate, and if we 
consider any of these to be the kind of duties which are legitimately enforceable, it is 
empty to deem them beyond the scope of justice simply due to their indeterminacy. 
Duties of justice are defined by their in principle, or justifiable, enforceability. This 
means that we may have duties of justice which we are not actually in a position to 
fully enforce in practice. For example, it is, in principle, justifiable that we employ 
legal institutions to use coercive measures to protect citizens from terrorist attacks.253 
However, we may be unable to entirely prevent such attacks no matter our 
commitment to this duty, or it may be that some measures against such attacks (such 
as torture) are not all-things-considered justified due to their moral impermissibility. 
In each case, the duty to protect citizens from terrorist attacks is in principle 
enforceable, despite practical challenges or limits on all-things-considered 
enforceability. This distinguishes moral from brute enforceability; simply having the 
means to enforce a mandate does not render it a duty of justice. 
It is likely impossible to enforce duties of justice in the real world in a systematic and 
global way, such that everyone meets them at all times. Often, the best we can expect 
to achieve is partial compliance, with some duties of justice either unsuccessfully 
enforced, or partially or completely unenforced. However, this does not detract from 
the idea that we can publicly justify the institutional enforcement of some duties, based 
on their fundamental moral importance. 
On this understanding of enforceability, a great deal rides on the kinds of things we 
take to be justifiably enforceable. Competing views over the domain of enforceability 




252 Buchanan, 1987, p. 562 [emphasis original]. 
253 Here I take coercion to be “where one agent makes threats to others to impose a 
disadvantage on them if they do not do what the threatener wants,” which Caney identifies as 
“the core idea of coercion (found in all leading accounts of coercion)” (2011, p. 520-521). 
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will differ over the substantive issue of how far legal institutions are warranted in 
intervening in the lives of the people they serve, and I will not offer a comprehensive 
account of this substantive issue here. However, such an account is not necessary to 
the role that moral enforceability plays in the project overall. It will be enough if I can 
offer an argument that some particular duties are morally enforceable;254 beyond that, 
I need not demarcate all enforceable duties. We might think that there are many 
reasons for judging a duty morally enforceable, and in the following section I consider 
three such ways of fleshing out enforceability. 
3.5.1 Interpreting enforceability 
I now consider three strategies for judging whether a particular duty is legitimately the 
subject of coercive enforcement: Mill’s harm principle, basic goods, and the necessary 
conditions for human dignity. 
Mill’s harm principle is one natural answer to the question of what duties we might 
properly consider to be justifiably enforceable, as it has already been applied to defend 
the principled limits of law in legal theory.255 
The Harm Principle: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”256 
Taken as it is, the harm principle would seem to defend a strikingly narrow range of 
enforceable duties, similar to that of the libertarian reading of the negative duties 
account. Regulation that is either paternalistic (to prevent harm to the individual) or 
aimed at collective goods (to provide collective benefits) will be ruled out. Curiously, 
Mill does support some autonomy-enhancing paternalism, as well as regulation aimed 
at securing collective benefits where failing to act is seen to cause harm.257 Although 




254 I have in mind here, of course, duties of responsiveness to need. I argue in Chapter 6 that 
these duties are morally enforceable, using Mieth and Nussbaum’s interpretations of 
enforceability as developed in the following section. 
255 Stanton-Ife, 2006. 
256 Mill, 2012a, para. 10. 
257 Stanton-Ife, 2006, section 3.6. Examples include education (autonomy-enhancing 
paternalism) and public safety (a collective good). 
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this distances Mill from the libertarian negative duties account defended in Section 
2.1, it introduces conceptual ambiguities to interpreting harm that make the harm 
principle less clear and definitive than it first seemed.258 
Avoiding exegetical interpretation then, a literal, narrow reading of harm is also 
subject to challenges. It would be difficult to justify any universal protective state 
legislation or intervention on such a view, including publicly funded education.259 
Further, the principle has difficulty dealing with cases of wrongdoing that do not 
feature direct harms, but that we do in fact criminalize, and that seem to be prime 
candidates for criminalization. Stewart calls these cases of ‘harmless wrongdoing,’ and 
they undermine the necessary connection between harm and enforceability.260 
Rather than reject the harm principle entirely, we might instead see it as defining one 
way, among many, that a duty might be properly subject to coercive enforcement.261 
On this reading, one reason for deeming that a duty of justice is morally enforceable 
is that it prevents harm to others. Such a view would no longer be subject to the 
challenge that it is overly restrictive, and it seems entirely appropriate that preventing 
harm to others offers us one moral reason for coercive enforcement. I now move on to 
consider two additional contenders. 
Mieth proposes that duties are institutionally enforceable when they aim at basic 
goods. She defines basic goods as “the substances of basic rights;”262 these are the 




258 Stewart (2010) has suggested that even strategies to vindicate the harm principle by 
relaxing the understanding of harm to include indirect harms will not be successful, as they 
end up counterintuitively criminalizing conduct on the basis of fear or worry. See also: 
Holtug, 2002. 
259 Mackenzie, 2014, p. 47. 
260 Stewart offers the example of rape, which (it is argued) can be perpetrated without 
directly harming the victim, despite its rank amongst the central instances of crime. The 
example stipulates that the victim was drugged and has no recollection of the crime, and has 
suffered no physical or psychological injuries. He adopts this example from Gardner (2007). 
Another, less central, example of a harmless wrongdoing might include the mistreatment of 
corpses. 
261 Stewart, 2010. 
262 Mieth, 2008, p. 31. 
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goods that are necessary to enjoy any further goods, such as security and subsistence. 
This will include a broader range of duties of justice than a narrow interpretation of 
the harm principle, and will be able to accommodate the autonomy-enhancing 
paternalism and collective benefits cases, when those cases pertain to such basic 
goods. However, it is questionable whether her account will be able to accommodate 
examples that appear to be duties of justice, but that also arguably do not centre on 
basic goods, such as the duty to keep contracts. If such duties are considered basic, 
they significantly widen her stated understanding of basic-ness, leaving her view 
ambiguous. Again, I suggest that we interpret Mieth as providing one reason a duty 
might be considered morally enforceable: that it pertains to basic goods. In this way, 
we (potentially) leave space for other ways of justifying contract duties and other 
duties aimed at non-basic goods, and we do not risk stretching the view beyond its 
intended meaning. 
Finally, I turn to the proposal that moral enforceability is connected to the necessary 
conditions for a life worthy of human dignity.263 This is the most maximal of the 
proposals I have offered, and it clearly relies on what we take human dignity to consist 
in, and what is necessary for securing it. Nussbaum naturally understands human 
dignity along the lines of the ten central capabilities.264 However, there is a further 
question of the relevant thresholds of each capability that are necessary for dignity. 
For example, life is a comparatively basic and limited capability, requiring that we are 
“able to live to the end of a human life of normal length.”265 However, how should we 
set the threshold for bodily health, which includes “being able to have good health”?266 
This might be understood more minimally in terms of sufficient means to maintain 
minimal human agency, or more maximally to include “a state of complete physical, 




263 Nussbaum, 2011, p. 167-169. 
264 See Chapter 2 Section 3.1. 
265 2011, p. 33. Even here the issue of thresholds arises, as we can define a normal lifespan in 
a variety of ways (e.g. by reference to the national average of the country you live in, by 
reference to the life expectancy of a person fitting your demographic characteristics, etc.). 
266 2011, p. 33. 
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mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”267 I 
stress this point about thresholds because it will be of great significance in determining 
precisely what this view defines as morally enforceable. As such, the view is more 
helpful when viewed as offering a line of reasoning on which we might defend the 
moral enforceability of a duty, rather than as a substantive view that offers concrete 
determinations. 
We should expect reasonable disagreement about the kinds of things that are 
enforceable. Even a negative duties account providing several overlapping criteria for 
justice duties (negative, perfect, determinacy, and enforceability) produces vast 
disagreement on the range of duties which are morally enforceable, based on the 
question of whether global poverty harms the poor.268 On the enforceability account 
that I offer, we are reduced to one fundamental criterion, which arguably leaves a wider 
scope for disagreement. However, this also serves to accommodate a view of the 
relationship between justice and beneficence that is focused on the central moral issue 
that distinguishes justice from beneficence: the legitimacy of third party enforcement. 
Duties of justice go along with claim-worthy entitlements that can be enforced, but 
they need not be categorically more determinate, or have an altogether different 
structure. 
I have offered several views on how we might determine whether a particular duty is 
morally enforceable: the harm principle, the basic goods view, and the necessary 
conditions of human dignity. Each of these has limitations, but each offers the kind of 
reasons that bear on the moral enforceability of a duty. Further, we can understand 
enforceability in terms of a continuum rather than a categorical binary; classical 
negative duties will likely be definitively enforceable, but others may occupy more 
liminal regions of classification. 
3.5.2 Challenges for moral enforceability 




267 WHO, 1948. 
268 This is visible in the contrasting accounts of our duties to the global poor presented by 
Narveson (2003) and Pogge (2007, 2002). 
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I now consider three challenges for the view of moral enforceability I have defended: 
lack of guidance, the right to do wrong, and unenforceable duties of justice. 
The lack of guidance worry is that by specifying that a duty is morally enforceable, we 
do not say much more than that it is ‘really serious’ or ‘very important.’ Enforceability, 
on this view, does not add anything of value to our understanding of the duty, and is 
not distinct from moral importance. However, this objection gets the direction of 
explanation backwards. The moral seriousness or importance of a duty may well be 
one way of justifying the enforceability of a particular duty, perhaps as a complement 
to the human dignity line of reasoning. However, it cannot help us to distinguish 
between duties of justice and beneficence on this view. I have taken justice to be 
fundamentally about a social or public sphere of the moral domain, with third party, 
institutional enforceability defining its scope. We may well have very important duties 
of private morality, but if they are not the kind of duty that could, in principle, justify 
third party enforcement, they are not duties of justice. 
The right to do wrong challenge speaks to the intuition that we should be able to make 
morally bad choices without third party intervention to restrict these personal choices. 
An example of a right to do wrong is one’s moral right not to help a friend in need, or 
a moral right to support a racist political party.269 The concern here is that by expanding 
the realm of moral enforceability beyond a minimal interpretation of the harm 
principle, we intrude in the realm of choice that should be protected for every moral 
agent. Whether there is a genuine right to do wrong is contested,270 but for the sake of 
argument, I will grant that here. What is important is that if there is such a right, it is 
not an unqualified or indefeasible one. Rather, it must be weighed against other 
considerations, such as the security or subsistence rights of other people. Indeed, even 
the harm principle is an example of just such a process of consideration: unfettered 
liberty is weighed against the potential to harm others, and the potential to harm others 
is found to be more morally weighty. If we do have a right to do wrong, it is appropriate 
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that this be weighed against other considerations (such as the basic goods and human 
dignity accounts) when determining whether a duty is a morally enforceable duty of 
justice. 
A final challenge points to a category of duties which are, it is alleged, unenforceable 
duties of justice. The challenge is motivated by the thought that duties of justice are 
not necessarily legitimately institutionally enforceable. Gilabert offers two such 
challenges: 
(1) “The long cultural struggle by feminists before legal frameworks 
implementing non-discrimination were established”271 
(2) “It is not a conceptual impossibility to think of a just society that has no 
robust, or coercive, institutional structure. An example might be an anarchist 
society securing liberty and equality for all through arrangements that are 
thoroughly voluntary.”272 
The challenge presented by (1) is easily dealt with. Although such institutions did not 
in fact exist, duties of non-discrimination are precisely the kind of duties which should 
be enforceable by institutions, and such institutions should exist. That is, the fact that 
the institutions necessary for the enforcement of a duty do not exist does not preclude 
that duty from being a duty of justice; rather, it precludes us from actually enforcing 
the duty. 
(2) is not so easily dismissed. We might counter that the ‘arrangements’ referred to 
must surely amount to an institutional structure on a more generous understanding of 
the term, but this would dodge the more fundamental point that it is conceptually 
possible to have a just society without any coercive institutional structures. I 
acknowledge that this is conceptually possible. However, it does not seem to be a 
human possibility; it does not depict ‘justice for Earthlings.’ Indeed, the anarchist 
community described is living outside the circumstances of justice, as such 
harmonious relations existing outside of any coercive structure require more than 
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mutual disinterestedness or limited altruism.273 While justice for angels may not rely 
on systems of coercive enforcement, justice for humans does. 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that duties of justice are those which are, in principle, morally 
enforceable. I began by examining the negative duties account, and argued that it 
exaggerates the moral significance of a distinction between negative and positive 
duties, even if such a distinction can be conceptually maintained. I then considered the 
prospects for determinacy, basic goods, rights, or Thomist love of one’s neighbour 
giving a better distinction between our duties of justice and beneficence. After finding 
faults or limits with each rival, I defended the moral enforceability account. I suggested 
that various lines of reasoning might help us to distinguish what is morally enforceable 
from what is not, including the harm principle, a basic goods view, or a human dignity 
view. Although none of these offered necessary and sufficient grounds for moral 
enforceability in themselves, they demonstrated the kind of reasoning that must be 
weighed when determining whether a particular duty is properly subject to coercive 
enforcement. 
Why care about the distinction between justice and beneficence at all? Beyond the 
pragmatic consideration that we are unlikely to eliminate this distinction from our 
moral and everyday language, duties of justice are often taken to offer stronger ground 
for public claiming and entitlement. Duties of justice are the kinds of things that we 
can make claims against, that are enforced by the sword of Lady Justice, and that “can 
be demanded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame.”274 Further, if one 
reason for inaction to alleviate global poverty is the lack of coercive enforcement of 
such obligations,275 then demonstrating that those obligations are properly the subject 




273 Rawls, 1999, section 22. It is also possible that this state of unstructured harmony would 
rely on more plentiful resource availability than would be best described by ‘moderate 
scarcity.’ 
274 Feinberg, 1973, p. 58-59. 
275 Lichtenberg, 2004, p. 79-81. 
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of coercive enforcement matters for national and international policy. In many ways, 
it is this core of moral enforceability that seems to me to matter most; if justice is not 
about enforceability, perhaps enforceability itself should be the focus of our attention.  
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Chapter 4: Need and Moral Normativity:  
A First Pass 
1. Introduction 
When beginning this inquiry into the moral importance of need, I started with an 
exploration of needs and their ends (see Chapter 1). There I argued that it is particular 
ends which make some needs morally important, and distinguished such needs from 
merely instrumental needs. Contemporary moral and political philosophical accounts 
of need tend to approach it from this vantage point of ‘needs,’ which made it a natural 
way to begin. However, in this chapter, I will shift my focus somewhat to question 
‘needing’, and what makes someone needing something morally important. 
Recall the three-part relation of need: 
X needs Y in order that Z. 
(Where X represents an entity – in this context, a human being – and Y 
represents a necessary condition to the end state Z obtaining.) 
Needs are here understood in terms of the necessary condition (or Y-term), which 
tends to focus attention on the things that satisfy needs – as in need for water, food, or 
housing. By focusing on needing, we shift attention to the entity that is in need (or X-
term). This brings out a sense of vulnerability: “my needing x is a state or condition of 
dependency upon x with respect to some non-negotiable good.”276 
In some ways, the questions that present themselves in respect to ‘needing’ are 
opposite to those when considering ‘needs.’ Focusing on needs, we are inclined to ask 
what needs are, how we can distinguish them from neighbouring concepts such as 
desires, what kinds of things people need, and possibly even mount a list of the most 
basic needs. In contrast, needing, or a person ‘in need’, is more immediately salient. 
Here questions cluster around the response or ‘pull’ felt when witnessing someone in 
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need – the source of the normative pull experienced, and when and how this pull is 
morally warranted. 
We might think that “the brute fact that a person is in serious need is a compelling 
prima facie reason”277 for action. If this is true, then we can question whether such 
apparent reasons obtain when all things are considered, but we cannot inquire any 
further into the normativity of need; the brute fact itself compels us, and there is 
nothing further to say. However, people can and often do disagree about when a person 
is properly considered to be in serious need, and whether needing in itself establishes 
any kind of moral demand on others. This being the case, we should look for the 
strongest defensible case for the moral importance of need in itself, in order to 
determine how seriously we should take the normativity of need.278 
In this chapter, I survey the most prominent accounts of the normativity of need in 
existing needs literature: ‘intrinsic normativity,’ ‘moralism,’ ‘avoiding harm,’ and 
‘vulnerability to coercion.’279 I will focus primarily on theorists who provide an 
explicit explanation of need’s normativity, as implicit versions are often too 
ambiguous or incomplete to be of much help.280 I assess each in turn, and finally 
suggest that each is unsatisfying, too limited, or neglects an element of need which is 
crucial to providing the best possible account. The strongest possible account should 
retain the practical merits that need is often taken to have as a concept – namely 
intuitive moral force and simplicity – and survive critical scrutiny and interrogation. 




277 Elazar, 2003, p. 5. 
278 For the remainder of this chapter, I am focusing on the normativity of morally interesting 
need, which as we have seen in Chapter 1 does not extend to just any expressed or felt need. 
279 These four views can be interrelated, and each theorist brings their own nuance to the 
more general category, but the general categories will be accurate enough to be helpful as a 
heuristic. 
280 One notable exception of a needs theorist whose explicit account of normativity I will not 
consider here is Lawrence Hamilton (2003). His work is of a critical, historical bent and 
focuses on the normativity of felt needs (termed by Thomson and others ‘false needs,’ (1987, 
p. 31)), as well as their generation and legitimation. He does not accept a categorical 
distinction between needs and wants, which is important to the normative story developed in 
this and the following chapter. Therefore, the two projects are quite distinct: see Introduction 
Section I.iii. 
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Further, it should not rely on a comprehensive moral doctrine which is itself highly 
contested (for example, defending the normativity of need exclusively on the grounds 
of the principle of utility).281 
Needs theory has enjoyed a level of critique, but often this has been centred on 
concerns about implementation, demandingness, paternalism, or coherence (i.e. 
whether needs can be distinguished from preferences, etc.). Relatively little critical 
engagement has been offered, even between theorists who substantively disagree, on 
the normativity of need. I hope that my critiques in this chapter are seen for what they 
are: friendly attempts to build the best possible defence of the normativity of need. 
Each view contains its share of insight, and although I will ultimately suggest that the 
four proposed accounts cannot be accepted as they stand, the original account I offer 
in Chapter 5 will explicitly draw from the insights gleaned in this chapter – in 
particular, from the ‘avoiding harm’ and ‘vulnerability to coercion’ approaches. 
2. Intrinsic Normativity 
I begin by examining the view that needs are intrinsically normative: they impose 
moral demands on us which call us to action in a way that is not mediated by any 
further considerations, and cannot be explained by anything more than the need claim 
itself. This view is sometimes paired with the contention that needs are not reducible 
to any other concepts, and so are in at least one sense fundamental. They cannot be 
analysed in terms of values, rights, interests, harm, or any other basic moral category, 
and must be considered a basic moral category in their own right. I have offered an 
understanding of need in terms of interests in Chapter 1, and I respond to the 
irreducibility view in Chapter 2, so I will not engage with it here. 
The intrinsic normativity account is sometimes suggested in passing by theorists who 
ultimately offer another story of need’s normativity: 
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“Needs already have moral force, I want to say prima facie, and by the very 
use of the term. That’s one reason why the concept of needs is so much abused; 
it pulls, or at least tends to pull, on people’s heartstrings.”282 
However, the archetypal defence of this view is found in Soran Reader and Gillian 
Brock’s 2004 ‘Needs, moral demands, and moral theory,’ and I will focus on it for the 
remainder of this section. 
Reader and Brock argue that needs are a basic element of moral practice, and that one 
of the defining features of the moral agent is that they will recognise the need of others 
as normative. All moral agents just will, characteristically, consider needs to be 
morally normative. The discernment of need is part of what it means to be a skilful 
moral agent: 
“Non-contingent needs have normative properties within moral practice which 
constrain what moral agents may do. In practice, things in the world – a piece 
of wood, some apparatus, a need – guide agents in a particular skilled activity 
– playing chess, doing science, or acting morally. So needs are moral demands 
for moral agents in the sense that the actions of moral agents are guided by 
them.”283  
If a person who considers herself a moral agent does not find need normative, this is 
an indicator not of a divergent moral perspective, but rather a failure to master moral 
practice: 
“If you do not see that the need constitutes a moral demand in such cases, what 
we will probably say is not that we need a better argument to prove the moral 
importance of needs, but rather that you have not yet mastered normal moral 
practice. […] Someone who does not understand that non-contingent needs 
impose moral demands does not understand what it is to be a moral agent.”284 
As the selected quotes suggest, much of this view seems to hinge on a prior 
commitment to (or rejection of) moral practice. This is not unexpected, as we should 




282 Braybrooke, 2005, p. 218. See Section 4 for Braybrooke’s version of the ‘vulnerability to 
coercion’ account. 
283 2004, p. 253. Reader and Brock are here using ‘non-contingent’ need in a way that is 
roughly analogous to my category of ‘non-arbitrary’ need: see Chapter 1. 
284 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 258. 
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not expect need to be morally normative for those who are not engaged in the practice 
of morality. Indeed, it would be surprising to find an account of the normativity of 
need which suggested that need is morally normative even for those who have rejected 
moral practice.285 However, Reader and Brock may ultimately commit themselves to 
that position when they go on to distinguish public and private morality. 
Reader and Brock posit that the normativity of need operates differently in private and 
public morality. Private morality, on their view, is concerned with the specific moral 
relationships that we are all engaged in as particular, individual persons. Private 
morality dictates that I must take the needs of those I am in a moral relationship with 
to be (defeasible) moral demands. For example, I am in a moral relation of friendship 
with some fellow persons, which requires (among other things) that I be disposed to 
meet the non-contingent needs of those persons, where appropriate. The story of 
need’s normativity that Reader and Brock offer for private morality matches that 
outlined above: insofar as I am committed to moral practice, I will (and must) take the 
needs of those I am in a particular moral relationship to make demands on me. 
Although this normativity will exclude those outside of moral practice, as we have 
seen, this is to be expected. However, private morality will excuse us recognising and 
responding to any need outside of the personal relationships we are already in, and so 
Reader and Brock offer a further sphere of morality to capture the needs of people with 
whom we do not have personal relations. 
Public morality is more general, and is not concerned with particular moral 
relationships. As public morality is generalised, it addresses only those basic needs 
which are shared by people as such: agency, life, flourishing, or harm. Further, need 
is normative in a different way in the public sphere: 




285 Does morality continue to make moral demands of those who do not (or cannot) 
participate in moral practice? I will remain agnostic here, but suffice it to say that such 
people will not find anything intrinsically morally demanding. Where further justifications 
are available, we should defer to them – where they are not, and I suspect any argument for 
moral normativity will ultimately reach such limits, we must accept that some people are 
incapable of responding to moral demands. 
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“[N]eeds are combined into lists, and are held to be intrinsically demanding, 
rather than simply being that which we in fact use as morally demanding in our 
practices as they are, as in our practice-based account [of private morality].”286 
This characterisation of normativity is not immediately clear. We have already seen 
that, in private morality, recognising need as morally normative just is a part of what 
it means to be a moral agent. That is one way that normativity could be intrinsic: for 
anyone engaged in moral practice, needs just do present themselves as moral demands, 
in a way that requires no additional justification. However, if normativity is different 
in the public sphere, as Reader and Brock contend that it is, this cannot be the sense of 
‘intrinsic’ used here. As Reader and Brock do not provide further clues, I can think of 
only one other sense of ‘intrinsically demanding’ consistent with their account: that 
need forces moral demands on us irrespective of our participation in moral practice. 
This would be a strange view, in that those operating outside of moral practice 
characteristically would not respond to (or perhaps even fully recognise) moral 
demands. For such agents, it would be particularly unsatisfying to claim that need 
simply is intrinsically normative, and some additional normative justification must 
surely be offered if we are to expect success. 
In fairness to Reader and Brock, they shift from arguing in decisive terms such as 
‘needs have normative properties’ to the more arms-length language of ‘needs are held 
to be intrinsically demanding’ when they talk of intrinsic normativity in public 
morality. Perhaps, then, they are indicating that this is a rhetorical feature of public 
morality – we must talk of needs in this way, for example, in order to hold people 
categorically accountable for meeting needs in the public sphere. The explication of 
intrinsic normativity offered for private morality is clearest, and it is consistent with 
the picture of normativity offered after the authors have addressed the public sphere.287 




286 Reader & Brock, 2004, p. 255-256. 
287 For example: “We are social animals, embedded in moral practice. We encounter needs, 
and normally meet them. Sometimes our own needs, sometimes those of others. If I see that 
you are hungry, I offer you something to eat” (p. 258). In summing up, the authors also refer 
to “the evident normativity of needs” (p. 266). 
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Therefore, I will direct my response to the version of intrinsic normativity offered in 
favour of private morality: needs just do make moral demands on moral agents. 
As someone who deems needs theory worthy of attention to such a degree that my 
thesis is focused on it, I should perhaps be among the people most inclined to accept 
the intrinsic normativity of need. Until I was presented with critical questions as to 
why ‘someone else’s need should matter to me,’ I was quite happy to make decisions 
in everyday life (and in bioethics research) with a kind of default assumption of need 
being morally important. However, broader social and political practice demonstrates 
that not everyone shares this assumption, and I suspect it would be facile to simply 
dismiss dissent as belonging to agents outside the bounds of participation in moral 
practice.  
Perhaps more importantly, I suspect that something more can be said on the matter. 
For example, Reader and Brock rightly notice that it is not just any entity whose need 
matters morally – they have restricted their focus to human beings.288 If we find the 
normativity of need too obvious or common sense to interrogate at first sight, this 
strikes me as a promising way of entering the inquiry. For example, we might start 
with questioning why human need matters morally in a different way than the need of 
other entities (if it does). This is something that many need theorists implicitly assume, 
and if this presumption is defensible it may then lead us on to further insights. The 
grounds for focusing on human need, or for giving it higher moral importance than 
need in non-human animals or other entities, might offer clues to the normativity of 
need.289 
Moreover, providing a deeper story of the normativity of need does not require that 
we intellectualise the phenomenology of experiencing, recognising, and responding to 
need. If this is a concern, there are many ways of understanding moral behaviour as 
benefiting from good emotional or cognitive habits that help us to effect moral 




288 For my comments on the moral importance of need in non-human animals, see Chapter 5 
and Conclusion Section 3.3. 
289 I offer my own view in Chapter 5, where I focus on morally relevant capacities. 
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judgment and action in the moment, and such approaches need not debunk the 
underlying or justificatory grounds on which we distinguish right from wrong or good 
from bad.290 
I suggest that if more can be said to defend the moral normativity of need, then it is 
worth exploring. The ‘intrinsic’ account is uniquely unhelpful for responding to critics 
of the moral importance of need who take themselves to be equal participants in moral 
practice with the rest of us. 
3. Moralism 
The moralist shares Reader and Brock’s focus on moral practice, but is particularly 
concerned with the necessary conditions for us to make moral judgements about 
practices outside of our culture or social sphere. If we are truly committed to our 
morality and its claims about the moral good or right action, then we will take this to 
be the measure of the good or right action, and hold that all moral agents should behave 
accordingly. However, judging the actions of others requires that their behaviour was 
the product of genuine choice. So, to the extent that we consider ourselves to have hit 
upon the true morality, we must provide all moral agents with the necessary conditions 
for genuine moral choice, such that their actions can be judged by our moral standards. 
This view is primarily championed by Len Doyal and Ian Gough in their landmark 
1991 A Theory of Human Need and subsequent writings. They cite an early version of 
the argument in Raymond Plant, Henry Lesser, and Peter Taylor-Gooby’s work,291 but 
Doyal and Gough’s work has been highly influential in needs theory and defended 
over the course of decades,292 so I will take their account as the canonical ‘moralist’ 
approach. 
Doyal and Gough state their argument clearly: 
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“The measure of our moral commitment is our willingness to take seriously its 
categorical character – its applicability to everyone and not just to those with 
whom we already profess agreement. If our good is the good then we must 
believe that all individuals should do their best to act accordingly – irrespective 
of their own moral values. If one believes, for example, that female 
circumcision is an affront to all women, or that the isolation of old people is an 
outrage, then the practice must be morally condemned – whatever the 
justification used by participants. However, if we believe that others should do 
their best to be good in our terms then we must also accept that they have the 
right to try do so [sic]. Yet for this prescription to be any more than a hollow 
moral abstraction, it also follows that they should have the right of access to 
those conditions which make such a choice a real physical, emotional and 
intellectual possibility: the right to optimal need-satisfaction.”293 
Note that they are establishing here not just the moral normativity of need, but a right 
to need satisfaction with stringent correlative duties. Throughout their work, they 
connect needs and rights, and for Doyal and Gough the reasoning used to answer the 
question of “whether people’s needs should be met”294 is the same which establishes 
a right to need satisfaction. 
A further note on the particularities of their account is necessary. It might be thought 
that need satisfaction is too low a bar to establish sufficiently genuine choice for 
attribution of blame and moral condemnation, given that on some theories of basic 
needs this will only include the barest of necessities for continued survival or minimal 
agency. We might think, say, that even the person whose minimal agency is sustained 
by meeting their most basic needs for sustenance, shelter, and security, cannot be said 
to genuinely choose whether to be complicit in cultural practices which may be upheld 
by threats or coercive force. Further, they may be subject to adaptive preferences, 
wherein they internalise conditions of oppression, and their preferences and choices 
are constrained by those conditions.295 However, Doyal and Gough’s basic needs have 
a liberationist bent to them. The two basic needs they offer are physical health and 
personal autonomy, but their personal autonomy is a much more demanding notion 
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than any minimal agency approach will accommodate.296 On their view, personal 
autonomy includes not just the psychological capacity to deliberate and the availability 
of opportunities to act and choose, but also critical autonomy. Critical autonomy 
involves the combination of freedom of agency (being able, in principle, to choose) 
and political freedom (participation “in agreeing to or changing the rules of a 
culture”297). This means that the example I provided would not meet their standards of 
need satisfaction, as the agent clearly is not in a position to participate in forming and 
reforming their culture’s presiding moral norms. Therefore, the agent would not be 
subject to our moral condemnation, as the conditions for genuine choice have not been 
met. 
We come now to consider the promise of the ‘moralist’ account of the normativity of 
need. I suggest this view offers an important insight: that of understanding basic needs 
as necessary conditions for some other end, in this case genuine moral agency and 
choice. As I argued in Chapter 1, this allows us to avoid the charge of arbitrariness in 
declaring some needs as basic and others as non-basic. However, seen as an account 
of the normativity of need, I suggest it faces at least three concerns. 
The first is that the argument as it is stated does not necessarily establish its conclusion. 
The thought is that if we are truly committed to the morality we defend, we will 
consider its demands to apply to all people; and this would be unfair if all people did 
not have access to the necessary conditions for real choice. Therefore, we must provide 
such conditions through optimal need satisfaction. However, this line of reasoning 
assumes that the duties of the morality we are committed to are unconditional – that 
is, they make demands on us even if we do not have access to the necessary conditions 
for meaningful choice. We might instead think that when morality commands all 




296 Soper, 1993, p. 121; also, see my view in Chapter 1. I defend a more minimal set of ‘basic 
needs’ along the lines of existential urgency, and those conditions which are necessary for 
any level of flourishing. On my account, there is still space for seeing something like Doyal 
and Gough’s ‘critical autonomy’ as a genuine, non-arbitrary need necessary for flourishing – 
however, it will not qualify as a ‘basic need’ as it does not accord with the understanding of 
‘basic’ I adopt, in line with thinkers such as Henry Shue. 
297 Doyal, 1998, p. 162 [original emphasis removed]. 
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people, it does so conditionally: those who can choose to act morally, should. If this is 
right, then another fair alternative to universal need satisfaction would be release from 
conditional moral duties when those conditions are not satisfied, and likely an 
accordant absolution from blameworthiness or sanction. To address this neglected 
alternative would require Doyal and Gough to defend a view requiring any reasonable 
morality, that we are truly committed to, to mandate unconditional universal duties. 
Such a move would be undesirably contentious, and their account as it stands does not 
offer any such defence. 
The second concern is one of reach. For example, on this account, anyone subscribing 
to a particularist or contextualist view of morality at any level will not be moved by 
the need of people outside their moral sphere. This is strange, as moralism does not 
appear to be necessary to feeling the normative pull of the needs of others. Further, 
Doyal and Gough mandate optimal need satisfaction, which will necessarily go beyond 
any more minimalist or sufficientarian demands. It is often thought that sufficientarian 
reasoning may require meeting some extremely minimal needs for survival for all 
people, and that above this low threshold such a morality may be silent, allowing for 
the narrowing of the moral sphere to co-nationals or those with whom we enjoy some 
other moral relationship. However, Doyal and Gough’s view of the moral good is 
clearly not a sufficientarian one, nor is it compatible with such views. Their concern 
appears to be that if we do not provide the “preconditions for the optimal pursuit of 
virtue,”298 any right action from those who are not in a position of genuine choice will 
be “a bland conformity of action [that] is a form of conceptual and emotional 
slavery.”299 This concern motivates the inclusion of critical autonomy as a basic need, 
and the optimal provision of need satisfaction. However, this level of liberationist need 
satisfaction is so demanding that it is not clear that even middle-class citizens of 
wealthy developed states can be said to have their most basic needs met. I consider 
that there is something telling in this result, but that ultimately it comes at too great a 
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cost if it requires explaining the normativity of need in terms that sufficientarians 
cannot accept, given the popularity of sufficientarian logic in other versions of needs 
theory.300 
Further, this account might allow those who are ideally situated to contribute to need 
satisfaction to get off the hook. For example, a person who has amassed wealth and 
power and purchased vacation homes in a range of impoverished countries (whose 
cultures are various and whose moral norms are sufficiently distinct), would on this 
view have no reason to be moved by first-hand observation of extreme need of other 
people if that person did not also hold to a version of morality which judges cultural 
practices beyond cultural borders. Whatever we might expect of the person’s 
reasoning, emotions, or action, we might think they should be moved in some way, or 
that they have reason to be moved. 
A third concern with the ‘moralist’ approach is that the source of normativity here 
appears to reside in one’s own moral convictions about the universality of the moral 
good, rather than in any response to or concern for the being in need. The reasoning 
appears to be that if we expect others to abide by the standards we advocate, we must 
provide them with the means to abide by those standards, otherwise moral 
condemnation for failure would be misguided. Although this seems right, it seems a 
strange reason to consider need to place moral demands on us. I cannot think how to 
express this confusion other than to question: what about the being in need? It seems 
to me that an acceptable story of moral normativity should feature some connection or 
relation to their position or concerns, and the two following accounts will shift focus 
to take just such a view. 
In summary, the moralist account of the normativity of need does not sufficiently 
establish its conclusion, and is undesirably restricted in reach: it cannot accommodate 
even sufficientarian moral logic, which would exclude some who are moved by needs 
enough to be needs theorists. Further, it disregards sources of normativity which are 
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more immediate and compelling. Therefore, we should continue looking for an 
approach which speaks to deeper grounds of normativity, and is not so restricted in 
reach. 
4. Avoiding Harm 
Avoiding harm, or avoiding serious harm, is a common theme in many theories of the 
moral importance of need. For some it is the ultimate end which our needs are directed 
toward (as in ‘X needs Y in order to avoid serious harm’).301 For others, it is a 
consideration in favour of taking needs seriously in moral and political practice.302 
However, in this section I examine two views which argue that avoiding harm features 
in our best justification for the normativity of need. I first consider Garrett Thomson’s 
view which centres on ‘extremity of harm,’ and then move to Wiggins’ view that 
unmet need amounts to harm that gives us a good ‘reason to opt out of social 
cooperation.’ 
4.1 Extremity of harm 
For Thomson, harm is at the centre of a range of claims of necessity. First, it is the end 
of all fundamental needs: “A person has a fundamental need for x if he must be 
inescapably and seriously harmed so long as he lacks x.”303 Further, avoidance of harm 
is a natural necessity, which makes it a practical necessity: 
“Objects of need are practically necessary because they are naturally necessary. 
The fact that needs are a matter of priority and that true need claims are 
unimpeachable is a consequence of what needs are, and it is because of this 
that needs are objective.”304 




301 Thomson, 2005, 1987; Wiggins, 2005, 1998; Frankfurt, 1998; Copp, 1998; Wiggins & 
Dermen, 1987. 
302 Referencing a Rawlsian, contractarian choice scenario and its possible outcomes: “Being 
unable to meet our basic needs must be one of the greatest harms that can ensue” (Brock, 
2005, p. 56). 
303Thomson, 1987, p. 90. 
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This is because, whether or not we want to avoid harm, harm has a disvalue because it 
deprives us of intrinsic goods.305 
Need and its normativity enters the picture because all true needs are aimed at avoiding 
serious harm. While there are many degrees of harm, being deprived of one’s 
fundamental needs is a particularly serious form of harm: 
“Needs are important because the harm suffered by a person when he lacks 
what he needs is especially serious. In the extreme, a person literally cannot do 
without what he needs; without it he is deprived of being an agent and a subject 
of experience at all.”306 
Although this passage does not explicitly reference moral importance, this is the extent 
of the argument offered for the normativity of need – meeting need is inescapable if 
we are to avoid extremely serious harm, which we cannot help but have interests in 
avoiding. Therefore, we have good reason to meet need. 
Thomson’s argument is straightforward and relatively pared down, and in this sense 
shares something with the ‘intrinsic normativity’ argument of Reader and Brock. 
Moreover, his emphasis on the seriousness of harm when fundamental needs go unmet 
seems to me well-placed. On his account, we focus squarely on the being in need as 
the source of normativity, unlike the moralist’s narrative. We might elaborate on this 
theme, drawing on Shue’s notion of the “morality of the depths”307 to speak to the 
moral importance of crossing the line between harm and serious harm. However, 
Thomson’s argument moves too quickly, and we should not make the same mistake. 
Thomson moves from natural to practical necessity in the blink of an eye. From the 
fact that the objects of need bear natural necessity for the needing being, he concludes 
that they have practical necessity – seemingly not just for the needing being, but for 
any rational (or moral?) agent. As Richard Keshen notes, this assumes that “morality 




305 1987, p. 38. 
306 1987, p. 127. 
307 1996, p. 18. 
 
Chapter 4: Need and Moral Normativity:  
A First Pass 
 
126 
is necessarily and essentially concerned to mitigate harm.”308 Although Keshen is 
ready to accept this caveat, this move is both a significant and a controversial one. This 
move will alienate all moral theorists who consider right action, virtue, flourishing, or 
any other basic moral concept to be the proper focus of morality – which we should 
avoid doing, unless we have no viable alternatives. Further, it means that the simplicity 
of Thomson’s argument is illusory, or at least borrowed from implicit premises which 
carry serious explanatory burdens with them when they are made explicit. 
Because Thomson does not defend his view of morality, we also cannot see the 
connection between my having a need (meaning that I have an interest in avoiding 
serious harm which carries natural necessity, and therefore also practical necessity for 
me) and anyone else being moved by that need. He argues that each of us has objective 
interests in avoiding serious harm, but it is not clear to me how that results in other 
beings, with their own interests, being moved to action on my behalf. It is this 
connection that we are most concerned with in this chapter, so unfortunately, 
Thomson’s theory is at best incomplete for our purposes.309 
4.2 Reason to opt out of social cooperation 
David Wiggins offers an alternative way of understanding the importance of avoiding 
harm in understanding the normative force of need. Like Thomson, Wiggins takes 
‘avoiding harm’ to be the proper end of morally important needs.310 Further, he 
considers that this end gives us a first answer as to how need is normative: 
“Given this account of the word’s content, it becomes unsurprising that ‘need’ 
taken in the absolute sense should have the special point and force it appears 




308 1989, p. 180. 
309 A further concern we might have for Thomson’s account, even if it were completed, 
might centre on his understanding of harm. He provides a non-comparative account of harm, 
such that being deprived of primary goods is a harm, whether or not we can describe 
ourselves as being ‘worse off’ by comparison to any counterfactual or previous state. Many 
philosophers have been suspicious of the moral significance of this kind of harm, or indeed 
whether it is best thought of as ‘harm’ at all. For example, see: Thomson, 2010; Parfit, 1987, 
section 126. 
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to have […]. It is also to be expected that, so understood, ‘need’ should be 
normative or evaluative, and normative or evaluative in virtue of its content.”311 
So again, it is the avoidance of harm that is intended to do normative work.312 
Wiggins does not pause to elaborate in any further detail how need and the avoidance 
of harm comes to have moral force for others, but he does offer an account of its 
political force. The significance of this distinction is not clear, but when he shifts to 
political force, he also shifts to a form of public justification: that is, how could we 
defend the importance of need to others, and establish it as a priority for public policy 
or intervention. Therefore, I suggest that this argument for the political force of need 
be seen, for our purposes, as a supplement to his earlier claim that need has normative 
force, as it will help us to understand the kinds of reason he might offer to defend 
need’s normativity. 
He claims that a person is entitled to have their need met when being denied such 
satisfaction would give 
“part or all of a reason, and a reason that is avowable and publicly sustainable 
within S [a given social morality], to reconsider his adherence to the norms of 
reciprocity and cooperation sustained by S.”313 
That is, unsatisfied need gives us a reason to withdraw support for, and cooperation 
with, society. This line of reasoning sits well with the thought that at least one 
justification for the existence of states is their ability to foster cooperation and 
collective action; cooperation matters for achieving important social and human 




311 Wiggins, 1997, p. 10-11, emphasis original. 
312 That is, if we take Wiggins at his word. Later in the same chapter, he allows that need 
claims are always relative to flourishing, as harm is always comparative in this way: “The 
suggested elucidation in terms of harm exposes a certain parameter that is always there to be 
discovered within claims of absolute needing. This is the idea, not innocent of the 
metaphysics of personhood, of well-being or flourishing, by reference to which we make 
judgments of harm” (p. 11). This is an unusual way of understanding the comparative nature 
of harm, and suggests to me that flourishing may be doing more work in his view than 
Wiggins admits. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it will be most expedient to take 
Wiggins at his word. 
313 Wiggins, 1998, p. 42. 
 
Chapter 4: Need and Moral Normativity:  
A First Pass 
 
128 
goods. However, as Wiggins’ argument suggests, people must have reason(s) to 
cooperate with others, and if their most basic needs to avoid harm are going unmet, 
they have at least one reason not to cooperate: that they are still subject to vital harm 
under the conditions of cooperation. We do not want to give people reason not to 
cooperate with us, as it is only through cooperation that we can secure important 
goods, and so we should seek to meet people’s needs. 
Brock takes issue with the importance of the intelligibility of the reason we have to 
withdraw cooperation.314 Concerned with defending need against libertarian critics, 
she cautions that the libertarian will simply consider unmet need not to be an 
intelligible or avowable reason to withdraw from social cooperation. I agree that this 
account would have to face such a challenge from libertarians. However, providing a 
defensible understanding of intelligibility is not obviously impossible – for example 
we might draw on Rawlsian notions of public reasons – and therefore this does not 
give us sufficient reason to reject the account. 
One appeal of Wiggins’ approach is its emphasis on the importance of cooperation. 
Although he does not explicitly go this far, foregrounding the pragmatic necessity of 
cooperation in this way is suggestive of an underlying recognition of the inherent 
vulnerability of the human condition, and especially that of the individual. His account 
also recognises that we must be mindful of the being in need, the harm they are subject 
to when their needs are unmet, and the fragility and contingency of social cooperation. 
Perhaps due to his attention to need’s political force, Wiggins turns our attention to 
justifying ourselves to those in need, who are subject to the outcome of our decision-
making. 
One limitation of the view, however, is its scope. If this were the only justification we 
could offer for need’s moral normativity, we could not include the need of those who 
are not in a relation of social cooperation with us, as part of a given social morality. 




314 1996. In the first edition of Needs, Values, Truth, Wiggins uses the phrase “an intelligible 
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We would need to have a very idiosyncratic understanding of what it means to be part 
of a ‘social morality’ to consider that such a morality obtains globally. Wiggins seems 
to have in mind demarcation along the lines of societies and states, which would 
disregard the need of many outside of such borders.315 Further, we might worry that 
even those within our borders who are not capable of “adherence to the norms of 
reciprocity and cooperation” would be neglected – although this could be accounted 
for by a nuanced notion of cooperation as defended by contemporary contractarians.316 
Most fundamentally, it does not seem to be a condition of the normative pull of need 
that it attaches only to those in a relationship of social cooperation with us. The 
profound force of the stories of migrant children left to die in their attempt to escape 
conflict and destitution cannot plausibly be traced to such a source, and their resonance 
was felt across borders.317 Therefore, our search for the strongest account of the 
normativity of need cannot stop with Wiggins, although his insight into the importance 
of justifying ourselves to those in need is a lesson worth carrying forward. 
5. Vulnerability to Oppression 
The final kind of view I will consider is concerned with the unique vulnerability of 
having your basic needs unmet. The seriousness and urgency of basic needs means 
that when they are unmet, we are subject to the whims of those who are able to meet 
our needs. This subjection is particularly destructive of agency and mutual respect. 
Therefore, we must reduce or meet need in order to deal justly or respectfully with 
those in need. Onora O’Neill and David Braybrooke offer similar accounts of the 




315 Perhaps we could reinterpret Wiggins, such that we keep his focus on social cooperation 
and reciprocity, but focus on human cooperation, disregarding the ‘social’ limit. Such an 
account would hinge on how we could meaningfully consider all human life to be in 
relations of reciprocal cooperation. In Chapter 5 Section 3.5, I discuss Sarah Clark Miller’s 
Kantian care ethical approach to the normativity of need, which is the closest approximation 
of such an account available in needs literature.  
316 For example, see Becker on a suitably expansive notion of reciprocity, accommodating 
the inclusion of people with profound disabilities (2005). 
317 Merriman, 2016. Arguably this also demonstrates the failure of that normative force to 
generate effective political solutions. 
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moral normativity of need, interestingly from Kantian and utilitarian derivations 
respectively. As I consider the two accounts to share strengths and weaknesses when 
taken as stories of the normativity of need, I shall address them together. Ultimately, I 
will suggest that each relies on the acceptance of a thorough-going moral framework 
in ways that will alienate non-Kantians, or non-utilitarians (respectively). As the 
normativity of need clearly appeals to theorists from either side of this classic 
theoretical divide, such a reliance is undesirable. 
O’Neill is concerned with defending the ability of a Kantian approach to take need 
seriously. She identifies a fundamental power imbalance in the existence of unmet 
need: “One very basic form of social vulnerability is the vulnerability of the needy to 
those who have the power to grant or refuse them the means of life.”318 Such an 
imbalance makes us vulnerable to coercion in the form of physical force or threat: 
“Nor does a threat to those in need have to be made with the standard rhetoric 
and gestures of armed conflict. It may well be couched in the language of 
standard commercial bargaining or political negotiation. But these modes of 
discourse respect others’ agency only when used among those who are 
(approximately) equals in power.”319 
Notice that even with the best of intentions, if there is a serious power imbalance, we 
cannot properly respect the agency of those in a position of relative powerlessness. It 
is the fact that those in need are subject to the whims of those in a position of power, 
rather than the actual enacting of such whims, that is problematic here. The relation of 
those in need to those in a position to meet that need inevitably fails to respect the 
agency of those in need. 
Further, O’Neill points out that this degree of vulnerability to coercion contravenes the 
Kantian principle of non-coercion, and within a Kantian framework this is taken to 
entail strict duties of justice.320 By allowing need to go unmet, and thereby allowing 
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inherently coercive power relations, we fail in our duty to respect the agency of those 
in need. She therefore mandates action to meet need: “To deal justly with the neediest, 
we must ensure that vulnerability to the demands of the powerful is not total, and so 
we must reduce their need.”321 
Although O’Neill argues for the moral demands that need makes of us from within a 
Kantian framework, the substance of her argument for normativity does not 
necessarily rely on our acceptance of such a framework.322 We need not be Kantians 
to recognise the destructive force of disrespectful power relations, which leave those 
in need vulnerable to oppression; a Kantian framework simply provides one possible 
set of grounds for the moral significance of such oppression.323 
Braybrooke makes a similar argument, claiming that people whose basic needs are 
unmet are particularly vulnerable to having their rights violated. This is because those 
who could furnish the means to meet their needs are in a relative position of power: 
“I argue that, once the contrast becomes sufficiently stark, the people with 
ample resources are in a position to circumscribe the exercise of other people’s 
rights, and even in a position to violate the rights. The people with scant 
resources become, not just worse off, but vulnerable; they face much more 
powerful people, who can exert power to make them worse off still.”324 




321 1998, p. 109. Arguably, O’Neill’s Kantian account is necessarily committed to focus 
moral attention on our duties and what we owe, rather than on the being in need, which I 
have suggested should be at the centre of the best account of the need of normativity. This is 
a point of dissimilarity to Braybrooke’s view which is not subject to such Kantian 
commitments. 
322 To be sure, her claim that need gives us strict duties of justice to reduce need does rely on 
need’s connection to the principle of non-coercion, and its role in a Kantian moral 
framework. However, in this chapter we are concerned only with establishing the best 
account of moral normativity, and need not rely on the details of her argument to establish 
duties of justice. 
323 That being said, to make use of this as a complete argument for the normativity of need 
outside of a Kantian framework, we would need to expand on what respect, vulnerability, 
and/or oppression involve. In the following chapter I expand on the insights I draw from this 
account accordingly. 
324 Braybrooke, 1987, p. 152. 
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Here he distinguishes vulnerability from welfare (being worse off) – distinguishing 
vulnerability from straightforward harm, and suggesting that even those who are not 
moved by welfarist arguments should be moved by the unequal power relations 
involved in vulnerability. 
As O’Neill observed, the coercive force of those in a position of power need not 
involve direct threat. However, for Braybrooke it is not clear that even indirect threat 
is needed for the powerful to make problematic use of the vulnerability of those in 
need: 
“The pressure for submission may simply take the form of making the right 
holders’ positions economically untenable: desperate to meet their needs, they 
sell out at a nominal price, when, if they could have bargained on equal terms, 
they need not have sold at all.”325 
Braybrooke considers that any viable theory of justice must demonstrate respect for 
our vulnerability to oppression, and so meeting needs is a matter of both practical 
necessity and justice in cases where failure to meet them would leave someone 
vulnerable to oppression: 
“Only a conception of justice that did not require any person N to respect some 
other person M’s position would escape the argument. […] With the most 
plausible – the most defensible and morally attractive – conceptions of all, as 
many would hold them to be, the connection made by practical necessity runs 
alongside a connection of conceptual or definitional necessity that embraces 
meeting needs simultaneously with equality.”326 
Focusing on the upshot of this argument for moral normativity, needs make moral 
demands on us because when they are unmet, people are particularly vulnerable to 
oppression and the violation of their rights. 
Braybrooke’s larger project is a defence of the practical, public policy-guiding power 
of a full conception of needs. To that end, he offers a complex conceptual framework 
elaborating a potential way of making collective decisions based on need. In addition, 
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he champions the use of need in utilitarian theory, arguing that need be seen as a 
surrogate for “whatever falls under the concept of utility, which I regard as too abstract 
for practical use.”327 
As may be clear from the quotes selected, Braybrooke’s argument relies on a prior 
conception of rights and their moral importance (which he grounds in utilitarian 
theory). This is because he has a particular target in mind, especially for his 1987 book 
Meeting Needs, where he defends the normativity of need in the most depth. He is 
interested in convincing those who wholeheartedly accept the normativity of rights, 
yet who also disclaim any connection between rights and equality, or need satisfaction, 
such as Robert Nozick.328 If we are to make direct use of Braybrooke’s argument but 
target a wider audience, supplementary steps to elaborate a conception of rights are 
necessary. The analogous reliance in O’Neill’s work is likely ‘respect for agency’ – 
which, although thoroughly theorized in Kantian scholarship, would require 
explanation and interrogation if her argument is taken out of its Kantian context. Thus, 
to make use of either account without ascribing to its theoretical commitments would 
require supplementary explanation and argumentation. 
What, then, can we make of a ‘vulnerability to oppression’ approach to the normativity 
of need? To begin with, this account gets the moral focus of normativity right: it is 
concerned with the vulnerability of the being in need. As indicated in Section 3, it is 
desirable that the being in need should feature in an explanation of the normativity of 
the need. Further, O’Neill’s view provides a concrete reason why such concern should 
be directed to the being in need: the morally relevant capacity of the being for agency. 
Beings with such morally relevant capacities should be treated with accordant respect, 
which for O’Neill requires the reduction of need such that moral agents are no longer 
subject to coercion. 
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In addition, this account has the benefit of accommodating the intuition that need has 
normative force beyond borders. Although Braybrooke relies on a conception of rights, 
which might be conceived as limited to state borders, there are also many conceptions 
of rights which have global reach. O’Neill’s respect for agency is more immediately 
global in reach, as it is grounded in the human capacity for rational agency. She may 
face similar exclusionary concerns to that of Wiggins’ contractarian argument focused 
on reciprocity and cooperation, in that people with profound cognitive disabilities will 
not qualify for every definition of rational agency – however, as we have seen, rational 
agency will need further development to make use of O’Neill’s account regardless.  
This approach is not without its flaws. People in need are vulnerable in other ways, 
and not only vulnerable to coercion or oppression. For example, as we saw in Section 
4, they are also vulnerable to suffering, given the susceptibility of all people to physical 
and psychological distress when our most basic needs are unmet. To that extent, the 
view is left seeming somewhat incomplete, as there is at least one source of normative 
force which is not accommodated on the ‘vulnerability to oppression’ model. 
Finally, the particular conceptions offered by Braybrooke and O’Neill require the 
acceptance of considerable theoretical baggage: a conception of normative rights (as 
grounded by utilitarian theory), and a Kantian moral framework which grounds the 
notion of ‘rational agency.’ As I suggested in 4.1, avoiding controversial theoretical 
commitments is worthwhile if possible, to avoid alienating potential subscribers to 
needs theory. For example, there are some who are suspicious of the liberal project of 
rights but who consider needs to be promising;329 and reflection on the conflicting 
stances of O’Neill’s Kantian and Thomson’s utilitarian conceptions illustrates that 
need appeals to theorists across the conventional borders of moral theory. For this 
reason, if we seek to erect the best possible account of the moral normativity of need, 
we should also try to keep it as self-contained as possible with respect to its 
commitments to particular moral theories. 




329 See: Hamilton, 2003. 
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In this chapter, I have canvassed the most prominent accounts offered by need theorists 
of the moral normativity of need, in an attempt to determine the most robust, 
defensible, and compelling approach possible. I argued that the ‘intrinsic normativity’ 
view is unsatisfying, and disregards those who consider themselves to engage in moral 
practice but who do not find needs intrinsically. The ‘moralist’ view requires that 
adherents accept a particularly thorough-going brand of universalism, which limits the 
reach of such an account. It also does not sufficiently focus on the being in need. 
I suggested that both ‘avoiding harm’ views get something right: they direct normative 
attention to the being in need. Further, they draw our attention to the moral seriousness 
of suffering associated with unmet need. However, Thomson’s ‘avoiding harm’ view 
is incomplete, and requires accepting that ‘mitigating harm’ is the fundamental goal 
of morality. Wiggins’ ‘avoiding harm’ approach incorporates an element of public 
justification, which calls on us to respond to the concerns of the worst-off in order to 
secure social cooperation. However, he fixes the borders of his account at ‘social’ 
cooperation, which limits the scope of need’s normativity in a way that cannot explain 
normativity beyond state borders. 
Finally, the ‘vulnerability to oppression’ view similarly has the right moral focus, on 
the being in need. O’Neill’s approach has the further benefit of offering a reason to 
direct our concern in that way: the morally relevant capacity of rational agency. In 
addition, both O’Neill and Braybrooke’s accounts are potentially global in scope, 
allowing us to make sense of the normativity of need across state borders. 
Unfortunately, neither approach will sufficiently reach theorists across the 
conventional borders of moral theory, as each is subject to theoretical commitments in 
their present form, and incomplete without them. Moreover, the ‘vulnerability to 
oppression’ view neglects the other ways that those in need are vulnerable, such as the 
vulnerability to suffering, which is perhaps best accommodated by the ‘avoiding harm’ 
accounts. 
Therefore, I suggest that we have not yet arrived at the best possible account of the 
moral normativity of need. I hope in the following chapter to learn from the insights 
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of the foregoing views, while also bringing in helpful understandings from outside of 
needs theory to offer my own account of need’s normativity. I incorporate elements of 
Wiggins’ public justification, O’Neill’s interest in morally relevant capacities, and the 
importance of vulnerability in what I will call the ‘responsiveness’ account. 
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Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I considered some of the most prominent accounts of the moral 
normativity of need in existing needs literature, including ‘intrinsic normativity,’ 
‘moralism,’ ‘avoiding harm,’ and ‘vulnerability to coercion.’ There I suggested that, 
although several accounts offered important insights for the inquiry, we should keep 
looking, as each was either inseparable from a larger (and comparatively controversial) 
normative theory, or otherwise incomplete. Therefore, in this chapter I will continue 
to question why we might take someone needing something to give us moral reason 
for action, offering my own account that it is the morally relevant capacities of the 
being in need which makes their need morally significant, and gives us reason to act. 
I hope to present a view that is concordant with the insights gleaned in the foregoing 
chapter: the moral seriousness of suffering (Thomson); the importance of public 
acknowledgement of need, or justification of our response to it (Wiggins); and the 
importance of respecting vulnerability (Braybrooke and O’Neill).330 
I begin with a reminder of one motivation for this project: that people do take need to 
be normative in everyday moral and political practice. I include a brief survey of 
research in moral and social psychology on empathy and altruism, which suggests that 
people sometimes take the need of others to give reason for action. Further, such 
research identifies moderating factors for our pro-social response to the need of others. 
Some of these factors directly contradict the morally relevant factors affecting our 
concern for others, presenting a challenge of motivation for the moral normativity of 
need. 
I then offer a neo-Aristotelian account of the normativity of need, focused on morally 
relevant capacities. Such capacities ground need’s moral pull, and are the source of 




330 See Chapter 4. 
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need-based obligation. I consider two potential counterexamples for the capacities 
account (wrongful life cases and ‘marginal cases’) and suggest that they can be 
accommodated using the proposed account. 
Further, it is our shared human vulnerability which illuminates the character of this 
obligation: responsiveness. This view is informed by the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
on the face-to-face encounter with the other and the recognition of another human 
being ‘like me,’ and contemporary feminist scholarship on the inherent vulnerability 
of the human condition. I continue with the suggestion that we are morally required to 
answer need with responsiveness, and I elaborate on the distinction between being 
responsive to need and meeting need, as the latter has been the primary focus of need 
theorists. 
I then consider Sarah Clark Miller’s Kantian care ethics, which offers the strongest 
rival account of moral normativity, and the view most similar to my own. I suggest 
points of similarity in my account of responsiveness and vulnerability, but highlight 
problems for her account that stem from her interpretation of its Kantian foundations. 
Instead of adopting her account, I propose to integrate her insights on skilful 
responsiveness into my own view. 
Finally, I address objections that we might have to this picture of the moral normativity 
of need. I begin with epistemic concerns for the duty of responsiveness. I then consider 
the view that need can only be normative in the context of certain kinds of relationship: 
for example, in relationships characterised by high levels of solidarity and cooperation. 
I hope to show that we can accommodate the importance of such special contexts 
without abandoning the moral importance of need, as such. 
The view we take on how and when need gives us moral reason to act has profound 
consequences. On one extreme end of the spectrum, we can only ever have duties of 
non-interference, and the needs of others cannot be taken to ground obligation. On the 
other end, we are required to give to those in need until we are reduced to their level 
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of need ourselves.331 If it is right that we are morally required to be responsive to need, 
this has potentially demanding implications for our individual and collective conduct.  
2. Need in Moral and Political Practice 
One good reason to be interested in the normativity of need is its regular appearance 
in appeals and decision-making in everyday moral and political practice. It features 
regularly in charitable appeals, with the annual BBC Children in Need appeal as a 
particularly prominent reference.332 It is treated with normative priority in political 
speeches: 
“As Home Secretary, I was determined to take on the grave injustices 
concerning mental illness that were within my remit – and I made improving 
the police response to people with mental health needs a top priority.”  
Theresa May, Prime Minister of the UK, ‘Shared Society’ Speech, 
09/01/2017333 
“My government will not be satisfied with mere ‘poverty alleviation’; and 
commits itself to the goal of ‘poverty elimination.’ With a firm belief that the 
first claim on development belongs to the poor; the government will focus its 
attention on those who need the basic necessities of life most urgently.” 
Shri Pranab Mukherjee, President of India addressing Parliament, 
09/06/2014334 
And similarly, it receives focus in media coverage, as in the headlines: 
‘Two months to organise a medical team of 14 for a man in dire need [of life-
saving operation but doctors are forced to CANCEL it due to a bed shortage, 
reveals TV documentary which lifts the lid on the NHS crisis]’  
Daily Mail Online, 18/01/2017335 




331 See Hill (2002) for a survey of the extremes. 
332 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/corporate2/childreninneed. Charities with a similarly 
prominent focus on ‘need’ include, but are not limited to: international mental health charity 
BasicNeeds (http://www.basicneeds.org/), African creative arts charity Dramatic Need 
(http://www.dramaticneed.org/), and Children in Need India (http://www.cini.org.uk/). 
333 May, 2017, para. 89. May makes other references to ‘needs’ in the same speech. 
334 Mukherjee, 2014, para. 7. 
335 Matthews & Corner, 2017. 
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‘FGM [female genital mutilation] victims need medical attention “every 
hour” says charity’ 
BBC News, 06/02/2017336 
I will not offer a systematic analysis of when and how the concept of ‘need’ is 
employed in such contexts. However, I do hope such passing references will resonate, 
highlighting the ongoing currency of ‘need’ and its regular use (and abuse) to motivate 
action or defend decisions. 
Further, social psychological research into empathy and altruism suggests that people 
do sometimes take the needs of others to be reasons for action, by demonstrating that 
some prosocial behaviour seems to spring from the motivation to protect or promote 
the welfare of others in need. While the fact that people do take need to be a reason 
for action cannot establish that, or when, they should, it instead will serve to motivate 
the later philosophical inquiry by suggesting that responsiveness to the normative pull 
of need is a common human phenomenon. Unfortunately, the research also highlights 
another feature of the normativity of need: it is not always successful. The pull is not 
an infallible one that inevitably causes concordant behaviour. Findings indicate that 
there are a host of situational and relational features that moderate our responsiveness 
to need, and that some of these features appear intuitively to be morally irrelevant. 
This presents a challenge of motivation that my account of the moral normativity of 
need must face. 
2.1 Empathy and altruism 
There is a longstanding debate in social psychology on whether there can be any truly 
altruistic behaviour, sometimes called the egoism-altruism debate.337 In this context, 
altruism is taken to be “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing 
another’s welfare.”338 This means that the motivated individual is seeking to attain an 
increase of another’s welfare as an end in itself, rather than as a means to increasing 




336 BBC News, 2017. 
337 Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009, p. 651. 
338 Batson, 2010, p. 149. 
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their own welfare. Those defending the existence of genuine altruism argue that 
prosocial behaviour can sometimes be explained by altruistic motives, whereas 
sceptics consider that even seemingly other-oriented motives are best understood as 
serving self-interest. The following discussion cannot be taken as definitive proof that 
genuine altruism exists, as it represents one set of hypotheses in an ongoing debate; 
however, the findings appear to give us reason for optimism. 
Prosocial behaviour that is congruent with the welfare of others is an everyday 
occurrence. A significant body of research over the last three decades has 
demonstrated that empathy is associated with such helping behaviour.339 According to 
the empathy-altruism hypothesis, prosocial behaviour can be altruistically motivated, 
springing from an experience of empathy: 
Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis (EAH): Empathy evokes an altruistic motive, 
the ultimate goal of which is to reduce the other’s need.340 
Empathy itself is “an other-oriented emotional response congruent with the perceived 
welfare of another that results from adopting the perspective (i.e. imagining the 
thoughts and feelings) of a person in clear need.”341 On this hypothesis, perceiving a 
person in need triggers the emotional response of empathy, which in turn evokes 
altruistic motives that contribute to an outcome of prosocial behaviour. 




339 For example: Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009; Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 
2006; Batson, 1991. 
340 Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009, p. 649; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987. While it is 
common in the psychological literature to define empathy in terms of responding to ‘need,’ it 
may not be wise to assume that the operationalisation of need in such research aligns with 
the philosophical concept I have defended. Specifically, in some experiments it is difficult to 
distinguish whether participants are responding to need or responding to suffering. However, 
in others the helping behaviours included allow us some insight. For example, Christopher 
Einolf (2007) conducted a meta-analysis of empathic concern and helping behaviours which 
included some behaviours which were ambiguous as they plausibly involved direct contact 
with someone who is both suffering and in need (‘gave money to a homeless person’ or 
‘helped someone find a job’), or as they were indirect but may have involved presumption of 
suffering (‘gave money to charity’ or ‘donated blood’), but others which plausibly do not 
always feature suffering in the same sense (‘gave up seat’ or ‘carried someone’s 
belongings’). 
341 Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009, p. 649; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987. 
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In contrast, the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis claims that the seemingly 
altruistic prosocial behaviour that EAH attempts to explain is actually an outcome of 
self-interested motives: 
Aversive-Arousal Reduction Hypothesis (AARH): Empathy is aversive, and 
people sometimes help others in order to reduce the empathy they 
experience.342 
AARH predicts that reducing empathy satisfactorily can be achieved either by helping 
behaviour, which reduces the need for empathy, or by simply escaping from situations 
that stimulate empathy.343 In contrast, only prosocial behaviour is predicted by EAH 
to be a satisfactory way to reduce empathy. 
Notice that as they are stated, the two hypotheses could potentially be compossible, if 
empathy can evoke more than one emotional response. Daniel Batson and colleagues 
have claimed that there are two distinct types of empathic responses: personal distress 
(characterised by alarm, upset, worry, etc.) and empathy proper (characterised by 
warmth, compassion, tenderness, etc.).344 While distress responses are aversive and 
trigger self-interested motivations to reduce the response, empathic responses trigger 
altruistic motives. It will be sufficient for our purposes if empathic response to people 
in need does sometimes trigger altruistic motives, and if the conditions for this 
response are relatively commonplace. 
The balance of evidence suggests that EAH is the best explanation for some prosocial 
behaviour. One strategy for testing these competing hypotheses is to produce a 
scenario in which reduction of empathy through escape is made easier than reduction 
of empathy through helping behaviour, as in this scenario the two hypotheses predict 
differing results. In a classic study,345 the participant was either depicted as having 
similar interests (high empathy condition) or dissimilar interests (low empathy 




342 Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009, p. 650. 
343 Batson, 1991. 
344 Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987. 
345 Batson et al., 1981. 
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condition) to a stranger in need (victim). Participants were also either told that they 
could (easy escape) or could not (difficult escape) leave the laboratory while the victim 
suffered painful electric shocks, and then given the opportunity to help the victim by 
receiving the shocks themselves instead. The results of the study were those predicted 
by the EAH. In the low empathy condition, rate of helping was affected by ease of 
escape, with higher rates of helping when escape was difficult. In the high empathy 
condition, rate of helping was uniformly high even when physical escape from the 
person in need was relatively easy. This study has since been replicated in a variety of 
contexts with similar results.346 
These findings have been challenged, as studies using this methodology have 
neglected to account for the importance of psychological escape. Critics suggest that 
while physical escape from the person in need may be sufficient in low empathy 
conditions, those experiencing high empathy do not believe that physical escape will 
be sufficient to reduce feelings of distress, and this accounts for their helping 
behaviour rather than genuine altruism.347 However, a more recent study demonstrated 
that even when psychological escape is relatively easy, participants in a high-empathy 
condition show consistently high rates of helping behaviour.348 Thus even when 
empathy is more easily reduced through egoistic methods, we can observe consistently 
high rates of helping those in need in empathically aroused people.349 
Unfortunately, empathic response itself is subject to a range of moderating situational 
and relational factors, not all of which are intuitively morally relevant. For example: 
Cultural similarity 
Cultural similarity (along dimensions such as ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
religious affiliation, standard of living, etc.) promotes feelings of other-




346 For example: Toi & Batson, 1982; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986. 
347 Hoffman, 1991; Doris & Stitch, 2007. 
348 Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 2009. 
349 It should be noted that defeat of the AARH only discounts one possible source of egoistic 
helping behaviour, albeit one that has historically garnered much support; there may be 
others. For this reason, the conclusions drawn from the findings of the empirical research 
surveyed can only be stated tentatively. 
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focused empathy, whereas cultural dissimilarity promotes ego-focused 
concerns and decreases need-responsiveness.350 
Experience of adverse life events 
People who have suffered from adverse life events (such as extreme 
interpersonal or political violence, or natural disasters) are more likely to 
demonstrate prosocial attitudes towards and help people in need who are 
dissimilar to them than those who have not experienced such events.351 
Attractiveness 
When a potential helper’s feelings of interpersonal attraction for the recipient 
are high, this increases their responsiveness to the person’s needs.352 
Number of people in need 
As the number of people in need increases, the degree of compassion felt for 
them decreases. Preliminary findings suggest that this may be due to 
expectations that the needs of large groups will be overwhelming, and so 
people proactively emotionally disengage to avoid experiencing 
compassion.353 
This last factor is worth reflecting on, as it describes a case where behaviour deviates 
from the explicitly held moral principle that people think they should feel more 
compassion for multiple victims than for a single victim.354 The seeming moral 
irrelevance of these moderating factors on empathy demonstrates the familiar reality 
that there is a gap between factors that are psychologically salient and those that are 
morally defensible. I will address this challenge in Section 4; for now, it gives us all 
the more reason for reflection on how and when needing does establish defensible 
moral reasons for action. 
In this section, I have claimed that we have some reason to think that people can be 
motivated to help others for altruistic reasons. I will now move on to consider what 




350 Siem & Sturmer, 2012. 
351 Vollhardt & Staub, 2011. 
352 Siem & Sturmer, 2012. 
353 Cameron & Payne, 2011. 
354 Cameron & Payne, 2011, p. 2; Dunn & Ashton-James, 2008. 
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grounds such a response; that is, how does someone being in need give me a moral 
reason for action?355 
3. Justified Responsiveness to Need 
There are many reasons that we might think need gives us a reason for action. If by 
unjustly harming someone I have put them in a position of need, a restorative 
justification is the most immediately apparent reason. Alternatively, if I have 
committed myself to providing for someone by contract or promise, a duty to honour 
agreements likely plays a normative role. However, I will focus on the bare fact of 
need itself. Aside from any related concerns that need may play a role in activating, 
when does someone needing something in itself provide reason for action? 
3.1 Morally relevant capacities and vulnerability 
I suggest that the same considerations which ground the moral status of human beings 
also ground the moral importance of human need: our capacities for activity and 
striving, suffering and connection. When faced with someone in need, we are faced 
with the kind of being that is self-aware, capable of imagining and planning for the 
future, capable of deliberation and responding to encouragement or censure, capable 
of struggle and experiencing loss, of communicating and connecting with others and 
the world around them. Similar to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach,356 this 
picture of moral status is heavily influenced by Aristotelian and Marxian notions of 
species norms,357 and construes a picture of what it means for a human being to thrive 
based in these fundamental capacities. The basic insight of this view is that the kind of 
being that is in need matters, and that the moral status of a human being is such that 
their need matters. In the search for what makes needing morally normative, this 
account answers: the capacities of the kind of being that is in need. 




355 Note that the following sections are in no way concerned with justifying actual helping 
behaviour as described in this section. 
356 Nussbaum, 2006a. 
357 Williams, 2004, p. 16-19. 
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Here we can locate the source of moral concern in the other – the moral reason for 
action is best described as located in the being in need, rather than in the moral 
character of the potential helper, or in their self-regarding concern for their own needs 
being met. 
Notice that the proposal does not hinge need’s normativity on moral agency, but rather 
on a cluster of capacities which give rise to moral status. It seems to me that the 
normativity of need is not contingent on moral agency, nor is it obviously tied to any 
one particular capacity. If the “ability to autonomously choose an intentional action” 
is a necessary condition for moral agency that is uncontroversial, as Rönnegard 
suggests,358 I take it that my account will be more inclusive than an account hinging 
on moral agency. The capacity for suffering is sufficient for moral concern, but the 
presence of further capacities such as social connection, self-reflection, 
communication, and striving ground the normativity of need.  
Many of the capacities identified here are possessed to varying degrees by non-human 
animals, such as the capacities for suffering, struggle, and loss, and for communication 
and connection with others and the world around them. It is an implication of this view 
that such capacities warrant moral concern for the need of such non-human animals, 
according to what is good for their species as such. Humans may not be well-
positioned to render judgement on the interests of non-human animals, but we can 
expect the conditions for survival (as necessary for the pursuit any other good) such as 
physical security, nutrition, hydration, species-compatible habitat, etc. to be minimal 
requirements. 
Similarly, the capacities mentioned are possessed to varying degrees by human 
animals. Most human beings will easily meet a threshold requirement such that they 
can meaningfully be said to have such capacities. For example, this means that 
although some humans are more self-reflective than others, we need only be 
sufficiently self-reflective to meet a threshold such that the capacity ‘self-reflective’ 




358 2015, p. 11. 
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can meaningfully be said to be present; it is an on-off designation rather than a ranking 
system. Some human beings will fall below such a threshold in at least one dimension, 
but no one capacity is necessary in isolation. Further, when someone fails to meet the 
threshold for several capacities, like Nussbaum I suspect that it is often best to presume 
that, were their needs met, the disabled may be enabled to meet relevant capacity 
thresholds.359 Where there are good epistemic grounds against this presumption, we 
may not be under a duty to respond to the being in the same way, in a relation as to 
one ‘like us,’ although this does not preclude other forms of appropriate moral concern. 
3.2 Two counterexamples for the capacities account 
I now consider two potential counterexamples for the view I have proposed: wrongful 
life cases, and marginal cases of humans who do not possess uniquely human 
capacities.360 
Wrongful life cases present a challenge for my view because they seem to be cases in 
which human beings in fact do not have any interest in survival. The classic example 
here is of a child born with a congenital disease which significantly impairs their 
quality of life, wherein “the imposition upon a child of an existence of poor quality 
can constitute an act of harming, and a violation of the child’s rights.”361 If it is better 
for the child never to have existed, then to respond to their needs qua human being, 
thereby promoting their survival, would in fact be harmful and misguided.362 
However, I suggest that even in such cases there is still a sense in which, as a human 
being, I have an interest in survival. Rather, in wrongful life cases, that interest has 




359 For a brief treatment on the moral status of animals on this kind of view, see: Nussbaum, 
2006b. For her views on disability, see: Nussbaum, 2008. 
360 I thank Philip Cook for pushing me to address these challenges in order to make the 
capacities account more clear. 
361 Williams, 2010, p. 351. 
362 For the purposes of discussion I will grant the assumption that it can be better, all things 
considered, for a human being never to have existed. 
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been overridden by stronger, countervailing interests.363 This rightly emphasises the 
defeasibility of our interest in survival, but it does not undermine survival as a 
necessary condition for any other good. 
Marginal cases of humans who do not possess uniquely human capacities present a 
more significant challenge for my view. Here the challenge might be outlined as 
follows: my account defends responsiveness to human need on the grounds of the 
morally relevant capacities of human beings. However, some non-human animals in 
fact have more of the relevant capacities, and to a greater degree, than some humans 
(such as infants and humans with profound cognitive disabilities). If this account is to 
stand, I must either bite the bullet and include the need of non-human animals, or 
provide some other principled way of distinguishing non-human animals that does not 
rely on capacities which many of them possess. In what follows, I propose to bite the 
bullet insofar as non-human animals possess morally relevant capacities which make 
their need matter. However, I suggest that the character of our response to non-human 
animals will be different. 
First, let us view the argument from marginal cases in more general terms, as stated 
by its proponents: 
“(1) It is undeniable that [members of] many species other than our own have 
‘interests’ – at least in the minimal sense that they feel and try to avoid pain, 
and feel and seek various sorts of pleasure and satisfaction. 
(2) It is equally undeniable that human infants and some of the profoundly 
retarded have interests in only the sense that members of these other species 
have them – and not in the sense that normal adult humans have them. That 
is, human infants and some of the profoundly retarded [i.e. the marginal cases 
of humanity] lack the normal adult qualities of purposiveness, self-
consciousness, memory, imagination, and anticipation to the same extent that 
[members of] some other species of animal lack those qualities. 
(3) Thus, in terms of the morally relevant characteristic of having interests, 




363 Wrongful life cases are similar to the case of the martyr discussed in Chapter 1, Section 
3.3: the martyr continues to have an interest in survival taken as a human being, but they 
have stronger interests in sacrificing their life. 
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some humans must be equated with members of other species rather than 
with normal adult human beings.” 364 
I propose to accept the conclusion (3), with a particular stress on the qualification “in 
terms of the morally relevant characteristic of having interests.” Insofar as non-human 
animals have the morally relevant capacities I have listed, we must see them as having 
moral status such that their existentially urgent need is normative. Similarly, when 
human beings do not have any of those capacities, and we have good epistemic reasons 
to consider that even if their needs were met they would not meet relevant capacity 
thresholds,365 their need will not be normative in the same categorical way that it is for 
beings who do meet the capacity thresholds. This is not to say that they are not worthy 
of any moral consideration, but rather that they do not mandate that particular kind of 
moral consideration. 
 However, while I have accepted conclusion (3), it is worth noting that the way we 
respond to fellow human beings in need will be (and should be) quite different to the 
way we respond to need in non-human animals. This is so for at least two reasons. For 
one, we are still coming to understand the interests and capacities of non-human 
animals. New research into animal behaviour is getting more and more 
methodologically creative to push back on our preconceptions of the limitations of 
non-human animal capacities,366 but however incomplete our understanding of human 
flourishing is, it can only ever be more so when attempting to understand what is good 
for other species. Further, we stand in a different relation with our fellow human beings 
compared to members of other species. Our words, symbols, and shared concepts have 
the power to structure our shared human world. As such, there is an expressive or 




364 Becker, 1983, p. 226-227; Dombrowski, 2006, p. 223-224 [emphasis original]. Note that I 
present only numbers 1-3 in a list of 9 premises and conclusions that Dombrowski identifies 
with the argument from marginal cases, as these are the most relevant for the present 
purpose. 
365 In the case of healthy human infants, we have good reason to believe that in time they 
will develop the relevant capacities if they have their basic needs met. 
366 For example: Pérez‐Manrique & Gomila, 2017; Droege & Braithwaite, 2014; Panksepp & 
Panksepp, 2013; Prior, Schwarz, & Güntürkün, 2008; Raby et al., 2007. 
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performative dimension to our ethical decision-making that can have direct effects on 
fellow human beings in need. 
In the following section, I proceed to develop the capacities account that I have 
proposed. Specifically, I focus on the shared human interests and vulnerabilities which 
shape how we should respond to fellow human beings in need.367 
3.3 Vulnerability and recognising an other ‘like me’ 
It is our morally relevant capacities, then, that ground need’s moral normativity, and 
ground need as a source of moral obligation. However, something further must be 
added to understand the character of that obligation to fellow humans. The human 
condition is characterised by vulnerability and interdependence: we are all at risk of 
being harmed, or having a reduced capacity to protect our interests.368 Each of us is 
subject to the episodic dependency of infancy, childhood, illness, and old age. 
However, there is a deeper sense in which our bodily existence is an intrinsically 
vulnerable existence. “To be vulnerable is to be fragile, to be susceptible to wounding 
and to suffering; this susceptibility is an ontological condition of our humanity.”369 As 
Judith Butler writes in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001: 
“One insight that injury affords is that there are others out there on whom my 
life depends, people I do not know and may never know. This fundamental 
dependency on anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away. No 
security measures will foreclose this dependency; no violent act of sovereignty 
will rid the world of this fact.”370 




367 Although I focus on human need hereafter, developing a needs theory for non-human 
animal species might be a productive way of approaching questions of the claims of non-
human animals: “[Our current treatment of animals] is largely shaped by perceptions of what 
‘humans’ need and want. The concept that we may wish to meet the dog’s needs as the ‘dog’ 
would prefer is a wholly recent” (Overall, 2016, p. 1). Moral concern for non-human animals 
will inevitably take, at least, a different shape – the recognition of an other ‘like me’ cannot 
play the same role. Similarly, morally relevant capacities of aliens or sentient machines 
would ground moral concern, but again the character of that concern will not be precisely the 
duty of responsiveness defended here for fellow humans. 
368 Mackenzie, 2014, p. 33. 
369 Mackenzie, Rogers, & Dodds, 2014, p. 4. 
370 2004, p. xii. 
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This precariousness, this susceptibility, is unavoidable for all of us. 
Of course, some of us are more vulnerable than others, whether due to the challenges 
of chronic illness or disability, or due to unequal power relations and access to social 
goods. Of particular concern is the vulnerability of those in a position of relative 
powerlessness, locked in reproducing cycles of oppression and victimhood. It is often 
this kind of vulnerability which we think of when we contemplate ‘vulnerable people,’ 
and for good reason – suffering and loss of dignity engendered by such seemingly 
intractable cycles requires urgent attention. Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit offer 
an insightful analysis of such reproducing cycles as ‘dynamic clustering’ of 
disadvantage, wherein a person accumulates disadvantages over the course of their 
life, and this disadvantage is reproduced in future generations.371 As Braybrooke and 
O’Neill caution,372 unmet need is itself a powerful, and radically unequally allocated, 
source of vulnerability to oppression. Leaving the powerless vulnerable to oppression 
is one of the ways that failing to respond to need disrespects the moral status of the 
worst-off.  
For many in high income, high consumption, countries with little or no direct exposure 
to war and extreme environmental events, narratives of self-sufficiency and 
independence can resonate. However, each of us will inevitably face our ontological 
vulnerability, and in such moments there is the potential for recognition of the 
universal nature of such vulnerability. 
A focus on our vulnerability highlights that when we are faced with a being in need 
who shares both our capacities and our vulnerabilities, we are also faced with the 
reality that ‘I could have been she’: 




371 Wolff & De-Shalit, 2007, p. 120. 
372 See Chapter 4, Section 5. 
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“It is acknowledged that the distress the person suffers could have been 
suffered by oneself. This acknowledgement implies acknowledging the other 
as ‘a fellow human being,’ therefore, a certain affinity.”373 
We may fail to recognise this as a reality, but that does not negate the relation we stand 
in to this fellow being in need. 
In addition to knowing the moral status of the kind of being we are dealing with, which 
I have suggested is determined by their capacities, we must also be able to distinguish 
when they are ‘in need’ in a morally relevant sense. To be in need of a stiff drink to 
unwind at the end of a long day is not on a par, morally speaking, with needing shelter 
to stave off hypothermia. In Chapter 1, I proposed that we take non-arbitrary needs to 
be those that are morally important. Briefly, non-arbitrary needs aim at objective 
interests that all human beings have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human 
beings, no matter the subjective aims, goals, and interests we have. Basic needs are the 
existentially urgent subset of these needs. 
Combining these two features, our picture of the moral responsibility we have to 
human beings in need begins to take shape. What we owe to such beings, in all 
circumstances, is responsiveness – responsiveness to their basic needs. To fail to 
respond in some way to the need of a being with the capacities of a human being is to 
fail to accord them their moral worth. All human beings will experience dependency 
during our life course, and to be responsive to this in others is to recognise them for 
what they are. 
To expand on this relation to the other, I will now draw on French philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas, whose work is relatively unfamiliar within the canon of 
Anglophone analytical political philosophy, but is uniquely poignant in its focus on 




373 Cortina & Conill, 2016, p. 51. Adela Cortina and Jesús Conill describe this in relation to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue of misericordia (“grief or sorrow over someone else’s distress, 
insofar as it is understood as one’s own”). 
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this relation. The relation to the other is important in developing an account of 
responsiveness to fellow human beings. 
At the heart of his ethics is the phenomenology of the face-to-face encounter with 
another person, which has an impact unlike any other object or force. In this encounter 
“I can see that another human being is ‘like me,’ acts like me, appears to be the master 
of her own conscious life.”374 The other person calls to me: “he does not even have to 
utter words in order for me to feel the summons implicit in his approach.”375 The other 
is exposed to me as an indisputable reality that cannot be reduced to their aesthetic 
presentation or the images I form of them in my mind. 
“This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only because it 
demands, deprived of everything because entitled to everything, and which one 
recognizes in giving  […] this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a 
face.  The nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to 
recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give.”376 
Importantly, when Levinas speaks of the face, or the face-to-face encounter, he does 
not mean only, or exactly, the literal face composed of eyes, nose, mouth, etc., but 
rather an arresting manifestation of being-ness. It is perhaps helpful to think of the 
face-to-face encounter, in this context, as the awareness that one is confronting another 
being, living an actual life like ours. This presentation of another being, vulnerable 
and mutable like myself, calls for responsibility to them. Our responsibility for the 
other’s vulnerability amounts both to not taking their life, and to protecting it – 
beginning with alleviating their material misery in providing for their basic needs for 
nourishment, shelter, etc.377 The call of the other is the call of a being whose body is 
susceptible to thirst, to hunger, to exposure. 




374 Burgo, 2011, section 1.1 para. 2. 
375 Burgo, 2011, section 1.1 para. 2 [emphasis original]. 
376 Levinas, 1969, p. 75. 
377 For Levinas, responsibility begins here, but it extends far beyond it even to moral 
responsibility for the other’s behaviour: “I am in reality responsible for the other even when 
he or she commits crimes” (2002, p. 169.). This derives from his view of responsibility as 
substitution – for more on this theme, see his 1988 interview ‘Responsibility and 
substitution’ in the same volume (pp. 228-233). 
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This relation of responsibility to the other is irrefutable, although it cannot force 
compliance but only beseech it: 
“Of course we have the power to relate ourselves to the other as to an object, 
to oppress and exploit him; nevertheless the relation to the other, as a relation 
of responsibility, cannot be totally suppressed, even when it takes the form of 
politics or warfare. Here it is impossible to free myself by saying, ‘It’s not my 
concern.’ There is no choice, for it is always and inescapably my concern.”378 
Levinas’ depiction of the face-to-face encounter as an act of ‘recognising’ is 
compelling. His works and interviews are translated from their original French 
language, and while caution is warranted when reading translations for exegetical 
purposes, my purpose here is more of a pragmatic inquiry into the insights his account 
offers that are helpful in understanding need’s normativity. That being said, the use of 
the word ‘recognise’ indicates a kind of familiarity. In order to recognise hunger and 
vulnerability in the other, we must not only come to know it but come to know it again, 
suggesting that we see in it a mirror of our own prior experience of vulnerability.379 
This does not preclude the singularity of the other, but does serve to identify an 
underlying likeness through experience.380 
Further, such recognition might be contrasted against lack of recognition, or 
invisibility. Axel Honneth and Avishai Margalit call attention to the dehumanising and 
humiliating effects of lack of recognition of the other, and the intentional invisibility 
of ‘looking through’ someone.381 Offering the example of the black person, or the 
cleaning lady, who is treated as invisible, they stress that this invisibility is not a 




378 Levinas, 2001, p. 247. 
379 The Levinasian sense that the other is a needing being ‘like me,’ and so ‘that could be 
me’ may seem in one sense to be self- rather than other-regarding. However, the sense in 
which this is self-regarding is, I hope, not problematic. We can never literally walk a mile in 
another person’s shoes, but our own experiences can help us sensitise to, and help us 
appreciate, the experiences of others. Levinasian thought calls attention to the shared human 
experience of need and vulnerability through our own phenomenological familiarity with it. 
380 This reading of recognising is perhaps in tension with the notion that the other cannot be 
reduced to my pictures of them in my own mind, and is fundamentally unknowable, but 
Perpich suggests that tension is a constitutive feature of Levinas’ work (2008, p. 13-14).  
381 Honneth & Margalit, 2001. 
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cognitive fact – the other is easily perceptible visually. Rather, lack of recognition is a 
performance of a social state of affairs, expressive of the other’s lack of worth or 
value.382 By recognising the other, we “express the fact that the other person is 
supposed to possess social ‘validity.’”383 
In the next section, I detail how we might appropriately respond to the call of the other 
through responsiveness. The requirement of acknowledgement I will defend reflects a 
kind of recognition, expressing the other’s moral ‘visibility.’ 
3.4 Responding versus meeting 
I suggested in Section 3.3 that what we owe to fellow human beings in need is 
responsiveness. This is a marked departure from much of needs theory which mandates 
meeting needs, even to the extent that it is the title of canonical works on the topic such 
as Braybrooke’s Meeting Needs, and Brock’s Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities 
to Meet Others’ Needs. Levinas’ phenomenology of the relation to the other gives a 
first indication of what responsiveness might look like, but I will now expand on what 
responsiveness involves, and how it differs from meeting need. 
In the first place, let me be clear that what I am responding to is the need of the being 
whose capacities and ontological vulnerability I share. Like Jacob Schiff, a proponent 
of responsiveness, I take acknowledgement to be a core feature of responsiveness.384 
Whatever else is involved in responding to someone’s situation, we must first 
acknowledge the existence of the being in need, which means that we must consider 
them in our practical deliberations. Acknowledgement speaks to their moral 
‘visibility:’ they matter, and so must factor in our moral decision-making. 




382 Recall my response to the argument from marginal cases in Section 3.2: the way we 
respond to human need will be different to need in non-human animals, because social 
relations and our performance of them matters to fellow human beings in a way it cannot to 
non-human animals.  
383 Honneth & Margalit, 2001, p. 115. 
384 2009, p. 65. 
 
Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
 
158 
Responsiveness, then, requires acknowledgement at a minimum. Beyond this, it may 
also require concrete action to reduce need. The appropriate kind of acknowledgement, 
and whether or not I must also act to reduce need, will depend on morally salient 
features of the circumstance. Relevant considerations as to when I am required to 
reduce need include my ability to help, the seriousness of the need, what other 
obligations I have, and the cost of helping. For example, if I meet someone that I do 
not have the means to help, an appropriate acknowledgement might be an expression 
of regret for my inability to help, or a gesture of concern. If I come across a person 
whom I do have means to help but cannot due to an overriding obligation (such as a 
parent’s obligation to their child who is in similar need), acknowledgement might 
require an apology, as a recognition of their claim on my help. 
Duty of responsiveness 
A moral agent has a duty to acknowledge the existentially urgent need of a 
fellow human being(s). Further, he or she may have a duty to stop or prevent 
the suffering and vulnerability caused by existentially urgent need if he or she 
can do so at less than significant cost to herself, either individually or by 
contributing to collective action. 
Often it will be appropriate that acknowledgement is explicitly expressed – this is 
perhaps particularly true of responses which will not result in meeting need. This is a 
minimal form of respect for the moral status of the being in need, signalling to them 
that we recognise that their existence matters, that they are not ‘invisible.’385 We have 
already seen that a sense of public recognition or acknowledgement was an important 
insight of Wiggins’ account,386 and in the next chapter I develop the role of 
acknowledgement in public justification. 




385 It might be thought that, in some cases, mere acknowledgement might exacerbate the 
sense of invisibility. For example, a passing remark to the effect that ‘we considered your 
plight, and are unable to meet your need at this time’ might have the effect of a public 
dismissal more injurious than invisibility, in part because it carries the guise of reasoned 
consideration. However, such an acknowledgement might be likened to a bad apology: it is 
not the fact of the acknowledgement that is disrespectful, but the mode of it. 
386 See Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
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Ultimately, responsiveness to need in others is a matter of treating their well-being as 
worthy of factoring into your moral deliberation and decision-making. I certainly fall 
short of this obligation if I never actually take action to help others, as this is an 
indicator that I am not really according their well-being any weight in my 
deliberations. Similarly, when the moral stakes are high, and the costs are low, even 
one-off failure to help seems to disqualify me as sufficiently responding to others in 
need.387 
Does the duty of responsiveness involve a duty to feel a certain way? Soran Reader 
and Brock express reservations about the ethics of care due to its focus on affective 
attitudes, suggesting that “from a needs-centred perspective, this is a mistake. On a 
needs-centred view, what matters for moral agency is that needs should be recognized 
and met. How the agent feels when he does this is unimportant.”388 In the main, we 
are agreed: what is strictly required by responsiveness is satisfied by acknowledgement 
in decision-making and action to reduce need. However, I suspect that appropriate 
responsiveness is incompatible with emotions which signal disrespect, such as 
contempt. Insofar as meeting need is entirely separate from affective response, and 
compatible with even expressions of contempt, responding to need is a demonstration 
of respect for the being in need, and so must proscribe such responses. Further, we 
might think that cultivating pro-social emotions such as empathy will be supportive of 
the disposition to respond to need. 
A further distinction between meeting need and being responsive to it is the kind of 
duty each entails. Most need theorists who advocate for meeting need see it as a 
defeasible, or pro tanto, duty: considerations such as cost, or competing obligations, 
will mean that sometimes, all things considered, we do not have a duty to meet even 




387 We might think responsiveness also requires something between acknowledgement and 
meeting need – for example, campaigning for institutional change aimed at reducing need is 
more than simply factoring need in our decision-making, but less than directly reducing need 
ourselves. As I shall suggest in the following chapter, such action will sometimes be the 
most appropriate response to need. 
388 2004, p. 264. 
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existentially urgent need. In contrast, we should always be responsive to need. At a 
minimum, this means that existentially urgent need should feature in any relevant 
practical deliberations. 
Responsiveness is not only morally required when I witness the other in need face-to-
face – the capacities that underpin the moral status of human beings are not subject to 
change based on proximity. When distance presents a practical barrier, this is best 
thought of as altering my ability to help. The range of available responses to those in 
need who are distant from us is more limited, but no less important. We cannot 
personally express concern or regret to every person in need globally, nor should we. 
However, human beings are political animals; we organise, we form communities, and 
we are capable of cooperation. Taking political action is an eminently appropriate 
response to the needs of distant or generalised others, and can take forms such as 
voting, engaging in the political process, protest, or civil disobedience. Indeed, 
political action may sometimes be a more effective and stable means of reducing need 
than individual action. As many commentators have observed of Singer’s drowning 
child thought experiment, appealing to local government for the erection of fences 
around dangerous ponds in inhabited areas may present the most sensible long-term 
solution for all involved. 
3.5 A comparison with care ethics 
Care ethics389 represents a departure from an ethic of justice or the ‘justice 
perspective,’ which privileges notions of impartiality, autonomy, and equality.390 This 
departure is sometimes taken to offer a more “need-centred” basis for ethical 
practice,391 and Sarah Clark Miller’s recent work suggests that we might look to care 
ethics to better understand the normativity of need. I consider Miller’s account to be 




389 Carol Gilligan’s 1982 In a Different Voice is often credited with founding modern care 
ethical theory. 
390 Many have considered the stark binary erected between justice and care to be a rhetorical 
oversimplification. It may help to view the characterisation provided here as a presentation 
of an ‘ideal type’ as Grace Clement cautions in her Care, Autonomy, and Justice (1996). 
391 Botes, 2000, p. 1071. 
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both my strongest rival, and in some ways the most similar to my own – her treatment 
of human interdependence and vulnerability is nuanced and apt, and she comes closest 
to developing the idea of responsiveness. Therefore, I examine and respond to her view 
in detail in this section. I highlight key affinities between my own view and Miller’s: 
particularly, her focus on the inherent interdependence of the human condition, and 
our call to be responsive to need. However, I also highlight some challenges that her 
account faces: for example, she cannot answer the challenge of obligatory aid. I then 
suggest that, despite problems with her account of normativity, her insight into the 
value of skilful responsiveness is a helpful addition to the account I have developed. 
To begin, a necessarily brief primer on care ethics. An ethic of care instructs that the 
relationships, dependence, and interdependence of human lives are of fundamental 
moral significance. It emphasises particularity and context over abstraction, and 
theorises people as fundamentally connected.392 It fosters a recognition of, and respect 
for, forms of difference along a plethora of dimensions which impact a person’s care 
needs, such as race, gender, class, sexual orientation, age, etc. Maintaining harmonious 
relationships and meeting the needs of others enjoy priority over equality or fairness 
of treatment.393 
Miller names four themes as key philosophical insights of the care ethics approach: 
particularity, dependence, interdependence, and need. A care perspective highlights 
human finitude, and draws attention to the many circumstances of dependency 
experienced in every human life, including illness and injury, infancy and senescence. 
The ways in which we do or do not care for each other in such moments of dependence 
are of utmost moral importance. The unavoidability of dependence means that we are 
all mutually dependent, and “if we are to survive, let alone thrive in leading lives that 
are recognizably human, others must respond to our dependent selves by meeting our 
needs through their caring actions.”394 Interdependence is emphasised in that others 




392 Clement, 1996. 
393 Botes, 2000. 
394 Miller, 2005, p. 140. 
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will also need my assistance, resulting in a mutuality of care. Further, care ethics 
prominently features the moral importance of “nurturing responsiveness to and 
responsibility for needs,”395 as although the particular experiences of need vary 
drastically, all humans have needs, and to have a need is to require care. Care, then, is 
the “morally appropriate reaction to another’s needs,”396 taking another’s need as the 
impetus for action. 
Accurate perception and skilful responsiveness are imperative to prevent the ethic of 
care from collapsing into paternalism. In this regard the person in need’s own account 
of their needs is epistemically privileged – care seeks to advance the self-determined 
ends of people in need where possible.   
Let us turn now to Miller’s account of the normativity of need. She draws heavily from 
Immanuel Kant’s justification for the imperfect duty of beneficence, which requires 
that those who can, take action by responding to the needs of others397: 
“The reason that it is a duty to be beneficent is this: since our self-love cannot 
be separated from our need to be loved by others as well, we therefore make 
ourselves an end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is 
through its qualification as a universal law; hence through our will to make 
others our ends as well.”398 
As finite, rational beings, our self-interest cannot be distinguished from our need to be 
helped when we are in need ourselves. In order to continue to exist as an agent, and to 
achieve any ends that require assistance, we will require our existential needs to be 
met by others. Rational beings, as such, will their own continued existence, and so 
must also will that finite rational beings help one another in circumstances of need. It 
is the inevitability of our dependence on others that requires us as rational beings to 
help meet the needs of others; if we were to will a universal law of non-beneficence, 
the help we need to continue existing would not be available to us. This would amount 




395 Miller, 2005, p. 141. 
396 Miller, 2005, p. 142. 
397 Miller, 2005, p. 147; Kant, 1991, p. 201. 
398 Miller, 2005, p. 148; from Kant, 1991, p. 156. 
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to a ‘contradiction in volition’ – both (necessarily, as rational agents) willing our own 
existence, and willing the destruction of the conditions which make this possible.  
For Miller, Kantian beneficence provides the general principle for action (or maxim), 
but this is supplemented by the care ethical approach which advises how to respond to 
the needs of others. In the process of acting on the duty of beneficence, we take up the 
self-determined ends of the one in need as our own. Here the skills of moral perception 
and judgement are imperative to enabling carers to accurately recognise need when it 
is encountered, and to enacting appropriate, effective responses. While moral 
perception allows us to distinguish a situation as morally relevant in the first place, 
moral judgement involves knowing what a moral principle requires in a particular 
situation, and recognising the morally relevant features as such. “Care ethics generally 
advocates a heightened degree of attentiveness to those present in our moral lives.”399 
Cultivating and developing our moral perception and judgement is thus required as 
necessary to successful caring. Here practices that involve cultivation of empathy are 
thought to promote not only receptivity to others in need, but understanding of how to 
meet their needs sensitively. 
Miller takes up a position that contrasts with Reader and Brock, arguing that the how 
of meeting needs matters: 
“The duty to care does more than obligate agents to respond to others’ needs; 
it requires that the nature of their response be both respectful and caring. […] 
The how of needs response carries with it the power of conferring or denying 
both equal moral worth and inclusion in a moral community.”400 
However, although the language of ‘responsiveness’ features prominently, Miller 
ultimately considers that our duty is to “meet others’ needs”401 through a duty of care, 
and relegates responsiveness to the ‘how’ of care, rather than conceiving of 
responsiveness as characterising the duty itself. 




399 Miller, 2005, p. 156. 
400 2012, p. 4. 
401 2012, p. 45. 
 
Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
 
164 
Many features of the care ethical approach to responding to the needs of others seem 
to me to be on the right track. It is without question that we are each of us dependent 
on others at various stages in our lives, and although globalisation can distance us from 
this reality, it also amplifies the insight to be gained from it. Economic, technological, 
and environmental interdependence has never been more deeply woven into the 
everyday lives of so many.402 Further, as we saw in Section 2.1, Miller is right to 
identify empathy as a possible aid to the success of caring for others, as empathy has 
been consistently associated with prosocial behaviour in empirical research. Its 
cultivation may be challenging given the existence of non-conscious, implicit 
processes regulating its activation, but further research on methods of cultivating and 
developing empathic responses may be illuminating here.403 
However, it is Miller’s use of a Kantian justification for an imperfect duty of 
beneficence that I will suggest fails to accord with taking need seriously. Although 
Miller takes her account to demand that “everyone who has the means to do so should 
be beneficent to those in need,”404 she is ultimately defending the existence of an 
imperfect duty. She considers the classing of beneficence as an imperfect duty to be 
an advantage of her view, as it allows carers to judge when and how to exercise their 
obligation, and to avoid sacrifice of their own needs. To see the tension between these 
claims, let us briefly reflect on the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties. 
Perfect duties are those that do not admit of exceptions “in favour of inclination,”405 
whereas imperfect duties do admit of such exceptions: 




402 For a discussion of the ways that globalisation has complicated our moral lives, see: 
Lichtenberg, 2010. 
403 We might worry about empathic overload or exhaustion in those who have cultivated 
empathic responses to others, and indeed there is a body of research in nursing literature on 
the phenomena of compassion fatigue and burnout. See, for example: Patricia Smith’s To 
Weep for a Stranger: Compassion Fatigue in Caregiving. 
404 Miller, 2005, p. 147. 
405 Kant, 1964, section II, p. 422. 
 
Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
 
165 
Perfect duty: One must never (or always)  to the fullest extent possible 
Imperfect duty: One must sometimes and to some extent 406 
It is this feature of imperfect duties that allows them to avoid demandingness 
objections levelled, for example, at utilitarians like Peter Singer, who consider aid to 
be morally required in all circumstances unless it requires sacrifice of something of 
comparable morally significant.407 To restate Miller’s moral requirement for meeting 
the needs of others in the form of an imperfect duty, then, ‘everyone who has the means 
to do so should sometimes and to some extent be beneficent to those in need.’ As 
Miller claims, this formulation has the benefit that it will be likely to avoid any 
demandingness objections. However, it also faces the problem of obligatory aid. 
Kant’s view of beneficence as an imperfect duty has been challenged as unable to 
account for the intuition that, in some circumstances, helping someone in need seems 
to be morally obligatory.408 Singer’s now-famous example of walking past a shallow 
pond and seeing a child drowning in it is meant to evoke this intuition, as is Karen 
Stohr’s description of driving by an elderly man who appears to be in distress at the 
side of a road. Helping will mean trivial costs like getting my clothes muddy or being 
late for a dinner date, but there is no moral dilemma here: I simply am morally 
obligated to help. In these cases, it seems that the imperfect duty of beneficence is too 
permissive, as it cannot mandate my taking action in any one particular circumstance, 
despite remarkably low costs and high stakes. 
Kantian scholars have offered various responses to this problem, and although I cannot 
explore each of them, I will now very briefly examine a handful of strategies that 
Miller might attempt in order to save her account. First, she might simply bite the 
bullet: we truly are only committed to helping ‘sometimes, to some extent,’ regardless 
of the extent of need or the cost to us, and our intuitions about the problem of 




406 Johnson, 2008, section 5, para. 2. 
407 Singer, 1972, p. 241; Singer’s views have changed somewhat in more recent publications. 
408 Stohr, 2011. 
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obligatory aid are simply mistaken.409 Aside from the lack of intuitive plausibility of 
this strategy, it also seems discordant with the spirit of Miller’s work. She is keen to 
advocate for the moral requirement to care for a subset of our most constitutive needs 
as agents, which indicates sensitivity to the extent of need. Further, she stresses that 
care ethics establishes a moral requirement of attentiveness, so that we are able to 
recognise situations of need – this indicates a level of vigilance required that goes 
beyond a voluntarist picture of beneficence. 
Second, we might instead reject the Kantian picture of duties as dividing into perfect 
and imperfect, in favour of some other picture of moral responsibilities to those in 
need. I will not consider this here as Miller’s account of the normativity of need hinges 
on a Kantian foundation. 
Third, we might take a more nuanced view of the duties involved. Setting aside any 
pedagogical interest in the most accurate interpretation of Kant, Stohr suggests that we 
should see the duty of beneficence as involving both the imperfect duty to help others 
occasionally, and the perfect duty to avoid indifference to others as ends. In this 
context, indifference means something like taking their ends not to be worthy of my 
regard, and it is related to the parallel perfect duty of respect, which disallows contempt 
or arrogance. On this picture, I am always required to “adopt the attitude that [the 
other’s] ends carry moral significance insofar as they are her ends.”410 This attitude 
can be fulfilled by direct helping behaviour, but also through responding in other ways, 
such as acknowledging the person’s need, or apologising for not helping. However, in 
order to accept that the attitude is present, we should expect that sometimes it will 
translate concretely into helping behaviour. Crucially for the problem of obligatory 
aid, there are some circumstances in which neglecting to take action to meet the needs 
of others will be sufficient evidence to judge that the agent does have an attitude of 




409 For example, see: Hill, 1971. 
410 Stohr, 2011, p. 61. 
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indifference, and this is the case for the thought experiments of the drowning child and 
the elderly man in distress. 
Stohr’s approach is well suited for adoption into Miller’s picture of the duty of care, 
and although it constitutes a significant shift, I suggest that it is her strongest response 
to the problem of obligatory aid. As we have seen, this adjustment also brings Miller’s 
Kantian view nearer to my own. Instead of an imperfect duty to meet need, we might 
instead focus on a perfect duty to be responsive to need, as I have advocated. This is 
concordant with Stohr’s dispositional reading of the problem of obligatory aid – in the 
problem cases, we might say that failure to help is indicative of insufficient 
responsiveness, as I claimed in the previous section. The responsibility to be 
responsive to situations of need mirrors the mandate not to be indifferent towards 
people in need, and the role of moral perception and judgement is vindicated in 
appraising when the mandate against indifference requires direct helping, when it does 
not, and how best to be responsive to the needs of others. 
A further concern for Miller’s account of the normativity of need is that it is reliant on 
Kantian foundations. As I suggested in Chapter 4 when discussing inherently Kantian 
or utilitarian accounts,411 it is undesirable to premise the normativity of need on 
foundations which require the acceptance of considerable theoretical baggage. It is 
worthwhile, if possible, to avoid alienating those who see value or use in the concept 
of need, but who would not subscribe to an inherently Kantian picture of its 
normativity. 
Given the problems I have highlighted for Miller’s account of normativity, I instead 
propose to accommodate her insight into the importance of the how of responding to 
need into my own account. Her theory offers the tools of empathy, attentiveness, and 
moral perception and judgement to counter the ills of paternalism and complacency. 
As we will see in the following section, this elaboration of the dispositional tools which 




411 See, for example, Sections 4.1 and 5. 
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support responsiveness will be helpful in addressing potential challenges for my 
account. 
4. Objections 
I now consider some of the most pressing challenges my account of the normativity of 
need faces. I begin with epistemic concerns, and then consider more fundamental 
challenges to this picture of normativity which seek to limit the scope of need’s moral 
importance.412 
4.1 Epistemic challenges 
The case of distant or generalised others in need brings to the fore the epistemic 
challenges inherent in a duty of responsiveness to others in need. We can only ever 
expect to have incomplete and imperfect information both about whether need exists 
and about the most effective means available of reducing it. How can we hope to 
respond to the needs of distant others when we may never be made aware of them in 
the first place? 
A first response to this question is an acknowledgement that sometimes we will have 
insufficient information to be aware of, or meaningfully responsive to, the needs of 
others. This is possible at any level of proximity, but particularly likely as distance 
increases. Many of the small-scale, acute cases of faraway need that we will never hear 
about will also be those that we are too distant from to be able to affect. However, 
larger-scale, chronic, or more easily anticipated need will allow of no such defence, 
and demands response. The insights of Miller’s account are also instructive here, as 
the cultivation and development of attentiveness and moral perception and judgement 
is critical to successful responsiveness to need. These skills are often advocated for 
health care professionals, for example, who care for the need of others directly and so 
must be able to recognise and respond to it effectively. However, a different form of 
attentiveness and moral judgement also contributes to prompt, considered, and 




412 See Chapter 6 Sections 3 and 4 on libertarian, demandingness, and moral psychology and 
distance objections for my account. 
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sensitive strategies in order to respond to, proactively anticipate, and trace the causes 
of, large-scale human suffering.413 I expand on the challenge of ensuring that 
responsive action is effective in the following chapter, where I argue that cooperation 
and collective action offer promising responses to concerns about demandingness and 
practicality. 
A further concern for this account of responsiveness is the tendency to epistemic 
arrogance, particularly in contexts involving asymmetrical power relations. If unmet 
basic needs leave people vulnerable to oppression, then when we encounter people in 
such need from the position of someone with capacity to help, we are in a highly 
ethically sensitive relation. Eric Nelson warns that we are liable to “pre-empt, label, 
and exclude the other”414 through the very act of recognition, taking ourselves to 
‘recognise’ a great deal more than shared ontological vulnerability, potentially 
projecting features of ourselves and assuming that these too are ‘shared.’ 
I suspect that this is, indeed, a challenge for any moral agent attempting to be 
responsive to need, although I would note that it is similarly a challenge for proponents 
of ‘meeting’ need, and for any who attempt helping behaviour aimed at those 
culturally, geographically, or otherwise distant from us.415 It will be helpful for the 
responsive agent to cultivate the attentiveness and moral judgement as suggested 
above, but to this we must add a degree of humility. Such humility will involve a 
recognition that shared ontological vulnerability does not amount to shared lived 
experience, and prompt the responsive agent to conduct regular reflexive checks of the 
particular position they inhabit, and the danger of abusing their relative power. In 
addition to the dispositional aid of humility, attempts to respond to distant need should 
be guided not only by good evidence about what works and best practice, but also by 




413 For success stories on this front, we might look to World Health Organisation 
programmes that have successfully eradicated smallpox and prevented HIV/AIDS and 
sexually transmitted infections in Thailand. See: Levine, 2007. 
414 2009, p. 80. 
415 Indeed, the other need not be a stranger for it to be possible to overestimate our 
‘recognition’ of them, as this is also quite possible in even the most intimate of relationships. 
 
Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
 
170 
local knowledge and insight. This is a potentially daunting prospect for most 
individuals to undertake on their own, and I expand on a collective answer to this 
challenge in the following chapter. 
4.2 The scope of need’s normativity 
I now consider the claim that need is only normative in the context of certain 
relationships. This challenge can be developed in a range of ways, and may defend 
different kinds of relationships as necessary for need’s normativity. For example, 
David Miller suggests that need-based obligation requires a relatively high level of 
solidarity or cooperation: 
“Greater solidarity will usually be required to underpin the need principle than 
the equality principle. If competitive or instrumental relationships encourage 
the use of desert criteria of distribution and highly cooperative or solidaristic 
relationships provoke the use of need criteria, equality may be appropriate to 
groups which display enough solidarity to make their members forgo claims 
based on differential contribution but not so much that they are willing to go 
beyond mechanical equality to take account of individual circumstances.”416 
I suspect that a key motivation for this concern is related to demandingness: it would 
simply require too much of us to have to worry about the individual circumstances of 
each person in need. We have cognitive and emotional limits, and these limits will not 
allow for the seemingly infinite consideration required to respond to need. By contrast, 
those we are in a cooperative or solidaristic relationship with are already a proper 
source of concern for us, due to the norms required by such relationships. In this sense, 
the challenge strikes me as compelling – as individuals we simply cannot cognitively 




416 Miller, 1992, p. 571. Note that the consistency of Miller’s commitment to this stance on 
need is questionable. His 2001 paper “Distributing responsibilities” defends a pluralist 
account of responsibility for remedying deprivation and suffering (which he calls 
‘connection theory’), which features capacity to help as a potential grounding for remedial 
responsibility – this indicates that sometimes mere capacity to help will be sufficient to 
ground responsibility to remedy need. However, his recent stance on economic migrants in 
“Justice in immigration” (2015) makes clear that despite the desperate need of migrants and 
a given state’s capacity to help, no one state has an obligation to admit them; rather, there is 
an obligation to evaluate their case based on ‘legitimate selection criteria.’ This indicates that 
even when capacity to help is clear, costs are low, and need is evidently dire, there is not 
even a prima facie duty to adequately respond to need. 
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or psychologically handle the extreme demands that responding to every need we 
know of would require. As I have already indicated, my account of cooperation and 
collective action in Chapter 6 is intended to address this very real challenge. 
However, if this challenge about scope is not reducible in some way to a challenge 
about demandingness, it is not clear to me what would ground such a limit on moral 
concern. In practice, we often do take the needs of strangers to be normative. This is 
particularly visible when we respond to charitable appeals emphasising dire need, and 
when we use it as a moral or political justification in public deliberation. To be sure, 
the consistency and extent to which we do so is problematic, as several serious, 
widespread ongoing human tragedies attest; but I see no reason for thinking that such 
concerns indicate a limit on need’s normative force, rather than a failure to 
appropriately respond to it. 
One reason for finding this objection appealing might rest in a confusion between 
moral psychology and the demands of morality. We have seen in Section 2.1 that it is 
often easier to experience empathy for people who are similar to us, and when there 
are fewer people in need. However, the fact that it is easier to feel empathic towards 
those who share our religious affiliation or ethnicity does not mean that we are 
absolved from moral concern for those who do not. Similarly, the fact that empathy 
makes responsiveness easier, and empathy will often come more easily in the context 
of certain kinds of relationship, does not mean that we are absolved from moral 
concern for those with whom we are not in such relations.417 
Instead, we might think the challenge is levelled at the idea of an obligation or duty to 
respond to need: perhaps it is the duty that can only exist in certain forms of 
relationship. This interpretation of the challenge would be committed to the view that 
we need not always be responsive to the existential need of others, although perhaps 
we must always be responsive to need of those we are in certain kinds of relationships 




417 For a similar line of argument in the context of climate change, see: Gardiner, 2010, p. 
94-95. 
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with. On this view, not only would we be excused from meeting need, but from 
factoring it in our moral deliberations (i.e. being responsive to it). This is quite 
different than simply allowing the non-basic interests of those we are in relationship 
to have some amount of priority in principle or practice, or even to allowing the non-
basic interests of those we are in relationship with to have priority over the basic 
interests of distant strangers in a particular context – this view morally allows that we 
give the basic need of distant strangers no moral consideration. Such a view would be 
seriously problematic, amounting to a rejection of the moral equality of persons. 
A further concern might centre on the particular kind of duty I have advocated: 
responsiveness. It might be suggested that responsiveness can only be mandated, or 
even expected, in certain kinds of relationships. While our ability to be responsive to 
the needs of those we are in close relationships with – such as our children, friends, or 
family – is relatively uncontroversial, how can we be called on to be equally responsive 
to people we have never met? 
It is important at this point to stress that responsiveness does not mandate that the 
moral agent have any particular affective response. It is certainly plausible that only 
certain kinds of relationships will be sufficient to generate some affective responses, 
and that this capacity will vary according to the psychological characteristics of any 
given agent, and their society’s prevailing social norms. While some affective 
responses will be helpful in supporting responsive action, they are not mandatory. 
Additional tools include the forming of pro-social habits and dispositions will facilitate 
responsive action, but again these are intended to play a supportive role; at heart what 
is obligatory is responsive action. 
Further, the concern points to the impossibility of demonstrating equal regard for 
distant strangers and those we are in close relationship with. Happily, the duty of 
responsiveness does not require us to be equally responsive to all people in every sense 
of the word ‘responsive.’ Rather, it requires that we factor all existentially urgent need 
in our practical deliberations, and where appropriate take action to mitigate the need. 
This equal concern is to be taken seriously, and we have to have weighty reasons 
against meeting need to decide that it should not take priority. However, we are still 
free to be more emotionally, communicatively, or otherwise responsive to those in 
 
Chapter 5: Need and Moral Normativity: 
Responding to Morally Relevant Capacities 
 
173 
close relationships with us, as long as this does not violate the equal concern that we 
must show in responding to existentially urgent need. 
4.3 Motivation and moral psychology 
In Section 2.1, I identified limiting factors to our actual pro-social responses to the 
need of others – limiting factors that do not accord with the moral grounds of concern, 
such as the attractiveness of the being in need. This presents my account, and any 
account of the moral normativity of need, with a challenge of motivation. No 
reasonable account of the moral normativity of need will allow that it is modified by 
the (morally irrelevant) features of our moral psychology; and yet, to ignore such 
features would risk producing a theory of moral demands that people will 
characteristically fail to accord with. 
One possible response to this challenge is to bite the bullet, and allow that morality 
makes demands of us that do not cohere with our moral psychology. We may fail to 
live up to these demands; indeed, we predictably will fail to live up to them. However, 
on this line of thinking, such moral failure does not offer reason to modify our 
understanding of the demands of morality.418 
The opposite response to this challenge is to consider modifying our understanding of 
morality, so that it is more in line with what we can reasonably expect of people.419 
Here, the thinking might be that if we know only morally exceptional people will be 
able to act in accordance with what we have hitherto considered the demands of 
morality, this gives us reason to think such demands might be properly conceived of 




418 Peter Singer’s famous (1972) “Famine, affluence, and morality” is an archetypal response 
of this kind: “The way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my 
conclusion. My conclusion follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless 
that principle is rejected, or the arguments shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must 
stand, however strange it appears” (p. 236). See also: Sobel, 2007. 
419 For example: Cullity, 2004; Wolf, 1982. 
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as supererogatory: to act in accordance with them would be morally exceptional, but 
is not morally required.420 
Instead, I suggest that we reframe the challenge. Moral psychology does offer insight 
into the predictable limiting features of our willingness to act to help those in need, 
but it also offers us the opportunity to make meeting our duties of responsiveness more 
concordant with our moral psychology. For example, Lichtenberg argues that a central 
reason that many do not take action on global poverty, despite “almost everyone 
believ[ing] it is a very bad thing,”421 is that we are highly influenced by what others 
around us are doing. If those around us behave as though inaction is an acceptable 
response, this eases the path for us to follow suit. One way of shifting this equation 
might be to push for the establishment of coercive sanctions, whether those of legal 
institutions or of social disapproval, which provide a measure of reassurance that 
others must also do their part. In Chapter 6, I argue that collective action and coercive 
sanctions offer us just such an opportunity to problem-solve the challenges of moral 
motivation, and I revisit the concern of demandingness in light of this revised picture 
of responsiveness. 
5. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by reflecting on one motivation for interrogating the normativity 
of need: that it features in our everyday moral and political practice. I briefly canvassed 
empirical research on altruism and empathy, suggesting that we have reason to be 
optimistic that people sometimes do take the need of others to be a reason for action. 
That is, they display helping behaviour whose ultimate goal is meeting the needs of 
others. I also drew attention to some moderating factors in our empathic responses. I 
then offered my own account of the normativity of need, which focused on the morally 
relevant capacities of the being in need, and their vulnerability to suffering and 
oppression. I suggested that many non-human animals possess capacities which 




420 Archer, 2016, p. 334. 
421 2004, p. 78. 
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ground the normativity of need, but that the way we respond to fellow human beings 
will be different, and is rooted in our shared interests and vulnerabilities. The relation 
to the other proffered was informed by the phenomenology of Levinas on the face-to-
face encounter with the other, and by feminist scholarship on ontological vulnerability 
as a feature of the human condition. I then defended responsiveness as the mode of the 
duty we have to those in need, contrasting it with ‘meeting’ need and emphasising the 
role of acknowledgement. I considered Miller’s Kantian care ethics and its defence of 
the normativity of need, indicating challenges for her interpretation of its Kantian 
foundations. I then highlighted her insight into the ‘how’ of being responsive to need, 
and the value of attentiveness and moral perception and judgement. These tools of 
responsiveness then featured in my response to epistemological challenges for my 
account in Section 4. I entertained possible limits on the scope of need’s normativity, 
but ultimately suggested that there is no moral ground for such limits – need’s 
normativity does not require circumscribing the particular responsibilities and 
relationships we each hold as moral agents and human beings. Finally, I proposed that 
the moral psychology of our empathic responses to others offers an impetus to 
problem-solve, and use such insights to render the demands of responsiveness more 
concordant with our psychology. 
If this account is right, we are morally required to be responsive to need, even if we 
are not always required to reduce it. In this chapter, I have had little to say about the 
role of collective action and institutions in responding to need, and I have not taken a 
stance on whether responsiveness to need might be a duty of justice – it is to these 
questions I turn in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Need and the Demands of Justice 
1. Introduction422 
Is the duty to be responsive to human need best seen as a matter of justice, or of some 
other moral domain? In the foregoing chapters, I have developed an account of morally 
important needs; defended the view that the scope of justice is bounded by those duties 
which we deem (in principle) morally liable to coercive enforcement; and proposed 
that the appropriate reaction to need in human beings is responsiveness, as a 
demonstration of respect for the sort of animal that people are. I now bring these 
diverse strands together to consider the relationship between need and justice. I will 
suggest that our duties of responsiveness are best thought of as collective duties, 
grounded in the capacity of the affluent to contribute. I then identify some 
characteristic features that we should be able to recognise if we are being appropriately 
responsive to need. Further, I will argue that duties of responsiveness are indeed a 
matter of justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally 
enforceable. Before closing, I address the most challenging objections that might be 
voiced against such a view, including demandingness and coordination concerns. 
In Section 2 I reflect on the nature of our duties of responsiveness, suggesting that we 
can best hope to fulfil duties of responsiveness through coordination in the form of 
collective action; whether this involves working within existing institutions, pressing 
for their transformation, or the creation of new institutions. I also offer a list of features 
that we should be able to recognise when we are being suitably responsive to the needs 
of other people, with a particular emphasis on the ongoing, adaptive nature of 
responsiveness. In Section 3, I argue that our duties of responsiveness are morally 
enforceable in principle, and that they are thereby duties of justice. I first canvas three 
lines of reasoning introduced in Chapter 3, each potentially offering sufficient 
conditions for considering a duty morally enforceable. I then defend the moral 




422 The title for this chapter is a nod to Theodore M. Benditt’s 1985 “The demands of 
justice.” 
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enforceability of responsiveness by reference to the moral seriousness and extent of 
need, and our collective capacity to respond. Further, I identify an unlikely ally that 
would be unhappy with the label “justice,” but would accept the moral enforceability 
argument. Before closing the section, I posit what enforceability of this kind might 
look like in practice, considering existing institutions and possible institutions and 
collectives that serve as examples of the sort of coordination I advocate. I address some 
of the chief challenges facing my account in Section 4. Does it demand too much of 
individuals with their own lives to lead, in an incredibly complex and constantly 
changing world? Can we expect people to be motivated by distant suffering when 
moral psychology tells us that psychological distance has a predictable negative impact 
on moral motivation? How can we coordinate action to effect change when, arguably, 
the institutions that might facilitate discharging our duties do not exist? I hope to show 
that although these challenges should be taken seriously, they do not provide decisive 
reasons to dismiss the seriousness of our responsibility to respond to human need. 
Rather, where solutions are not yet forthcoming, we have good reason to get problem 
solving. 
This chapter bears on contemporary challenges of relevance for public policy, but it is 
not intended to offer direct policy recommendations. Rather, it should be seen as a 
moral argument in favour of the development of accordant policy recommendations. 
Determining that our need-based obligations are amenable to enforcement, in 
principle, offers a first step in the process towards such policy.423  
 
 




423 The closest I come to offering a concrete policy recommendation is to advocate for the 
establishment of an interdisciplinary programme of research, along the model of effective 
altruism, to problem-solve collective and institutional approaches to our duties of 
responsiveness. I take it that this programme of research would make policy 
recommendations a focal goal. 
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2. Responsiveness and Coordination 
Thus far, I have focused primarily on the individual duty that each human being has 
to be responsive to the need424 of fellow human beings. This comes with the caveat 
that some human beings, such as those with profound cognitive disabilities, may not 
be able to respond to need in others in any meaningful way, and so cannot be under 
any such duty. Of course, the capacity to be responsive to need is also variable above 
this minimum threshold, as radical inequality characterises our relative standing with 
each other both in terms of wealth and resource control, and in terms of power and 
influence. However, even the most impoverished among us are in a position to respond 
to need in others, even if they cannot ameliorate it.425 Recall that the appropriate form 
of responsiveness will vary depending on the situation. While it requires 
acknowledgement at a minimum, in cases where we are able to do something to help, 
it may require either action to address the need directly, or a more indirect response to 
contribute to its amelioration. 
Duty of responsiveness 
A moral agent has a duty to acknowledge the existentially urgent need of a 
fellow human being(s). Further, he or she may have a duty to stop or prevent 
the suffering and vulnerability caused by existentially urgent need if he or she 
can do so at less than significant cost to herself, either individually or by 
contributing to collective action. 
Notice that this duty is one owed to the human being(s) in need, and we must be in a 
position to stop or prevent suffering at a relatively low cost. 
How far does this duty extend? People are in serious need all over the world, and the 
causes are many and in some respects change over time. In the past, most people were 
arguably not in an epistemic position to know about the needs of those beyond their 
immediate community. However, this can no longer be credibly relied on as a limit on 




424 Throughout the chapter, whenever I refer to duties of responsiveness to ‘need,’ I am 
referring to existentially urgent need (or ‘basic need’) as elaborated in Chapter 1. 
425 It has been proposed that more immediate and everyday exposure to serious need actually 
discourages the temptation to ignore or ‘switch off’ (Piff et al., 2010). 
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the demandingness of our duties to others, as globalisation and mass communication 
bring reports of distant famines, ecological disasters, and wars to our inboxes and 
screens with the click of a button. Although media coverage may be sensationalistic 
and patchy, where there is large-scale human suffering due to basic needs going unmet, 
there are generally many in affluent countries (and in privileged pockets of developing 
countries) who are in a position to know about it. 
As individuals, we are not capable of addressing the serious need of all our fellow 
human beings; but as we have seen, we are not alone in having a responsibility to 
respond to need. “We are capable of acting, and do act, through political and social 
institutions to accomplish things that would be unreasonable to demand of 
individuals.”426 Further, the same globalisation processes and technological advances 
that have heightened mass communication have put us in a position to coordinate and 
take action in ways that were previously either prohibitively costly or simply 
unavailable.  
I suggest that to adequately respond to the scale of human need we currently face, we 
are required to coordinate our efforts in order to take effective collective action. This 
proposal is in keeping with a rich literature on coordination or institutionalisation as a 
means for addressing demanding ‘positive’ obligations.427 Developing a full theory of 
collective duties of responsiveness is beyond the scope of this project, but drawing 
from existing work on collective duties to distant fellow humans should give us enough 
to work with.428 




426 Kassner, 2009, p. 191. 
427 For example, see: Cripps, 2013; Lichtenberg, 2013; Kassner, 2009; Mieth, 2008; Shue, 
1988, 1985; Goodin, 1985. ‘Positive’ is in quotes as not all the authors listed accept a 
distinction between negative and positive duties or responsibilities, and I myself have cast 
aspersions on a strict binary between them in Chapter 3. 
428 In particular: Björnsson, Forthcoming; Cripps, 2013; Lichtenberg, 2013; Kassner, 2009. 
For a general account of collective responsibility, see: May, 1987. On points of parity 
between individuals’ and collectives’ obligations, see: Collins & Lawford-Smith, 2016. 
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Most people in the affluent developed world, and wealthy elites in developing 
countries, are in a position to contribute to action responding to need at a “less than 
significant”429 cost to themselves. Although all people are responsible for responding 
to the needs of others to an extent reasonable given their capacity, the capacity of the 
affluent means that they are uniquely able to coordinate, forming collectives that not 
only improve efficacy and scope, but potentially also alleviate demandingness 
concerns and bolster our moral motivation.430 I will expand on demandingness and 
moral motivation in Section 4. 
The line of reasoning runs as follows.431 Taken as an individual, I do not have the 
ability to respond meaningfully to the current extent of basic human need. However, I 
am one individual among many who is a member of an affluent nation, and taken as a 
whole, all those individuals with the capacity to contribute do have the ability to 
meaningfully respond to basic human need (collective capacity). If we have the 
capacity to respond to such existentially urgent need at less than significant cost, then 
we should do so.432 Failing to do so amounts to a failure to take human lives seriously. 
In virtue of our collective capacity, and the seriousness of human need, we as 
individuals are subject to a collective obligation to contribute to responding to need 
(collective obligation). 
Our collective obligation is best understood in terms of a shared obligation: ‘the 
affluent’ do not constitute an organised group, but rather a number of individual agents 
whose contributions make the fulfilment of the obligation feasible.433 The result at the 




429 Cripps, 2013, p. 13. 
430 Capacity to help has a causal history. Where that capacity is derived from historical 
injustice, our need-based obligations must be augmented or supplemented with historical 
ones. See: Berkey, 2017; Thompson, 2000.  
431 Thanks to Philip Cook for encouraging me to spell out the steps in the argument 
establishing collective obligation here. 
432 Approximations of this principle have been taken to offer a kind of moral bedrock by 
some moral theorists (for example: Singer, 1972; Ross, 1930). Quite how we should interpret 
the cost qualifier, and therefore how weak or strong the principle ends up being, has been the 
subject of much debate. For a survey of contributions to this debate, see Sonderholm 2012.  
433 Björnsson, Forthcoming. 
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individual level is the individual duty to facilitate the fulfilment of the collective 
obligation. Although each individual contribution is insufficient in itself for fulfilling 
the collective obligation, such contributions have moral worth and are thus meaningful 
contributions. Individuals have a duty to collectivise, rather than to each act separately 
to respond to need, because it is only through coordination that we can hope to respond 
to need effectively, and in the long term. Coordination facilitates strategic planning 
and prioritisation,434 while individual response to need will be predictably haphazard. 
Further, many of the most significant threats we currently face are best thought of as 
fundamentally collective problems, with climate change as perhaps the most obvious 
example: 
“A great many persons (present and future) face a global-level threat from 
which we could protect them by organising ourselves effectively to act together 
in certain ways, but which instead we are making much worse, through the 
combination of billions of individual actions.”435 
By coordinating with others, we are able to define and distribute duties whose 
requirements might otherwise be indeterminate or infeasible. It is overly burdensome 
to expect duties to all people in serious need to be action-guiding for individuals in 
any direct sense, as the capacity of any individual affluent person will run out long 
before human need does, and prioritising between claims is simply not feasible at such 
a psychological distance. As Joshua Kassner argues, by ‘institutionalising’ these 
obligations, we are able to form collectives of people who are jointly responsible for 
responding to need, with each individual required to do their part to ensure that the 
collective achieves its aims.436 
Where collectives to appropriately respond to need do not exist, they should be 
formed.437 On this view, we have duties to establish and support collectives that would 




434 Shue, 1988. 
435 Cripps, 2013, p. 2. 
436 Kassner, 2009, p. 188. 
437 Cripps calls potential sets of individuals who have a moral duty to espouse a goal, and 
would form a collectivity if they were to do so, ‘should-be collectivities’ (p. 60). 
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then distribute our duties of responsiveness. Establishing such collectives and 
institutions will help to specify individual-level contributions: 
“[We have a duty to] expand current feasible sets of political action so that 
certain just distributions that are infeasible (or have very low feasibility) in the 
present become feasible (or more feasible) in the future. […] For example, it 
would be a mistake to say that there is not a duty of justice to help eradicate 
global poverty because it is currently unclear who should do what for whom, 
or because we currently do not have international institutions scheduling and 
enforcing specific forms of contribution.”438 
The process of forming a collective involves cost in itself, and this cost should be 
factored into what each individual can reasonably be expected to contribute. Similarly, 
where existing collectives require ongoing support or transformation to respond to 
need, associated costs should be accounted for. Such collectives may take a variety of 
shapes. Elizabeth Cripps offers the following possibilities: 
(a) an effective agreement between states 
(b) an extended remit for an existing international organisation 
(c) the establishment of some stronger, global-level institution 
(d) a global-level agreement between individuals or sub-state collectivities439 
The action of collectives between individuals or sub-state collectives (d) will be a 
necessary step to achieving change in state or international institutions. 
2.1 Collective capacity to respond to need 
I have not yet said enough about our collective capacity to respond to need to motivate 
the account. The motivation to move to a collectivised picture is largely grounded in 
capacity. If each individual responded to need to the extent reasonable based on their 
capacities (i.e. at less than significant cost to herself), without coordinating with others, 
the results would be haphazard at best, providing insufficient security for the most 
vulnerable. Coordination enables strategic planning and prioritisation, division of 
labour, and the establishment of processes which reduce error, waste, and 




438 Gilabert, 2016, p. 518. 
439 Cripps, 2013, p. 20-21. 
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duplication.440 Although mass coordination can also have its drawbacks, such as the 
potential for wasted time and resources when bureaucracy goes awry, or lack of 
sufficient transparency or accountability mechanisms, when seeking to tackle 
widespread and persistent global problems, I take it that some level of coordination 
will be necessary in order to be effective. 
Will the coordinated efforts of those in a position to contribute be sufficient to respond 
to those in need? This is a complicated empirical question, and I will not be able to 
definitively answer it here. Philosophers have taken up empirical research in this area 
to provide very different answers in the past. Often, the answer depends on the 
perceived source of need (whether global poverty, climate change, or refugees and 
conflict).441 In the case of global poverty, Thomas Pogge has stressed that although 
institutional reform is necessary to eradicate poverty, these reforms are achievable, 
and at relatively minimal financial cost:  “the mere fact that the poorer half of 
humankind consume under 2% of the global product (at market exchange rates) 
strongly suggests that severe poverty is wholly or very largely avoidable today.”442 In 
contrast, Leif Wenar cautions against excessive confidence in the empirical thesis “that 
small sacrifice from the rich can bring great benefit to the poor.”443 He cites a body of 
literature that is pessimistic about the effectiveness of aid, pointing to its tendency to 
be directed to meet strategic or political goals rather than humanitarian ones, and the 




440 Shue, 1988. 
441 In the case of climate change, Cripps warns that we may soon be unable to both 
effectively address climate change and meet the basic material needs of the existent human 
population (2015). The IPCC has suggested that, at the time of publication in 2014, “limiting 
climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate risks” (2014, p. 8). However, 
there are sufficiently clear reasons of self-interest to address climate change that, even if we 
did not have the capacity to entirely mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, the 
argument for some other form of action (such as adaptation) is difficult to question. 
In the case of refugees, I am not aware that brute capacity to help has been questioned as a 
limiting factor in our moral responsibilities. 86% of refugees are resettled in neighbouring, 
developing, countries that are close to conflict (UNHCR, 2016). I take it that developed 
countries have superior material resource and infrastructural capacities, such that capacity to 
help is not at issue. 
442 Pogge, 2007b, p. 3-4. 
443 Wenar, 2003, p. 291. 
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risk that it establishes perverse incentives and dependence, and delays reform. 
However, far from recommending that we abandon all hope, Wenar takes this as 
impetus for those who give regular charitable donations to push for better research into 
what makes aid effective, and to improve accountability mechanisms in both state aid 
activities and non-governmental organisations. This proposal is far from indicating 
total scepticism of the possibility of benefit from aid, but rather presumes that at least 
some aid is effective. 
Where does this leave us? Those who are optimistic that global poverty and its 
associated suffering can be eradicated, and even in one lifetime, caution that simply 
siphoning money from the global affluent to the global poor is not a solution to creating 
lasting change. Massive poverty reduction in East Asia has more than halved global 
poverty levels since 1990, but Sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be a challenging case, 
with only slight reduction in the proportion of people in poverty.444 This suggests that, 
going forward, poverty reduction may have to target particular countries in order to 
have a realistic chance of change.445 However, these figures may also be cause for 
optimism: it is possible to drastically reduce poverty in the course of a lifetime. 
Further, many are now taking up Wenar’s challenge in the form of the effective 
altruism movement, applying scientific evidence and philosophical method to try to 
maximise the good achievable by altruism on the part of the global affluent.446 This is 
not a movement positioned to substitute for broader coordination and institutional 
change, as it relies on maximising the contribution of individuals, rather than 
coordination and collective action. However, it marks a more sophisticated approach 




444 Linda Yueh, chief business correspondent of BBC News, looked at the UN Millennium 
Development Goal of halving poverty (from 36% in 1990) by 2015. It was met five years 
early, in 2010, but largely attributable to China. While progress in East Asia has been 
outstanding, the number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa has actually increased. This 
means that strategies must now be tailored to individual countries. She reports that World 
Bank President Jim Yong Kim is “confident” that poverty can be eradicated (2015, para. 14).  
445 It may turn out that the best way to alleviate need is to tackle causal sources of need and 
dependency, whether directly or indirectly. If this is the case, responsiveness in practice will 
require empirical research into the causation of need, despite the moral argument as I have 
offered it relying on need-in-itself. 
446 See, for example: MacAskill, 2015; Singer, 2009. 
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to discharging our individual duties, and champions the importance of planning and 
evidence-based decision-making in response to need. 
2.2 Characteristics of responsiveness 
Before I move on to ask whether our collective duties of responsiveness are morally 
enforceable, it is worth pausing to consider what responding to need looks like in 
practice. I have already suggested that acknowledging need is a minimum requirement, 
meaning that it must be considered in the moral agent’s practical deliberations.447 
However, often, responsiveness requires more. When we are in a position to stop or 
prevent suffering at a reasonably low cost to ourselves, we must go beyond 
acknowledging that suffering, and take action. A suitably responsive action: 
1. Takes context into account 
This is illustrated in the real-life situation of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
poverty reduction proving more intransigent to improvement than 
other areas of Africa or Asia over the last several decades. What 
works in one context may be counterproductive in another, and 
attempts to respond to need should be directed both by the best 
evidence and practice available, and by local knowledge and insight. 
2. Learns from past mistakes 
Thankfully, the endeavour of responding to serious need is not a new 
one, and many lessons have been learned in international 
development and aid practices that are vital to making our efforts 
effective in the future. It means that good quality programme and 
policy evaluation research is a high priority, and should help to direct 
strategic planning on an ongoing basis.448 It also means that we 
should have good reason to think the situation will be improved by 
our actions; hoping, or deciding to ‘wait and see’ are not strategies 
sufficiently responsive to need unless we have good reason to think 
inaction is the best way to ensure needs are met. 
3. Is an ongoing conversation 
Responding to need requires more than a one-off action: it is more 
like a conversation than a statement. The scale and complexity of 
serious need on a global scale mean that it is an iterative process to set 




447 The idea of reasons that must feature in our practical deliberations is adopted from 
Kassner (2009, p. 184-5). 
448 Amanatidou et al., 2014. 
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about responding to it, requiring planning for both the short- and 
long-term. Securing the means to reliably address the basic needs of 
the most vulnerable will involve constant re-thinking to meet 
emerging challenges. 
4. Balances acute and preventive considerations 
The extent of urgent human need now is sufficiently dire that 
responding to it risks overwhelming our attention entirely. However, 
it cannot be allowed to obscure the importance of securing the 
necessary conditions for anticipating and responding to future need. 
We can learn from insights into this difficult balance from public 
health research and practice.449 
In suggesting these features of responsive action, I draw from Scanlon’s notion of 
justifying our actions to others.450 I do not rely on his contractualist commitments, but 
responsiveness taps into the very intuitive need to make decisions and behave as 
though the people whose lives are affected by your decisions are present. What would 
you say to people affected by your decisions? How would you explain yourself? 
Appropriate acknowledgement of need will often require this kind of public 
justification, particularly in cases where the decision has been taken not to reduce need. 
Public acknowledgement is an expressive act of recognition, signalling that those in 
need matter, that they are not invisible. 
None of these features of responsiveness is revolutionary, and to realise them requires 
a great deal of empirical and strategic know-how. However, I hope it provides a clearer 
outline of responsive action. Further, when we do not have a reasonable chance of 
taking more direct coordinated action to respond to need, for example due to lack of 
sufficient empirical research on responses to complex needs in a particular 
geographical area, we should instead focus on supporting research to supply the lack. 




449 For example: Kelleher, 2013; Bitton & Eyal, 2011; Brock & Wikler, 2009. Responding to 
need more generally is somewhat different to the health care case, in that effective response 
here may require addressing the root causes of need and dependency (such as unjust 
structures and systems which reproduce dire need). If this is so, effective response will be 
aligned in all but the most acute cases. On making difficult choices of priority in climate 
change and population justice, see: Cripps, 2015. 
450 Scanlon, 1998. 
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3. Morally Enforceable Collective Duties of 
Responsiveness 
I now turn to the heart of this chapter. In the previous section, I suggested that we 
should respond to need by forming (or supporting, or transforming) collectives, which 
provide a range of benefits in making real progress in responding to need. I have not 
attempted an evaluation of our existing institutions and practices, or defended 
particular actions that should be taken in practice: I recommend Judith Lichtenberg’s 
2013 Distant Strangers as a balanced and action-guiding work on the subject, and 
many others have also tackled these questions.451 Rather, I have sought to provide a 
picture of the kind of duties we share to respond to need, in order to defend the claim 
that these duties are morally enforceable, in principle. To put it another way, they are 
the kind of duties which can legitimately be the subject of state or institutional 
coercion. The emphasis on ‘can’ is important, as I will not attempt to argue for the 
unnecessarily strong (and misguided) claim that such duties should always be 
enforced. This is a point of principle, and not a mandate for blanket coercive 
institutional practices. However, if the distinction I defended in Chapter 3 between 
justice and beneficence was successful, this point of principle will establish that duties 
of responsiveness to need are a matter of justice, as they fall within the scope of moral 
enforceability. 
I have been concerned with justice throughout this project because of the categorical 
moral tone that it conveys. It indicates the realm of entitlement, claims that can be 
made without relying on noblesse oblige, and responsibilities that cannot be shirked 
whenever the going gets tough. However, for some, justice has a very different, and 
inherently institutional, meaning.452 Those with such a political conception of justice 
may not recognise my picture of justice as moral enforceability, but I hope that they 
will still be moved by the argument for moral enforceability itself. If we can agree that 




451 Pummer, 2016; MacAskill, 2015; Cripps, 2013; Illingworth et al., 2011; Singer, 2009; 
Schweickart, 2008; Pogge, 2007a, 2002; Andreou, 2007. 
452 Familiar proponents include John Rawls (1971) and Nagel (2005). 
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duties of responsiveness to need are stringent enough to be enforceable, it is enough 
to establish the kind of moral (if not rhetorical) force I seek.453 
I begin the section by arguing for the moral enforceability of duties of need. I then 
identify an unlikely ally in the form of a proponent of a political conception of justice: 
Thomas Nagel. Although he would not accept that need-based duties are duties of 
justice, he accepts that minimal humanitarian duties are morally liable to state 
coercion. Finally, I will highlight some examples which may make the idea of coercion 
seem more plausible in this context. 
3.1 On the moral enforceability of need-based duties 
Much of the philosophical literature defending need-based or ‘positive’ duties has 
tended to either structure the debate specifically to address libertarian454 concerns and 
critics, or to take libertarian assumptions as a starting point, which puts the burden of 
proof on any departures from this position.455 Although this is understandable, I think 
it would be a mistake to allow too much of the discourse to be shaped by a repetition 
of the same concerns, particularly as it risks distorting the landscape of the discussion 
to make libertarianism appear a more popularly defended foe than may be accurate. 
However, I will begin by offering Narveson’s test for determining when something is 
a duty: “When there is good reason, interpersonally considered, to require the person 
in question to do or refrain from the act in question.”456 
In Chapter 3, I identified three possible lines of reasoning for defending the moral 
enforceability of a given duty: the harm principle, the basic goods view, and the human 




453 That said, I cannot resist a brief comment here to point out how strange it would be to 
find ourselves with duties that are subject to coercive enforcement by the state, that are owed 
to others on impartial grounds of equal concern and respect, but that we cannot call duties of 
justice. 
454 I take the core of this view to be that there is a strict division between negative duties of 
non-interference (i.e. duties not to harm) and positive duties of aid, and that only negative 
duties can be enforceable duties of justice. 
455 Lichtenberg, 2013; Ashford, 2009; Mieth, 2008; Gilabert, 2006, 2004; Pogge, 2002; 
Russell, 1987. 
456 2003, p. 422-3. Admittedly this is not the most provocative of Narveson’s contentions. 
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dignity view.457 I now revisit each in turn, and consider their verdict on the 
enforceability of the duty of responsiveness. I then turn to more general considerations 
in favour of need’s enforceability, arguing that the extent of human need, taken with 
our collective capacity to contribute, gives us good moral reason to see need-based 
duties as legitimately enforceable. 
John Stuart Mill’s harm principle is a reasonable place to start, as it is still in use in 
defence of the principled limits of law in legal theory.458 Recall: 
The Harm Principle: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”459 
However, the harm principle is notoriously ambiguous as to what counts as harm. On 
a narrow reading that only considers direct harms, regulation that is paternalistic or 
aimed at collective goods will be ruled out. Mill himself departs from this reading of 
the principle by defending the enforceability of some autonomy-enhancing 
paternalism (such as education) and collective goods (such as public safety).460 The 
difficulty of specifying harm such that it classifies a range of behaviours that is neither 
too narrow nor too broad has led some legal theorists to instead see the harm principle 
as defining one way, among others, that a duty might be properly subject to coercive 
enforcement.461 I will adopt that interpretation here: the harm principle offers 
sufficient but not necessary conditions for legitimate enforcement. Although a narrow 
reading of harm, and the harm principle, would not allow for the enforcement of need-
based duties as they do not require that a harm has taken place, there are other 
considerations that may warrant the enforceability of need-based duties. 
On a basic goods view, duties are institutionally enforceable when they aim at basic 
goods. On this understanding, basic goods are any goods which are necessary to enjoy 




457 See Chapter 3 Section 3.5.1 for a discussion of each view. 
458 Gardner, 2007. 
459 Mill, 2012a, para. 10. 
460 Stanton-Ife, 2006, section 3.6. 
461 Stewart, 2010. 
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any further goods, such as subsistence and security. This view accommodates a wider 
range of duties of justice than a narrow interpretation of the harm principle, including 
autonomy-enhancing paternalism and collective goods when they are basic. However, 
it is not clear whether it can accommodate cases which appear to be enforceable, but 
aim at seemingly non-basic goods, such as the duty to keep contracts. More 
importantly for the task at hand, I have defined basic needs in terms of the necessary 
conditions for the securing of any other human goods, so the basic goods view would 
allow the enforceability of basic needs almost by definition. Even if this is right, it 
does not substantively add to our reasons for considering need-based duties 
enforceable. 
Similar concerns arise for the view that moral enforceability is connected to the 
necessary conditions for a life worthy of human dignity.462 This is the most maximal 
view of the three, and will clearly rely on what we take human dignity to consist in, 
and what is necessary for securing it. However, as our existentially urgent needs denote 
necessary conditions for any other human goods, they will by definition be included 
in the remit of enforceability. As we saw with the basic goods view, the human dignity 
view cannot expand our understanding of the reasons we have for taking need-based 
duties to be enforceable. 
I suspect that the issue of distinguishing the range of duties which are morally 
enforceable is a substantive one, and one that cannot be settled by refining our 
definition of enforceability. Rather, it must be settled on the grounds of whether we 
have good reason, in principle, to enforce a given duty. I propose that the extent and 
moral seriousness of human need, taken with the collective capacity to respond, give 
us in-principle grounds for coercive enforcement. I commented on the collective 
capacity to respond in the previous section, and I now turn to the extent and seriousness 
of need. 




462 Nussbaum, 2011, especially p. 167-169. 
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The current scale of human need is tragic.463 In 2013, 767 million people lived on less 
than 1.90 USD a day, and over half of those people were children.464 Progress for those 
who move out of poverty is often temporary, as they are particularly vulnerable to 
political and economic shocks, food insecurity, and climate change.465 Over 800 
million people still go hungry. Vastly more people (2 billion) have micronutrient 
deficiencies or “hidden hunger” due to insufficient vitamins and minerals. 161 million 
people – 51 million of those children aged under 5 – were affected by stunting or 
wasting in 2013.466 Although there has been significant improvement in poverty and 
malnutrition rates in recent decades, particularly in East Asia, we also face rising 
challenges associated with climate change and forced displacement due to conflict and 
persecution. 24 people were forced to flee their homes each minute in 2015.467 The 
UNHCR projects that 1.19 million refugees will need resettlement in 2017, which is 
up 72% from 2014, before the large-scale resettlement of Syrians.468 
This level of human suffering is dire enough that it must be taken seriously. Any moral 
or political theory that cannot mandate action of some kind will go against the deeply 
held moral intuitions of many that we are required to make some reasonable effort to 
help one another.469 Otherwise, we are left concluding that it is morally permissible to 
be unmoved in the face of suffering and need that we could have contributed to 
ameliorating. There is something paradoxical in the idea that “respect for other 
people’s interests is not violated provided we ignore them entirely, if we have nothing 




463 Indeed, we might think the level of need identified in the following passage warrants 
something more than the duty of responsiveness I have defended: revolution. For example, 
see Fabre (2012) for a defence of the legitimacy of subsistence wars. 
464 World Bank, 2016. 
465 World Bank, 2016. 
466 WHO/FAO, 2014. 
467 UNHCR, 2016. 
468 UNHCR, 2017. 
469 Russell, 1987. 
 
Chapter 6: Need and the Demands of Justice 
 
197 
to do with them.”470 This indicates that some level of moral impermissibility attaches 
to failing to respond to the kind of existentially urgent need we are considering. 
The moral impermissibility involved is made clearer by reflection on the structure of 
the duty of responsiveness. Rather than a mandate to meet all basic needs, the strict 
component of the duty is one of acknowledgement. Recall that, whatever else is 
involved in responding to someone in need, we must first acknowledge their existence, 
which means that we must consider them in our practical deliberations.471 Often it will 
be appropriate that acknowledgement is explicitly expressed; this is particularly true 
of responses to need which will not result in reducing it. While the appropriateness of 
action to reduce need is situational, we must always at least respond with 
acknowledgement. To fail to acknowledge the existentially urgent need of our fellow 
human beings would be a fundamental failure of equal concern. Taken with our 
collective capacity to respond to need, we have sufficiently serious moral reason to, in 
principle, warrant coercive enforcement of a duty of responsiveness. 
Granting this, the next step is to question why someone who accepts that helping is 
morally required would in principle oppose state or institutional coercion.472 
Lichtenberg proposes two possible explanations: 
(a) However small the cost, and however serious the suffering, not helping is 
never as bad as harming. 
(b) Not helping does not rise to the level of wrongness or moral unacceptability 
that justifies state coercion.473 




470 Lichtenberg, 2013, p. 41. This is particularly true given Lichtenberg’s argument in 
“Negative duties, positive duties, and the ‘new harms’” that our most banal day-to-day 
activities, such as buying groceries, are implicated in complex causal chains through 
international global commerce which funds dictatorships, exacerbates climate change, and 
makes many lives go worse. Even by turning our backs on people in need, we are not 
thereby having nothing to do with them (2010). 
471 See Chapter 5 Section 3.4. 
472 Recall that although there could be many contextual features which would make such 
coercion inadvisable, morally impermissible, or even illegitimate in practice, these do not 
militate against in principle enforceability. 
473 Lichtenberg, 2013, p. 26. 
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Although some have sought to challenge (a) with counterexamples indicating that 
contribution to harm is often less important than the degree and urgency of need,474 I 
will not attempt such a challenge here. Instead, note that even if (a) is true, (b) does 
not necessarily follow, and (b) is what is necessary to maintain the principled 
opposition to coercing people to aid others. Lichtenberg advises that libertarians offer 
no argument for (b), simply taking it as a kind of existential claim that you cannot be 
held responsible for making people better off. 
Narveson’s libertarian brand of contractarianism does not provide much illumination. 
He claims that for any duty to be accepted as such, it must be in the rational interest of 
each to accept it. In his view, “prospects for a universal agreement to help others when 
they need help, as an enforceable duty, are poor.”475 Presumably this is based on 
concerns about self-interest and lack of reciprocity on the part of those who would be 
required to help, although Narveson does not elaborate. However, it is still not clear 
that these provide in-principle challenges to state coercion, even within contractarian 
reasoning. Resources could, in principle, be sufficiently evenly distributed to do away 
with reciprocity concerns in some circumstances. Alternatively, vulnerability or risk 
could be sufficiently randomised, or evenly distributed, to give those contracting 
reason to accept coercive measures, even without any veils of ignorance. 
More importantly, concerns about a lack of substantive reciprocity at the international 
level are unlikely to provide sufficiently serious moral reason to outweigh the moral 
seriousness of urgent need altogether. For them to do so, it would have to be the case 
that need is never of sufficient moral seriousness to outweigh considerations of 
reciprocity, even in cases where effective responsiveness is straightforward and of low 
cost. To maintain this would display insufficient respect for the moral status of those 
in need.476 Even if we take it that self-interest is decisively in favour of not 




474 For example: Overland, 2005. 
475 Narveson, 2003, p. 423. 
476 Zofia Stemplowska offers a similar argument in defence of a ‘duty to take up the slack’ in 
the face of dire need, suggesting that the unfairness or inequality resulting from slack-taking 
 
Chapter 6: Need and the Demands of Justice 
 
199 
contributing,477 this is better understood in terms of a challenge of feasibility or 
demandingness, rather than as a moral challenge. 
Norman offers a unique defence of the moral importance of reciprocity, and of the idea 
that any need-based claims must presuppose a prior norm of reciprocity. He argues 
that reciprocity is an adaptive species norm, and that an evolutionary account of 
reciprocity is indicated by its pervasiveness in animal behaviour: “in contrast to a 
community of cheaters and suckers, a community of reciprocators will survive.”478 
The suggestion is that the existence of ‘cheaters’ threatens to overwhelm species or 
groups who will be taken advantage of if they are too altruistic. Although the moral 
argument here is somewhat tangled up in the observation of reciprocity as a common 
species norm, two remarks should suffice as a response. First, we are in no danger of 
losing reciprocity norms as a species. Reciprocal relations are a ubiquitous feature of 
human life, and responding to the basic need of fellow humans does not credibly 
threaten to upend our moral and social relations such that reciprocity would lose its 
place, or its hold on our moral psychology. Second, I have defended a duty of 
responsiveness that is sensitive to cost, and the cost of responsiveness on this view 
does not threaten to overwhelm us. 
I can imagine one remaining reason to accept (b), which focuses on the proper domain 
of the state. The challenge might be something like: ‘Helping people in need is all well 
and good, but it isn’t the state’s business.’ The challenge might possibly include a 
special caveat that helping non-citizens in need is even less within the state’s domain. 
In this case, coercion is inappropriate because any state activity in this realm is 
inappropriate. I fear that sufficiently responding to such a challenge would require 
providing a theory of the state and its proper domain. However, I agree with Kassner 




is never morally serious enough to outweigh “the gravity of the need faced by the victims” 
(2016, p. 597). 
477 It is not at all clear that self-interest will be in favour of not contributing to collective 
action on sources of human need such as climate change. Further, the risk of persistent, 
desperate need leading to political upheaval, conflict, and wars motivated by scarcity of 
basic goods such as water, is difficult to accurately factor in such calculations. 
478 Norman, 2001, p. 127. 
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in thinking it plausible that at least one reason states are justified in existing at all is 
their ability to help us coordinate and secure social goals that would otherwise be 
unachievable.479 If international aid, for example, was a high priority for most of a 
state’s people, I cannot see how this challenge would withstand scrutiny. 
Without sufficient reason to accept (b), we relapse to the arguments I provided in the 
previous section for thinking that coordination and collective action are the most 
appropriate and efficacious means of tackling serious human need at a global level. 
We have collective duties grounded in our collective capacity to respond to need, and 
the moral seriousness of the extent of human need, and it is the coordinating power of 
collectives and institutions which makes them an appropriate sphere for enforcement: 
“the obligations we bear provide our social and political institutions with the moral 
justification necessary to coerce us into supporting action that will fulfil the moral 
burdens we share.”480 Further, enforcement provides assurance of compliance that 
makes contribution less psychologically burdensome, and offers less risk of relative 
disadvantage as a result of contribution.481 
3.2 An unlikely ally 
Thus far, I have defended what might be seen as cosmopolitan duties: enforceable 
duties of responsiveness to need as a demonstration of appropriate respect for the value 
of our fellow human beings. However, I now identify a proponent of a constructivist 
view of justice who also defends the existence of some minimal, enforceable, 
humanitarian duties to non-compatriots. The existence of such an ally does not provide 
overriding reasons for accepting the account I have proposed; however, it may serve 
to make the duties I defend seem less insular.482 




479 Kassner, 2009. 
480 Kassner, 2009, p. 191. 
481 Nagel, 1975. 
482 Kassner suggests that Saladin Meckled-Garcia should also be seen as an ally from the 
constructivist camp. However, he indicates only a very brief line in Meckled-Garcia’s 2008 
“On the very idea of cosmopolitan justice” to support this, and even that line seems too 
begrudging to be elaborated into support for my account: “Of course, I do not deny that there 
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On a constructivist or “political conception of justice,”483 demands of justice only exist 
within an institutional context that is unique to sovereign states, whose members are 
“fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political 
institutions.”484 This necessarily precludes any duties of justice to non-compatriots as 
international institutional arrangements currently stand, as it is argued that insufficient 
international coercive mechanisms exist for anything like the relation of co-
membership, necessary to justice on this view, to obtain. Essentially, we do not stand 
in the proper relation to non-compatriots to have transnational duties of justice.  
Given this, it might seem surprising to find a proponent of a political conception 
defending enforceable humanitarian duties. However, Nagel is emphatically not 
committed to the view of justice as moral enforceability I defended in Chapter 3. This 
means that transnational, and even global, duties to aid the worst off are still potentially 
enforceable; they simply cannot be termed duties of justice. 
Nagel defends a “moral minimum” that “governs our relations with everyone in the 
world”:485 
“The normative force of the most basic human rights against violence, 
enslavement, and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue 
from immediate danger, depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other 
people’s shoes. The interests protected by such moral requirements are so 
fundamental, and the burdens they impose, considered statistically, so much 
slighter, that a criterion of universalizability of the Kantian type clearly 
supports them. […] It does not require us to make their ends our own, but it 
does require us to pursue our ends within boundaries that leave them free to 
pursue theirs, and to relieve them from extreme threats and obstacles to such 
freedom if we can do so without serious sacrifice of our own ends.”486 




are moral duties applying across domains and agents, not just within them, to observe and 
sometimes act to protect fundamental rights for example” (p. 246). 
483 Nagel, 2005, p. 132. 
484 Nagel, 2005, p. 128. 
485 Nagel, 2005, p. 131. 
486 Nagel, 2005, p. 131. 
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Here the justification for the moral enforceability of need-based duties is grounded in 
the moral seriousness of need, and our capacity to help without serious sacrifice, much 
like the argument I offered in the previous section. 
Nagel goes on to argue that even such basic duties are not achievable without some 
level of institutional coordination, although he requires that these institutions stop 
short of sovereignty. Further, he recommends that international institutions be 
supported to enforce such duties by governments, which may also act as sources of 
funding. 
As we have seen, although Nagel does not characterise the basic humanitarian duties 
he defends as duties of justice, he does defend the moral enforceability of such duties. 
3.3 Envisioning enforceability 
This section offers some possible models of state enforcement of duties of 
responsiveness to need. In doing so, my purpose is not to advocate for any particular 
model, but rather to identify a range of options to render the enforcement of 
responsiveness somewhat more tangible. A wide spectrum of collective and 
institutional action is potentially legitimate, in principle, but democratic processes and 
political context will be decisive as to whether any particular model is practically 
feasible, or all-things-considered justified. 
Some current practices could be seen as forms of state enforcement relevant to our 
duties of responsiveness. The most obvious example that comes to mind is state 
welfare programmes. However, these are also potentially justified by the cooperative 
institutional relations which constructivists characterise as limited to the nation state, 
and so not of direct use here. Perhaps a more illustrative model is that offered by Nagel, 
on which international institutions coordinate with governments to enforce what he 
calls the duty of rescue. He cites examples such as the World Bank and the 
International Criminal Court. On this model, sovereign states supply funding through 
non-discretionary taxation of citizens and associated enforcement procedures, and the 
relevant international institution coordinates planning and activities as indicated by the 
institution’s goals. This model might be expanded to feature enforceable financial or 
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political sanctions for those member states who abdicate their agreed 
responsibilities.487 
Alternatively, some stronger, global-level institution might be established, with the 
responsibility of scheduling and enforcing specific forms of contribution at the state 
level.488 This is perhaps easiest to imagine in the case of a potential institution tackling 
climate change, where a range of creative solutions for the distribution of 
responsibilities are reasonably well-developed.489 For example, Daniel Farber 
proposes the establishment of an international compensation commission for countries 
that have incurred climate adaptation expenses.490 He suggests that compensation 
might come from an international fund, or from an emissions credits trading scheme. 
Instead, the enforcement of duties of responsiveness might be pursued outside the 
context of states, by forming a global-level agreement between individuals or sub-state 
collectives. In this case, enforcement could not take a legal form (at least on current 
models of state sovereignty), but would rather be a matter of more informal collective 
norms, or of voluntary commitment to be liable to sanction when one abdicates one’s 
responsibilities. Such collectives might either seek to directly respond to and mitigate 
need, or to indirectly contribute to that goal by pursuing political activism with a view 
to establishing legally enforceable institutions of the kinds already indicated. 
What might state enforcement mechanisms involve for individuals living in these 
states? The most obvious mechanism for the affluent is taxation in support of direct 
responses to need, institutional structures which facilitate such responses, and research 
and development into effective responses. Practical challenges will, in many cases, 




487 The structure of the argument, as I have defended it, has not justified the international 
enforcement of sanctions between sovereign states, outside the context of voluntary 
agreements of the sort I describe here. Such enforcement would likely require justification of 
a kind that is inherently connected to the legitimate functions of states, and my defence of 
the moral normativity of need does not reach this far. 
488 Gilabert, 2016, p. 518. 
489 For example, carbon tax or emissions trading schemes have been implemented in a range 
of states and regions (SBS News, 2016). 
490 2007, p. 1607-1608. 
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preclude more direct contributions to reduce need. However, where there is unmet 
need in the near proximity, another potential mechanism might involve organising 
mandatory community service schemes.491 
As I have indicated, collective action movements will be necessary to the 
establishment of any international or state level adoption of coercive enforcement 
systems. Transnational solidarity movements offer one example of such collective 
action, and a human right to basic subsistence has been proposed as a plausible core 
for cross-cultural dialogue and advocacy to that end.492 In the absence of institutional 
actors capable of enforcing responsiveness to need, one way of fulfilling the duty of 
responsiveness is to take part in such movements aimed at change. Such indirect action 
aims to secure the necessary conditions for comprehensive responsiveness, and is thus 
a valuable contribution. 
4. Objections 
I will now address some of the foremost challenges facing the view of collective duties 
of justice to respond to need that I have presented. I first address demandingness 
concerns, and then the related worry that the moral psychology of responsiveness to 
need cannot extend to distant fellow humans. Next is what turns out to be another 
species of demandingness concern, wherein duties to coordinate are too burdensome 
when appropriate institutions do not yet exist. Finally, I consider whether my account 
risks multiplying duties (or collectives, or institutions,) in a way that unnecessarily 
clutters or confuses the moral landscape. 




491 For example, this may be an appropriate contribution for communities near borders where 
refugees are known to attempt dangerous border crossings, or where asylum seekers are 
temporarily housed. It may also be an effective response to the basic need for social 
inclusion that I defended in Chapter 1, Section 3.3. We might respond to this need by 
organising mandatory community service schemes at a local level, focusing on outreach for 
marginalised and vulnerable people. See: Brownlee, 2016, p. 67. 
492 Flynn, 2009. 
 




All moral accounts which defend duties to fellow human beings, as such, on the basis 
of need or suffering must face the challenge that such responsibilities are too 
demanding.493 Peter Singer’s landmark “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”494 has been 
critiqued extensively for demanding too much of people with their own lives to lead, 
as his strong individual utilitarian principle requires sacrifice “reducing ourselves to 
the level of marginal utility,”495 at which point we are no longer even able to help. One 
response to such charges is to simply accept the demandingness claim. On this line of 
thought, the mere fact that a moral principle is demanding and requires extreme life 
changes does not mean that it is wrong. We may fail to live up to what morality 
demands of us, and we will be morally responsible for such failure. Although Singer 
takes this approach in responding to demandingness concerns,496 I will not. Not only 
would this significantly reduce plausibility for those who take morality to set more 
achievable expectations for us, but I think there are more satisfying ways of dealing 
with the challenge.497 
The account I have proposed defends coordination as a means of making responding 
to need more achievable and efficient, with the possibility of enforcement which would 
provide assurance of compliance, and a measure of security for the most vulnerable. 
However, I have only defended in principle moral enforceability; in practice we will 
have countervailing reasons. Although the duty I have defended is not discretionary, 
it is defeasible, and enforcement will not always be warranted.498 For this reason, I 




493 For example: Meckled-Garcia, 2013; Wellman, 2005; Miller, 1999. 
494 Singer, 1972. 
495 Singer, 1972, p. 241. 
496 Singer, 2016. This response to the demandingness objection has found favour with other 
consequentialists: Sobel, 2007; Goodin, 2009. 
497 Singer’s utilitarian approach means that although he considers it to be true that the 
principle is extremely demanding, it may be best to argue for the truly defensible position 
only in academic books and journals (2016). If presenting some more palatable, less 
demanding alternative is more likely to generate action, we should instead publicise that 
version of the principle. 
498 Kassner, 2009. 
 
Chapter 6: Need and the Demands of Justice 
 
206 
cannot rely exclusively on the psychological benefits of coercive enforcement to 
dismantle this challenge. 
Instead, I suggest that coordination supplies us with a way to address this concern. 
There is a straightforward sense in which coordination allows for division of labour, 
strategic planning and prioritising, and assurance that at least all those who you are 
cooperating with are ‘doing their part too,’ similarly constrained by the expectations 
of the collective. This is a line of reasoning with a long history in political thought, 
and for my purposes, it amounts to the claim that ‘many hands make light work.’ 
Further, Lichtenberg stresses that “demandingness is not a fixed quantity,”499 and that 
by changing the conditions under which people act, we can make it easier and more 
automatic for them to make choices which would otherwise be seen as high-cost or 
too morally demanding. If, for example, our duties will require reductions in individual 
consumption levels, this will be much less psychologically taxing if we see that others 
have made similar reductions.500 She derives this line of thought from the situationist 
social psychological experiments501 of the last several decades, and we could equally 
learn from nudge theory,502 which is particularly instructive for directed behavioural 
intervention.  
For example, Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius conducted a recent study testing 
the relative efficacy of two signs encouraging energy conservation to guests in a hotel. 
The signs encouraged reusing towels, and each room had one of the two, reading: 
“Help Save the Environment 
You can show respect for nature and help save the environment during your 
stay.” 




499 Lichtenberg, 2013, p. 8. 
500 She offers a variety of reasons for this effect: “networking and infrastructure effects; 
adaptation and habituation; salience and availability; status, signalling, and self-respect” 
(2013, p. 144). See: Lichtenberg, 2013, p. 122-149. 
501 For a philosophical review of situationist literature and its potential to bolster moral 
progress, see: Sarkissian, 2010. 
502 See, for example: Thaler & Sunstein, 2008. 
 




“Join Your Fellow Citizens in Helping to Save the Environment 
Almost 75% of guests who are asked to participate in our new resource 
savings program do help by using their towels more than once…”503 
35.1% of guests in rooms with the first sign reused their towels, versus 44.1% of those 
in rooms with the second sign, indicating that the simple belief that others were reusing 
their towels was enough to encourage higher participation rates. A second experiment 
demonstrated an even stronger effect when the sign indicated 75% of guest who had 
stayed in the same room had participated. Note that this option was made more choice-
worthy without coercive sanctions. 
These results have been replicated in other contexts, with similar effects in voting 
behaviour504 and healthy eating behaviours.505 Directed intervention on the basis of 
such studies could take a variety of forms, but they certainly give us reason to think 
that coordination can lessen psychological burdens associated with contribution. 
Finally, I have indicated that there are limits on what any one person can be expected 
to contribute, and that those limits do not require us to contribute unless we can do so 
‘at less than significant cost’ to ourselves. This raises the question of how we should 
understand costs and their moral significance.506 Many defenders of stringent duties to 
the global poor have disagreed about how best to define and defend the principled 
limits of contribution. On the view I propose, we will need to make sacrifices; 
opportunity costs for the time, effort, and resources we dedicate to responding to need 
will mean that we cannot ignore even small sacrifices. But where do we draw the line? 
Although at one extreme it clearly exceeds the ‘significant cost’ qualification to 
require that we give up everything that gives my life meaning in order to respond to 




503 2008, p. 473-474. 
504 Gerber and Rogers found that emphasizing high estimated turnouts for upcoming votes 
was more effective in motivating voters than warning that many citizens fail to vote (2009). 
The effect was particularly strong for only occasional voters. 
505 Croker et al., 2009. 
506 Thanks to Judith Lichtenberg for pushing me to comment on this ongoing debate. 
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need, should I give up a hobby if it is particularly costly, time-consuming, or resource 
intensive? I will not settle the question of how costs and their moral significance are 
best defined here, but I will offer one possible way of understanding ‘significant cost.’ 
Cripps suggests that costs exceed the ‘significance’ limit when they interfere with the 
exercise of a central human functioning interest or functioning, even if that 
interference is temporary.507 Returning to the example, if my hobby is one among 
many options for me to pursue meaningful recreation, the cost of pursuing an 
alternative hobby is not significant; if there are no such alternative options, sacrificing 
the hobby would be significant. This view is, for example, more demanding than Liam 
Murphy’s requirement that we only contribute as much as we would have to if 
everyone able to contribute was also doing their part.508 However, I suggest that 
coordination and publicizing collective contributions could make otherwise 
burdensome duties considerably more psychologically comfortable. 
4.2 Moral psychology and distance 
A related concern is that the greater the psychological distance between people, the 
less willing they will be to take action to alleviate suffering or engage in prosocial 
behaviour.509 This is a well-established claim in social psychology,510 and it appears 
to extend to a variety of kinds of distance, including physical distance511 and in-
group/out-group membership.512 As I defend duties to fellow human beings in need as 
such, arguably we could not get much more psychologically distant than that. 
This challenge amounts to a more particular version of the demandingness claim, in 
that the fundamental concern is that it will be too demanding to expect people to 
contribute to collective action to benefit people who are so psychologically distant 




507 Cripps, 2013, p. 13-14. See Chapter 2 Section 3.1 for a list of the ten core capabilities 
proposed by Nussbaum which might offer candidates here. 
508 Murphy, 1993. 
509 For example, see: Wenar, 2003. 
510 Henderson, Szu-chi, & Chiu-chi, 2012. 
511 Levine & Thompson, 2004. 
512 Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008. 
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from themselves. One way of responding to this challenge is to find ways to humanise 
those who are psychologically distant from us.513 
For example, it is well-established that charitable appeals that feature identifiable 
people tend to be more successful that those providing statistical information about the 
scale of the problem.514 One study found that providing both an identifiable beneficiary 
and statistical information was less successful than simply focusing on the identifiable 
person.515 
This phenomenon has been observed outside the laboratory too. Reports of the refugee 
crisis offering statistics regularly failed to resonate, but when the photograph of Alan 
Kurdi, a drowned toddler whose body was washed ashore, circulated in the popular 
news media, people across Europe became more sympathetic to child refugees. What 
is more, many took action, welcoming people into their homes, donating food, and 
volunteering in Calais camps.516 Among other things, this gives us reason to think that 
psychological distance is not a fixed quantity either. We are sensitive to the way the 
suffering of others is presented to us, and particular, humanising portrayals can move 
us to take action even when horrifying statistics cannot. 
An alternative response to this challenge is to accept that psychological distance will 
be difficult to overcome in a sustained way. Even when we keenly experience the 
normative pull of particular cases such as Alan Kurdi, this pull is liable to fade from 
our minds over time, and will not be enough to sustain ongoing collective action. If 
this pull is enough to gain attention, we might instead turn that attention into ongoing 
action by shaping how easy it is to choose to continue our involvement. One way of 




513 I do not claim that humanising people allows us to entirely dispense with the problem of 
psychological distance, as the tangibility of physically confronting need in the flesh may 
always be more gripping than even the most skilful narrative. However, skilful narrative can 
break down barriers such that we are motivated to respond, and that is enough for this 
purpose. On the role of narrative in behaviour change, see: Kim et al., 2012; Niederdeppe, 
Shapiro, & Porticella, 2011. 
514 Small & Loewenstein, 2003. 
515 Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007. 
516 Merriman, 2016. 
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doing this is to build a sense that others are contributing too. As we have seen, this can 
be achieved without coercive sanctions, by making the contributions of others nearby, 
who share characteristics with us, more visible.517 This may bolster the sense that 
contribution is the norm or the default, and allow us to tap into the powerful cognitive 
bias that people have towards choosing the default option when it is available.518 
However, coercive sanction through institutional enforcement offers a more 
widespread and long-term method of behaviour change. This is an insight into human 
behaviour which is common in moral and political thought, and is also supported by 
social psychological research into cooperation and sanctions. In public-goods 
experiments involving a series of rounds of contribution, cooperation tends to decrease 
over time unless punishment mechanisms are introduced, allowing fellow participants 
to punish non-contribution.519 Indeed, introduction of sanctioning systems tends to 
transform the least trusting participants into strong co-operators.520 Further, if coercive 
sanctions521 were introduced, we would not have to rely on people keeping the pull of 
those in need foremost in our minds. Such enforcement builds confidence in 
compliance, and it provides a concrete sense that others are contributing too.522 
4.3 Non-existence of necessary coordinative collectives 
The previous two objections present a challenge for any account that defends non-
discretionary duties to those in need, on the basis of their humanity alone. I now 
consider an objection that is a particular problem for views offering a collectivised or 




517 Lichtenberg, 2004. 
518 Recent neuroscience indicates that simply choosing the default may be psychologically 
rewarding in itself, aside from the outcome of the choice. See: Yu et al., 2010. 
519 Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Ostrom, 2000. 
520 Ostrom, 2000, p. 141. 
521 Although I have been primarily concerned with legal and institutional forms of coercive 
sanction, social norms also play a connected and important role in behaviour regulation and 
change. 
522 It will be important that the pull of need is not lost entirely, such that democratic 
processes and institutional change deprioritise responsiveness. We are not in danger of 
running out of human need any time soon, so maintaining its salience will rely on effective 
communication of ongoing need, perhaps particularly when significant political choice 
situations arise. 
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institutional picture of those duties, like my own account. Meckled-Garcia523 charges 
that we currently do not have sufficient international institutions to enable coordination 
on a level necessary to enforceably distribute benefits and burdens. Such institutions 
only exist at the level of sovereign states, and in this context, coordinating to secure 
something like subsistence at the international level is implausible: 
“In the absence of shared institutions this fairness function would have to be 
played by a rule that, if followed by individuals and separate states, will 
coordinate actions to successfully secure subsistence for the needy whilst 
taking those fairness factors into account. That such a rule could be developed 
which even takes into account changing circumstances is not plausible.”524 
Meckled-Garcia is focused on the plausibility of finding ‘a rule’ as the principled basis 
for coordination outside the existence of sufficient coordinative institutions, but there 
is no need to focus on this particular point as it is not clear to me that states themselves, 
which he takes to perform the role he describes, do so on the basis of a singular, 
unifying rule. 
Rather, the challenge is twofold. One, in the absence of sufficient international 
institutions to coordinate our duties of responsiveness, it is unrealistic to think that we 
could ever discharge such duties, and such institutions do not exist. Two, it is 
implausible to think that the necessary institutions could ever come to exist. 
To the extent that the first concern is true, this provides the impetus for such 
institutions to be created. Indeed, creating necessary coordinative structures should 
take first priority. Those who contribute to this process are ‘doing their part,’ despite 
it having only an indirect effect on human need. 
It is not clear to me why we should think that the second concern is true. As we have 
seen, even a fellow proponent of the political conception of justice judges that some 




523 2013.  
524 Meckled-Garcia, 2013, p. 79. The language Meckled-Garcia uses, often referring to 
distributing “benefits and burdens” (p. 79), suggests to me that he has in mind more 
extensive duties than those I have defended here; indeed, perhaps duties extending to an 
international distributive justice scheme. 
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international institutions already sufficiently coordinate with states to be seen as 
cooperating to collectively enforce institutional norms.525 We must also bear in mind 
that the level of coordination proposed is not so extensive as that involved in enforcing 
the significantly more extensive duties of justice which Meckled-Garcia considers to 
obtain at the level of the state. Admittedly, establishing such institutions would be 
challenging, requiring time, resources, and expertise. If Meckled-Garcia is right that 
such institutions would be unprecedented, we would likely face a steep learning curve. 
However, none of these challenges give us reason to think the task impossible. Rather, 
if we are taking the level of human need we face seriously, we should see this as an 
opportunity to get problem-solving. 
There is at least one promising avenue from which to start problem-solving. 
Proponents of an institutional view of our duties to respond to need could press for an 
interdisciplinary collaboration, similar to that fostered by proponents of the individual 
view of such duties in the form of effective altruism. Existing expertise could be 
brought together to: 
(a) Evaluate current institutions 
Investigate current activity, as well as potential, in coordinating 
international action to respond to need. 
(b) Investigate potential institutions 
Consider the most achievable, efficacious, and fairest ways of 
coordinating international action. 
(c) Determine pathways to change 
As understanding of (a) and (b) builds, investigate the practical actions 
necessary to establish sufficient institutional coordination. 
Potential collaboration could be sought from such fields as the social sciences with 
expertise in international institutions and law, development studies, social psychology, 
and moral and political theory.  




525 Nagel, 2005. 
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4.4 Multiplying duties 
The thrust of this final challenge is that having identified duties of responsiveness to 
need, I have in effect recommended that we add a duty to the already expansive list of 
duties that moral and political philosophers have argued for, thus adding unnecessary 
conceptual clutter or moral confusion. 
First, let me address the clutter. Although language, and even argumentation, shifts 
significantly between theorists and this tends to produce the appearance of multiplying 
theories and duties, I suspect that when viewed without the natural instinct toward 
territoriality and preference for our own turns of phrase, various theories and duties 
dovetail more than we might think. I am not defending anything like Derek Parfit’s 
ambitious unifying project.526 Rather, I argued in Chapter 2 that needs and capabilities 
are best seen as two sides of the same coin rather than rivals, and I gave some 
indication that other neighbouring concepts (such as rights) may be similar. I have 
focused on need due to its enduring and cross-cultural pre-theoretical appeal, and the 
fact that it is relatively under-theorised given its currency not just in philosophical 
argumentation but in news coverage, charitable appeals, and political practice. Further, 
even if needs and their neighbours dovetail, that does not mean we would tell the same 
stories if asked both ‘why is need so compelling?’ and ‘why are human rights so 
compelling?’. 
Second, the moral confusion. In practice, securing any kind of responsiveness to need 
will necessarily involve, for example, addressing climate change. The overwhelming 
weight of empirical evidence tells us that it will be a challenge for us all,527 although 
it will disproportionately affect the global worst-off.528 Climate change already 
threatens water and food security, with ecological disasters leaving vulnerable 




526 See: Parfit, 2011. 
527 “Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world – access 
to water, food production, health, and use of land and the environment” (Stern, 2006, p. vi). 
528 “The impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed – the poorest countries and 
people will suffer earliest and most” (Stern, 2006, p. vii). 
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malnourished people destitute.529 Although this indicates potential dovetailing 
between need and climate justice considerations, as an example, perhaps it reanimates 
the challenge of demandingness? Cripps judges that at least one reason that young 
people have for taking on collective climate change responsibilities is based in self-
interest. Aside from any concerns for distant people, we are all vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change, and self-interest is not quite so sensitive to demandingness 
concerns. 
Finally, I would add that I am not convinced by arguments which presume the moral 
landscape to be a simplistic one. Certainly, there is no sense in adding useless 
complication; however, the mere fact of complication should not be taken to 
necessarily indicate that a mistake has been made. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that we should take a collective view of our duty to 
respond to need, and that such a collective duty is in principle morally enforceable, 
and so should be seen as a matter of justice. I began by suggesting that coordination 
and collective action render a duty of responsiveness to need less demanding, and more 
feasible. As such, our collective capacity to respond to need should be seen as 
grounding a collective duty of responsiveness. I then offered various reasons for 
thinking of this duty as morally enforceable, in principle, and thus a matter of justice. 
Finally, I addressed a range of possible objections to my proposal. 
Demonstrating that our need-based obligations are duties of justice, and are in principle 
legitimately enforceable, gives them clout. Further, it means forms of collective action 
that rely on coercive force for their feasibility are available to us in addressing need, 
and they may be all-things-considered justified in practice. That is good news, as the 
extent of human need, and the difficulty and complexity of addressing it, present 
daunting challenges. Many sources of human need, such as climate change, are at their 
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heart collective; therefore, it should not be surprising that addressing them will 
necessarily involve collective action. In the absence of institutional structures for the 
distribution of responsibilities responding to need, coordination and collective action 
to bring about such distribution is called for. Thankfully, we have a wealth of expertise 
in relevant fields which, if mobilised into a cohesive programme of research, might 
yield concrete policy recommendations that allow us to problem solve and respond to 
need effectively.    
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Being responsive to need is not a new idea. Indeed, it is perhaps among the most 
characteristic practices of the moral agent. However, understanding our duties to 
others in terms of responsiveness (rather than meeting or satisfying) is, I have argued, 
a step forward in how we conceive of our need-based duties. In the foregoing chapters, 
I have attempted to develop an account of the normativity of need on which the morally 
relevant capacities of our fellow human beings, and our shared vulnerability, ground 
duties of responsiveness which are stringent and, in principle, enforceable. I will now 
recapitulate the key points of the thesis, before revisiting the motivation for the thesis, 
to consider the state of the project as it currently stands. I then suggest areas for future 
research, including the extension or application of the account into the domain of non-
human needs and nearby fields such as bioethics, and reflect on its relevance and action 
guidance for current global challenges. 
1. A Brief Recapitulation 
I began by preparing the ground for the inquiry, offering a familiar analysis of need as 
a three-part relation (‘X needs Y in order that Z’). After surveying prominent accounts 
of the distinction between needs and wants, I suggested that morally important needs 
are those which all people have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua human 
beings (‘non-arbitrary needs’). On the most sympathetic understanding of some 
existing accounts, this was not new; however, needs talk has been charged with being 
confused,530 and linguistic precision is helpful in assuaging this concern. I then 
distinguished an existentially urgent subset of non-arbitrary needs as ‘basic needs,’ 
employing Shue’s understanding of the term ‘basic.’ 
I then considered the relation between needs and their nearby conceptual neighbours, 
with a particular focus on capabilities. The capabilities approach of Nussbaum was 
contrasted with the needs theory of Doyal and Gough, and I argued that a 









complementary reading offered the most complete picture of human well-being and 
entitlements. However, Sen’s early writings gave us reason to see needs and 
capabilities as two sides of the same coin: neither approach is necessarily dependent 
on the other, but each offers a valuable and distinct focus. I then claimed that a similar 
picture arises when we consider the relation between needs and rights. Although needs 
are not irreducible, they offer a valuable lens or vantage-point which is more useful 
and insightful for some tasks than others, much like neighbouring concepts. Needs 
play an important role in moral and political theory. 
A ‘moral enforceability’ account of duties of justice was defended, where duties of 
justice are those which are, in principle, morally enforceable by third-parties. This 
distinguished my account from the classical view on which need-based duties are best 
seen in terms of beneficence or humanitarianism. The moral enforceability account 
does not require that all duties of justice are justifiably enforceable in practice, nor 
that duties of justice are only the concern of institutions. Rather, duties of justice are 
the kind of thing that we might be justified in enforcing coercively, in principle. 
Having developed an account of needs and of duties of justice, I then turned to moral 
normativity. Existing views on the normativity of need were entertained, and each was 
judged unsatisfying. However, several offered valuable insights on the importance of 
suffering, vulnerability, and public acknowledgement for the view which I ultimately 
developed. I proposed that we see the morally relevant capacities of the being in need 
as giving them moral status such that their needing is morally significant. Further, the 
kind of vulnerable being each of us is requires that we are called to answer this need 
with responsiveness. I pointed to some differences between responsiveness and 
meeting need, and highlighted the role of acknowledgement and the skilful dimension 
to determining how to respond. 
Finally, I posited that we have duties of responsiveness to need which are a matter of 
justice, as they are the sort of duties that are, in principle, morally enforceable. I 
developed a collective view of these duties, grounded in the capacity of the global 
well-off to contribute. I suggested that we look to moral and social psychological 





rigorous research on best practice are imperative to appropriate responsiveness when 
faced with global threats to the necessary conditions for human existence. 
2. Motivations Revisited 
As I suggested in the introduction, the kind of moral claims that needs makes of us, 
and their relative strength, matters. If responding to need were discretionary, and not 
properly subject to institutional enforcement, we would be limited in the range of 
policy interventions we could employ to address need. However, I have argued that 
our need-based obligations are duties of justice, and amenable to enforcement. 
Determining that they are amenable to enforcement, in principle, is the first step to 
giving such obligations teeth. 
Further, the account of the moral normativity of need I have developed is a 
contribution to moral and political theory which defends strict, enforceable duties to 
the global poor. The need-based argument is best seen as complementary to harm or 
exploitation-based views, as they need not be mutually exclusive. For those sceptical 
of such rivals, it offers a compelling alternative. For those convinced by such rivals, it 
offers an additional way of understanding and justifying enforceable duties. 
An additional motivation for the project was to address the lack of rigorous 
investigation of the moral normativity of need. Previous contributions did not 
sufficiently engage with or challenge the views of other contenders. Further, they often 
relied on assumptions which rendered them incompatible with many rival prevalent 
moral theories: for example, relying on the principle of utility to establish the 
normativity of need. I hope that the foregoing inquiry, which offers extensive 
engagement with rivals in Chapters 4 and 5, achieves this goal. 
The project has also developed a rigorous, defensible response to the question of why 
someone else being in need should matter to me: my fellow human beings have 





“I have seen no plausible argument that we owe something, as a matter of 
general duty, to those to whom we have done nothing wrong.”531 
“Those obligated to offer assistance on grounds of justice do not come ‘from 
the outside,’ but are members of the community.”532 
“I could look in their face and say, ‘You can’t come.’ I’ll look them in their 
face. […] I don’t think they should be moving into Greenwich, Connecticut. I 
don’t think they should be coming into the United States.”533 
Donald Trump, [in response to question whether he could look Syrian 
refugee children as young as 5 in the face and tell them about plans for 
refugee relocation] 
“A morality that holds need as a claim, holds emptiness – nonexistence – as 
its standard of value; it rewards an absence, a defect: weakness, inability, 
incompetence, suffering, disease, disaster, the lack, the flaw – the zero.”534 
I have argued that a morality that holds need as a claim offers a recognition of the kind 
of being that we all are – we are vulnerable beings, capable of tragic suffering, and 
also capable of flourishing when we are supported in securing the necessary conditions 
for doing so. There are those who are healthy, whose loved ones are also healthy, 
whose capacities were supported and developed in periods of particular dependency, 
whose passions, skills, or talents align with prevailing social values, who were born in 
countries that are comparatively well-off and secure, and who do not face first-hand 
threats to their security from violence, war, and climate disasters. For such people, it 
may be easier to dismiss defect, weakness, and inability as unusual, and undeserving. 
However, we all required at least the minimal care and essentials of survival in our 
gestation, infancy, and periods of ill-health to allow us to grow into reasoning, capable 
beings. Occurrent need may be shorter-lived in those who lead lives of relative 
privilege and advantage, but we are all needing beings. 
 




531 Narveson, 2003, p. 419. 
532 Valentini, 2015, p. 747 [emphasis original]. 
533 Campbell, 2016, paras. 9 & 12.  





3. Looking Forward 
In closing, I now turn to several ways that the theory of need and its normativity I have 
proposed might be expanded or applied, beyond the considerations that have been my 
focus. 
3.1 Non-human need 
I have focused exclusively on human need throughout the project; this is because 
human need has been the focus of all foregoing need-based theories, and I sought to 
respond to and develop such theory to make it as rigorous and defensible as possible. 
However, the theory of moral normativity I have defended, which takes the morally 
relevant capacities of the needing being to be the ground of normativity, could be 
developed beyond human need to those beings who also have morally relevant 
capacities. The most obvious extension is to non-human animals. Here we might 
expect that animals demonstrate a sliding scale of morally relevant capacities, with 
many giving sufficient indication of the capacity to suffer, fewer demonstrating the 
capacity to remember the past and plan for the future,535 and fewer still giving 
sufficient indication of the capacity for metacognition and self-reflection.536 
I suspect that caution is warranted due to epistemic challenges that we, as human 
beings, face when attempting to understand and interpret the interests of non-human 
animals. Objective human interests are sufficiently contestable that developing a fixed 
list of human needs for all humans, at all times, is unwise.537 Attempting such an 
endeavour for non-human animals would border on the ludicrous. However, 
developing an account of some of the most basic animal needs, based on objective 
interests we have good reason to be confident particular non-human animals have, 




535 Nicola Clayton and colleagues (2003) argue that food-catching birds show indications of 
episodic memory and future planning. This challenges the ‘mental time travel hypothesis’ 
that animals cannot recollect specific past events or plan for the future. 
536 For example, Gin Morgan and colleagues have asserted that rhesus macaque monkeys can 
make retrospective and prospective judgements (2014). 






offers a concrete way of factoring non-human animals into our moral deliberation. 
Such an account would have to offer a way of assigning relative priority when human 
and non-human animals’ needs conflict, and indeed when non-human animals’ needs 
conflict.538 However, the minimal requirement I defended for humans (i.e. that the 
being with morally relevant capacities’ need be at least factored into any relevant 
moral decision-making) might offer a start.539 
A similar, albeit currently only hypothetical, extension might be attempted in the field 
of bioethics to new kinds of being with morally relevant capacities. Much of the theory 
I have posited refers to the human condition, objective human interests, and 
responding to beings ‘like us.’ However, some bioethicists argue that enhancement 
technologies show enough promise that we must seriously consider the moral status 
that highly enhanced post-humans might have540 – for example, would an immortal 
human no longer be human? One way of approaching this question might incorporate 
questions of whether such beings share the same interests and needs of non-humans. 
In addition to post-humanism, artificial intelligence technologies may also present 
future challenges for determining the moral status of sentient machines, and 
developing an account of the basic interests and needs of machines might be a 
worthwhile entry-point to offering such beings moral consideration. 
3.2 Need for perfectionists 
After identifying the range of morally important needs as those which are non-
arbitrary, that is those which we have in virtue of what is good for each of us qua 
human beings, I have largely focused on the subset of these which are most 
existentially urgent: our basic needs. This is because I have been interested in 
understanding the relationship between need and justice, and addressing pressing 
global challenges of dire need. However, need theory does not have to be limited to 
basic needs theory; indeed, the framework I have offered could be developed to 




538 Cripps, 2010. 
539 The capabilities approach has been extended in this way. For example: Nussbaum, 2006. 





provide either a thorough fleshing out of the necessary conditions for human 
flourishing, or for understanding the kinds of moral claims that such non-basic needs 
make on us.541 On the view I have defended, such needs do not ground duties of justice 
in themselves, but we might take instruction from care ethics or similar relational 
theories on which the moral importance of non-basic, flourishing needs might be 
activated by standing in a particular relationship to a fellow human being.  
3.3 Extending responsiveness 
I have defended a strict duty of responsiveness to need, rather than one of meeting 
need. We might use this duty of responsiveness not only for action guidance in 
decision-making, but also to critique and challenge current responses to global 
challenges of dire need. For example, a necessary component of appropriate 
responsiveness is acknowledgement: this means that we must consider the beings in 
need in our practical deliberations. In practice, it will often require that we explicitly 
express this acknowledgement, as a minimal form of respect. However, it is common 
in political practice to explicitly acknowledge only those whose need we have chosen 
to prioritise, leaving those who either never entered into consideration or were 
deprioritised out of the narrative. This may be politically expedient, but on the view I 
have defended it is also disrespectful, and should be subject to critique and analysis. 
We might look to the critique and analysis of real-life cases of political apologies 
offered in political theory as a nearby example, offering inspiration for proceeding 
with such critique.542 
Further, the account of responsiveness I have offered may also be of help in 
understanding other kinds of duties. I have focused here on need-based duties, but 
responsiveness might be reinterpreted in other settings, particularly those where a 
‘success’-based obligation (such as ‘meeting’) would be too strong or impractical, but 
where some response or acknowledgement is always called for as a matter of respect 




541 For example, along the lines of the Marxian “species being” (1959, p. 31) or Aristotelian 
flourishing (2005, book X). 





for, or accountability to, the being we must respond to. For example, although I have 
concentrated on need-in-itself, responsiveness might be called for when arbitrating 
between legitimate moral claims in the context of relationships which generate 
associative duties. 
I hope this section demonstrates that the theory of needs and need’s moral normativity 
I have developed could be extended or applied to moral and political contexts and 
challenges beyond human need. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Duties of responsiveness to need have real-life implications. A wide range of threats 
to the necessary conditions for human life, confront us. Many of these are uniquely 
collective challenges at heart – such as climate change, and the refugee crisis – and 
they are already resulting in existentially urgent need in the most vulnerable now. We 
have a duty to respond to such need that carries sufficient moral force to make it 
amenable to enforcement, in principle. Further, coordination and collective action 
represent our best chance of comprehensively addressing these threats. 
The seriousness of the challenges we face, and the extent to which we have treated our 
responsibilities to those in need as discretionary in the past, means that we cannot 
afford to simply treat this as business-as-usual. We have access to a wealth of 
knowledge in collective action, moral motivation, international development, and 
international institutions. By marshalling this expertise, we could develop an evidence 
base identifying the most effective and achievable actions necessary for each of us to 
do our part to respond to need. Moreover, if we find that enforcement is all-things-
considered justified, we will be able to give our duties of responsiveness teeth. 
Although the prospect of responding comprehensively to human need is daunting, we 
owe it to our fellow human beings to get problem-solving. 
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